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Facing Down a Wooden Dummy, and the Myth of “Perfect Practice”

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Mr Bean Wins the Wing Chun Dummy, courtesy Snickers and Youtube.

 

“Practice does not make perfect.  Only perfect practice makes perfect.”  – Vince Lombardi

 

The Bane of my Existence

 

I have spent a lot of time thinking about Vince Lombardi’s famous maxim on the value of practice.  I will readily admit to hating this quote.  It is exactly the sort of tough, yet ultimately unexamined (and perfectly circular) statement that reminds me of everything I despised about team sports while in school.  That probably explains my attraction to individually oriented martial arts.

 

Not that any of this matters when you are laying on your back staring up at your wooden dummy from an angel that Ip Man never intended.  Not that I blame the dummy.  I blame the carpeting.

 

Dummies and carpets, especially high pile or shag carpeting, do not mix.  To properly practice the mook yan jong you need to step with confidence as you shift and employ a variety of kicks.  You can technically do the set in bare feet.  I certainly have as I walk by, or find myself wanting to try out an idea out without getting geared up.  Yet the nature of the unpadded dummy limits how hard and realistically you can kick (especially if you have a square legged model).  Wing Chun, in contrast with arts like karate or judo, seems to have been designed with shoes in mind.

 

This is where carpeting becomes a problem.  Prior to taking up Wing Chun I never really thought that much about flooring.  And for the first four or five years of my training I simply did all of my daily practice at the school.  Still, having to rely on the school’s jong was never ideal.  During the advanced classes there were always more students than dummies, and I didn’t want to be a distraction to the students in the more junior classes which were held at other times.  Successful schools tend to be busy schools.

 

When I finally had the opportunity to buy a dummy I jumped at the chance.  I was sure that having my own jong would enable a level of daily practice that would vastly improve the quality of my Wing Chun.  And then I moved to a new place with (shudder) wall to wall carpeting.

 

The dummy came with me of course.  But so has the carpeting.  For some reason, each of the last three places I have lived have had very nice carpets throughout.  My wife loves them.  I am more mixed.  Don’t get me wrong.  They are great when you are getting out of bed on a cold winter morning, or throwing down the yoga mat to do your core work.  But dummies really work better on hardwood floors.  Polished concrete is even better.

 

With a little creativity you can work around the issue.  You can move in bare feet, but kicking is a problem.  The sneakers allow you to kick, but can become so grippy on the carpets that I am afraid of ripping something in my knees.  The coefficient of friction on socks are way too low to be considered safe.  In the end I settled on a pair of house slippers with rubber soles.  They offer enough protection to my feet that I can kick without worry, while providing enough grip to allow me to move around the dummy without fear of slipping (most of the time).

 

This arrangement is by no means perfect.  Mounted on a portable stand with horizontal bars (rather than the typical thin slats) my dummy feels more “dead” than “alive.”  It does not have that nice spring that more traditional Wing Chun practitioners crave.  Nor is it likely that I will be able to do anything about it until I can find a place to have it permanently mounted.  But I did come up with a way to hang my rice bags onto the dummy itself, making a more diverse training tool that is now a central part of my daily practice.

 

And I would like to think that the quality of this practice is now pretty good.  But it took a lot of terrible practice sessions to get to this point.  Contrary to the implications of the quote above, I do not think of those frustrating sessions as a waste of time.  As one of my teachers recently pointed out, we only waste time when we fail to practice at all.

 

Instruction at a TPLA Workshop held on April 30th, 2016. Source: The TPLA Facebook Group.

 

 

 

The Problem with Perfect Practice

 

Vince Lombardie is far from alone in his admiration of “perfect practice.”  While reading threads on a private lightsaber combat facebook group I noticed that the merits of a similar quote (this time delivered by an olympic fencing instructor) were being vigorously debated.  A couple of the students (one drawing on his own background as a firearms instructor) believed it was vastly better to have students who never practiced rather than those who practiced poorly.  As far as they were concerned, the first group was superior as they possessed “no bad habits” and would therefore be easier to teach.

 

I experienced a mixture of emotions as I read this thread.  Darth Nihilus, the instructor at the Central Lightsaber Academy (the location of my current ethnographic research) has a lot to say on the topic.  I recorded an instance in my field notes where, after watching the performance of one of his students, he shouted that it was not enough to just practice daily, you actually had to strive to practice perfectly.

 

Nihilus’ was a professional musician before becoming a full time martial arts instructor.  The approach to practice and personal study that you see in the musical world has certainly influenced how he approaches training within the martial arts.  As he went on discussing what our practice sessions should look like (a topic that he decided that the class needed some ersatz instruction on) he ended up doing a hilarious imitation of his high school keyboard teacher who would sagely appraise his performances and tell him, “if your practice is garbage, it doesn’t matter if you do it a thousand times, you are still getting garbage.”  Which makes perfect sense.

 

And yet, there are some difficult truths that haunt this entire conversation.  The most obvious would be that perfection is a moving target.  At least in the martial arts.  It is not a thing or a singular point.  It is more of an aspirational philosophy.  No one ever reaches perfection.  As one gains technical mastery in a single area, other horizons of possible improvement suddenly appear that you were not even aware of.

 

All of which brings me back to Wing Chun.  One of the best pieces of advice on teaching that I got from my Sifu was that when introducing new material to students I should demonstrate, explain, answer questions, and then step back and let them work on the problem themselves.  It is so easy to smother someone acquiring a new skill with well intentioned, but ultimately incomprehensible, advice.  Sometimes what students need is not more explanation, but a structured opportunity for practice.

 

As I have watched teachers that I admire, I noticed that they all encourage (and even demand) that their students practice.  But none of them are all that insistent that their students be “perfect” or practice perfectly.  Not that their students usually realize this.  Learning any new, sufficiently complex, embodied skill can (and often does) feel overwhelming.  Yet from where I am now, I can look back on them supervising the mastery of a complex task (say, the dummy form) and appreciate the way in which they would give their students one task to work on at a time rather than simply listing all 53 of the major mistakes that were made the last time the student did the form.  This is how progress is made, one correction at a time.  And that means that none of our practice is “perfect.”

 

Ip Ching, the younger son of Ip Man, discussing Chi Sao techniques with a teenage student at the VTAA headquarters in Hong Kong.

 

Practice as Research

 

The strangely shifting and fungible nature of perfection is not the only difficulty that such conversations pose.  The more we think about the topic the more questions arise about both the nature of the thing being practiced, as well as the act of practice itself.   Indeed, scholarly research into both areas may be helpful.

 

Readers interested in delving deeper into the question of what ‘practice’ is, as well as its relationship to the mastering of technique and the production of knowledge, might be well served by picking up a copy of Ban Spatz’s book What a Body Can Do (Routledge, 2015).  This book has become something of a hit in martial arts studies circles because it directly speaks to a number of questions that lay at the heart of the turn towards the exploration of “embodiment” and “practice as research” rather than historical or social modes of inquiry.

 

A more traditional discussion of “practice” might start by supposing the existence of a self-contained, coherent and unchanging body of technique called a style.  Techniques might be derived from conceptual first principals (the fastest point between any two points is a straight line) or inherited from a more traditional form of transmission (Ng Moy invented the art that would become Wing Chun after watching a snake fight a crane).  These bodies of techniques, and a conceptual understanding of how to use them, are then transmitted directly from one generation of teachers to the next generation of students through the process of diligent, dare I say perfect, practice.  Only in this way can a student’s fundamental dispositions be changed, and can the genetic purity of the next generation of the art be maintained.

 

Yet, as Spatz might point out, it is not clear that any teachers are actually up to the task of revealing the full depth of insight about a given technique that years of diligent practice can reveal.  Any martial artist can tell you that more goes into our punches, kicks, locks and throws than just gross motor movements.  There are a myriad of small adjustments that can alter the nature of a technique, and another myriad of insights that might be gained (or not) as to when and how to employ them.  Nor do students approach the learning process as a blank slate, or an empty vessel ready to be filled with some sort of genetic transmission of pure knowledge.

 

Each of us brings our own assortment of bodily predispositions to the learning process.  Some of these are physical, others are cultural.  My wife’s approach to, and understanding of, Wing Chun will never be the same as mine.  I will never experience a punch or laup the same way that she does.  How could it be otherwise?

 

Yet one of the biggest determinants of how easy or difficult it will be to master a technique is what prior bodily dispositions you already have.  Or to put it slightly differently, there is no such thing as a student that comes to a problem with no “bad habits.”  We all have many idiosyncratic bodily dispositions.  Some of them will push our development in one direction, while others might give us a shove in the other.

 

There is sometimes a suggestion that when Ip Man (or any other kung fu instructor of his generation) tailored his teaching to a given individual’s background or nature he was only passing on the “technique” and not the “true system” of Wing Chun which would be reserved for a handful of close disciples.  Yet by placing the student at the center of the learning process, and allowing Wing Chun to be conceptually rather than technically driven, there were aspects of his pedagogy that can be thought of as ahead of their time.

 

Rather than seeing “techniques” as simply closed bodies of movement and knowledge, Spatz (capturing the intuitive understanding of most of the martial artists I know) describes them as akin to onions, each level of technical mastery reveals a new layer of questions and nuance.  Nor depending on our background and nature, is it clear that we are all headed in the same direction on this journey of exploration.  And beyond a certain point in our training, most of the new knowledge that we acquire will not come from classes and seminars (though that route never vanishes), but from the process of practice itself.

 

Practice is not just the acquisition of a finite skill.  It’s a powerful research tool.  As we practice we make discoveries.  Spats notes that at first many of these will focus on how we can improve our own performance.  As we become more advanced they may include insights into the application and nature of a given technique.  Later, more original discoveries might open the way to creating new techniques and insights into how to better structure the process of practice.  When reading the biographies of individuals like Kano Jigoro or Morihei Ueshiba, it becomes clear that this is the way that at least some martial arts are born. Yet at all of these levels of research martial artists are engaged with the age old question, articulated by Spinoza, of asking “what can a body can do?”  This is such a simple question, and yet the answers always manage to surprise.

 

The idea of a direct transmission of knowledge from the mind/hands of the master to the mind/hands of the apprentice is mostly an illusion.  (And I say this as someone with great love and respect for my teachers).  The nature of practice itself suggests that the learning of technique, beyond its basic stages, is a rhizomic and ever evolving process.  As our practice becomes better, our research into the nature of techniques becomes more profound.

 

Keep practicing! Nima King Wing Chun School. Source: SCMP

 

 

Practicing on Carpet

 

When we think about what actually happens as we strive to practice and master a technique, the very idea of perfection is quickly revealed as a myth.  After years of practicing the dummy form I have yet to finish a routine and think “That is it!  Perfection has been achieved.”  At this point in time I am as much motivated by curiosity as anything else.  There is so much more that I want to understand, and the only way of getting there is through practice.

 

Yet it is never enough to declare something a “myth” and move on.  Rather, within martial arts studies, we must stop and examine what these myths do.  What social functions do they serve?  How is it that mythic statements about something as fundamental as daily practice get passed on?

 

Caution is required as we move forward.  As with most things, I suspect that this particular myth serves more than one purpose.  Specifically, myths can be used to point to insights that empower, or they can set up hierarchies and relationships that disempower.  Our goal as scholars is not so much to dismiss all myths as lies, as it is to actually understand them. Ergo my ongoing interest in the creation myths of the southern Chinese martial arts.

 

This essay drew on two practical examples of “bad practice.”  One that resulted in me staring up at my dummy after having slipped on shag carpeting, the other elicited a shout from an instructor in a lightsaber combat class.  Together they might weave a more complex understanding of what this council to perfection may signify.

 

Lets begin by returning to the Central Lightsaber Academy.  The instructor, Darth Nihilus, made his living as a professional musician before devoting himself to teaching Chinese martial arts.  Musicians understand something about the nature of practice and embodied skills.  But what is more interesting was that the specific student who he pulled aside was also a professional musician (in this case a drummer) who had played with multiple bands and toured quite successfully.

 

When Nihilus told him that he needed to perfect his practice (and related the story about an old piano instructor of his own), he was entering into a type of dialogue that his student would immediately understand in a very specific way.  Both had taught music lessons.  They understood how the process of practice and learning interact.  Both understood that he was issuing a call to practice with improved mindfulness.

 

Simply going through the motions is not enough. One must be self-aware, actively choose goals when practicing, and strive to improve those one or two things until you could do them “perfectly.”  In a moment of frustration Nihilus called on a student not to “be perfect,” but to make a conscious choice to put himself on a path to mastery.  At its best, this is what the challenge of “perfect practice” can be.

 

At its worst, it is a paralyzing agent.  Consider gain the story of my own experience with the dummy.  I really enjoyed the feel and tactile feedback that I could get from my Sifu’s dummy mounted in his school.  Unfortunately, my dummy arrived a short-time after leaving Salt Lake.  And when I set it up, I found both the flooring and the stand less than ideal.

 

Notice that I did not say “unworkable.”  There were certain skills that I wouldn’t be able to practice.  And it is difficult to do the form “properly” on a carpeted floor.  Yet rather than compromising and getting down to business, I let my perfectionism take over.  I convinced myself that it was better not to practice than to do so badly, or in less than ideal circumstances.  Specifically, I was concerned that I would develop “bad habits.”

 

Fear and paralysis is the dark side of a call to perfectionism.  Luckily, guilt eventually got the best of me and I was able (through a lot of terrible practice sessions) to experiment and work out a (mostly) suitable resolution to my situation.  At this point I can practice the dummy without thinking about these issues too much.  Have I developed “bad habits” by practicing on carpeting for the last five years?  Probably.  But I have also learned a few things about effective footwork that I would never have known.  God help the guy who decides to come after me on a shag rug.

 

Perhaps the real problem with the concept of “perfect practice” is that its inherent impossibility encourages an often unhealthy appeal to authority.  Consider again our opening quote.  How would one know if your practice had been “perfect?”  I suspect that in the world of football Vince Lombardi would have been more than happy to act as an expert witness.

 

When the process of striving for mastery is short circuited by an instructor, school or brand that claims to be able to judge and certify “perfection,” a more serious set of problems arise.  Rather than practice evolving as a form of research, it may devolve from hollow mimicry to stultification.  That is a problem whenever one outsources personal judgments about progress or motivation to an exterior authority.  This situation can be tricky to identify when we are the ones who are caught up in it.  The observations of scholars like Ben Spatz can raise the warning cry, and suggest that we reexamine whether we are still on the path of mastery.  It all comes down to how you practice.

 

 

oOo

 

If you enjoyed this essay you might also want to read:  Butterfly Swords and Long Poles: A Glimpse into Singapore’s 19th Century Martial Landscape

 

 

oOo



The Bubishi Gets its Due: Returning the ‘Bible of Karate’ to its Chinese Roots

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David S. Nisan and Liu Kangyi. 2016. The General Tian Wubeizhi: the Bubishi in Chinese Martial Arts History. Taipei: Lionbook Martial Arts Company. 136 pages of text, plus 128 pages of facsimile reprint. $47.95 USD.

 

Introduction

 

Given life’s many obligations, it is all too easy let one’s personal study lapse.  Balancing the cross-cutting pressures of family, professional responsibility and martial arts training is never easy.  We walk by that growing pile of reading projects and think, “I will look at them this weekend.” Then we don’t.

 

Yet every so often a work comes along that reminds us of what we are missing, and what got us interested in martial arts history in the first place.  David S. Nisan and Liu Kangyi’s recent publication, The General Tian Wubeizhi is just such a book. This volume tackles one of the most well-known puzzles in the Southern Chinese martial arts.  (And Karate practitioners have been talking about this subject since the 1930s).  Yet their approach feels both fresh and strikingly original.

 

Nisan and Kangyi’s volume simultaneously gives readers an important new primary source, offers an original conceptual framework to understand both the meaning and significance of this find, and explains it all to a general readership in a way that is refreshingly clear and accessibly to anyone, regardless of their familiarity with the preexisting literature on Chinese martial studies.  It is hard to think of any work that has made quite so many contributions to the discussion of the Southern Chinese hand combat systems in so few pages.  Both academic and practical students will find many new insights in these pages.

 

An expanded cover detail from The General Tian Wubeizhi.

 

 

 

Bringing the Bubishi back to China

 

A few words of introduction may be necessary for readers who are not familiar with the manuscript tradition generally referred to as “the Bubishi.”  This Japanese romanization of the Chinese title Wǔbèi Zhì, does not refer to the venerable Ming era military encyclopedia compiled by Mao Yuanyi.  Rather, it is a term that in the 1930s came to be retrospectively applied to a diverse manuscript tradition preserved in Okinawan hand combat circles.  Yet the exact nature of these “books” is difficult to pin down.

 

These untitled works were essentially collections of texts dealing with a range of topics including medicine, martial philosophy and unarmed fighting techniques.  (Andreas Quast suggests that it is significant that the Bubishi contains no discussion of weapon techniques.)  No surviving editions include a title page, preface or statement of authorship.  In that sense they are even more mysterious than the Taiji Classics, though they likely date to the same period and may have been at least partially the product of similar social forces.  While there was some overlap in critical material, various lineages of Bubishi transmission included different numbers of articles organized in a wide variety of ways.  While clearly a compiled work with multiple authors (or editors) the Bubishi was not so much a cohesive edited volume as an ongoing research file or, in the words of Nisan and Liu, “a notebook.”

 

While Japanese authors have been discussing this manuscript tradition since the pre-WWII period, in the current era it is best known to English speaking audiences through the efforts of Patrick McCarthy who has published multiple editions of translation and commentary. McCarthy’s once characterized the Bubishi as the “Bible of Karate,” and the symbolic resemblance is certainly recognizable.  While very little in this work outwardly resembles modern karate practice, many of the art’s pioneers drew inspiration from its pages.  The Bubishi functioned as a textual witness linking what became a modern martial art to an idealized and supposedly pure past tradition.

 

Karate students have dominated the discussion of this manuscript in the West.  Yet, as Nisan and Liu argue (and as I have repeatedly noted on this blog), that is only half of the story. In fact, it may be a good deal less.

 

Very few individuals in Japan can read the Bubishi as it is written in a combination of classical Chinese and the local Minnan dialect of Fujian province.  When accounting for the various textual errors that arose from poor copying and mistakes in the transcription of local dialects, it is a challenging document for anyone to work with.  Yet it is a uniquely Chinese document, one that is tied to the Fuzhou region and the folk martial art traditions still popular in the area, including White Crane and Luohan Boxing.  The authors of the present volume lay out a convincing case that it was probably compiled sometime in the second half of the 19th century (and probably after 1860).  As such, the Bubishi is a potentially invaluable textual witness to a period of rapid transformation within the Southern Chinese martial arts.  Yet students of Chinese martial history have, for the most art, passed over this manuscript tradition in silence.

 

The efforts of Nisan and Liu may well provide the push needed to spark a long over-due discussion.  By examining this work within its original cultural context, they hope to both shed light on the nature, origin and authorship of the collection, as well as providing martial artists with a new set of concepts for making sense of it.  This effort was facilitated when Lionbooks acquired a previously unpublished Bubishi manuscript from the estate of a Japanese-American karate student that was unique in a number of ways.  While badly damaged in places, this copy seems to represent an early textual variant.  Further, it is unique in that it contains a very large number of beautifully painted, full color, images.  While a few other hand painted Chinese fight books are known to exist (see the Golden Saber Illustrated Manual, 1725) such works are extremely rare and suggest interesting questions about their ownership and the social function of these texts.  Yet this work is not a translation project.  Rather, the beautiful facsimile edition is accompanied by a text that seeks to explore the place of the Bubishi in Chinese martial arts history.

 

A facsimile page from The General Tian Wubeizhi.

 

Reviewing the Argument

 

The authors begin in the first chapter by posing a fundamental, yet often neglected, question.  When looking at a tradition such as this, containing a wide range of both martial and medical materials, we must ask “What is this a case of? Where does this work fit in the typology of Chinese popular literature?”

 

While a respectable number of late imperial martial arts manuals still exist, most of them lack the unique structure and emphasis on medicine (specifically, trauma medicine), that we see in the Bubishi.  That does not mean that the book is utterly unique.  Wing Chun students are probably already thinking about “Leung Jan’s Book,” inherited by Ip Man, that is now on public display in his museum in Foshan.  This handwritten, two volume collection, also includes a mixture of medical and martial material.  In fact, readers who are already familiar with the Bubishi will find its medical illustrations quite familiar.

 

While the authors never actually mention this (or any other) specific example, they begin by asserting that the Bubishi belongs to the genre of popular literature known as “Bronze Man Notebooks.”  These works were the prized possessions of the sorts of physician/martial artists who were such a fixture in the towns, temples and marketplaces of southern China.  Citing Meir Shahar’s work on the development of late imperial boxing traditions, they note that by the 17th century it was becoming increasingly common to encounter discussions that mixed martial and medical knowledge. They argue that this was important as it allowed martial artists to both attend to the sorts of training injuries that naturally occur during vigorous practice, and to make a living while pursuing an itinerant lifestyle.

 

A “Bronze Man Notebook” recorded both the outlines and critical philosophy of boxing systems, as well as the prescriptions, herbs and theories of medical treatments.  Together they comprised a unified medical/martial understanding.  Indeed, it is hard not to think of figures like Leung Jan or Wong Fei Hung when reading Nisan and Liu’s discussion.  As such it is not a surprise that the Bubishi reads more like a medical text that martial arts notes have been added to, rather than a fight book with a medical appendix.  This is exactly the opposite of what most modern readers want and can be a source of frustration.

 

The economic value of such works dictated that they were only passed on to close disciples.  Nor could the medical (or martial) knowledge encoded in these works be called upon without a period of apprenticeships during which an extensive body of oral lore and clinical insights would be conveyed.  The second chapter of this work extends this textual discussion by exploring the contents and basic structure of four different lineages of the Bubishi textual tradition.

 

In Chapter Three the authors tackle the image of the deity known as General Tian who is occasionally found within these manuscripts.  This exploration begins with a discussion of the centrality of Confucian thought to Chinese martial arts philosophy which many readers will find useful.  I frequently receive questions about the supposed Buddhist or Daoist origins of some specific martial art (in my case its usually Wing Chun) and often end up suggesting that people think about Confucian practice first if they are serious about grasping the “philosophical roots” of their system.  I can now see myself directing individuals to this chapter in the future.  Incidentally, those interested in the links between the southern martial arts and opera will want to pay close attention to the exploration of General Tian and his links to both social spheres.

 

In Chapter Four readers will find a theory on the dating and the authorship of the Bubishi.  Nisan and Liu explicitly link the text to martial arts circles that gathered around the Ryukyu trade/tribute station in Fuzhou.  This compound also included a Confucian school that educated many of the best and brightest minds of the island kingdom.  Of course, Fuzhou was also a regional martial arts hot-spot.  Drawing on subtle clues from the text the authors convincingly argue that the text was compiled in the area sometime after 1860 (and somewhat less convincingly) that it was assembled by successive generations of Kung Fu obsessed students at the Ryukyu House before they were shipped back to their families.

 

Serious students of Southern China’s martial arts history will find Chapter Five even more interesting.  Once an approximate date for the text has been established (and the authors have made real progress in this area), it then becomes possible to ask what this text tells us about the development of the martial arts in a specific city at a known point in time.  Using the text of the Bubishi the authors explore the process by which the mid-century spread of Yongchun White Crane impacted the subsequent development of systems like Luohan Boxing and Five Ancestors.

 

Once dated to a specific period, the Bubishi offers a window onto the process by which the conceptual and philosophical basis of White Crane spread and was layered onto other preexisting regional martial practices.  The mid-19th century was a time of great innovation in the Fujianese martial arts, as masters were challenged to create more effective fighting systems.  They often did this through a process of “martial fusion” facilitated by the spread of the conceptual aspects of White Crane.  Indeed, the Bubishi seems to record an intermediary phase in the formation of Fuzhou White Crane that illustrates the process by which these arts became progressively softer as the century progressed.

 

Fuzhou did not exist in isolation.  Douglas Wile has explored the increasing emphasis on softness seen in Taijiquan circles during the late 19th century. Further, the mid-19th century expansion of martial fusion in Fujian corresponds to the explosive growth of Choy Li Fut (another remarkably acquisitive system) in Guangdong, and eventually the spread of the White Crane creation story and aspects of its conceptual system into the Pearl River Delta. Both forces would have a profound impact on the development of Wing Chun and other regional styles.

 

Their argument is elegant, textually supported and modest in nature.  It reinforces a number of other discussions of what was going on in other regional martial arts centers during the late 19th century.  Yet Nisan and Liu’s contribution is unique as the Bubishi provides an actual record of how this process of fusion and transformation unfolded.

 

Vintage Postcard (undivided back) dating to the late Qing dynasty. Note the resemblance of the queue arrangement of the individual on the left to many of the paintings in The General Tian Wubeizhi.

 

 

Concluding Thoughts

 

 

Beyond its many historical contributions, The General Tian Wubeizhi is clearly a labor of love.  The binding and covers are great, and the full color reproductions of the original manuscript pages (which read from back to front) are surprisingly good.  The authors did not attempt to interpolate areas of missing text.  As they point out, this is already available from other sources.  Nisan must be commended on the quality of his translations and editorial work as the entire argument is laid out in such a way that it is not only clear, but accessible to wide range of readers who may not be all that familiar with Chinese martial arts history or society.

 

Nevertheless, this sort of accessibility comes at a cost.  While this text is sure to reach a wide audience, serious researchers will find themselves wanting a more scholarly apparatus.  While there are footnotes throughout, the book contains no index or reference section.  I repeatedly found myself scanning back through 50 or more pages worth of footnotes in an attempt to identify the full citation of a reference that had sparked my interest.  This quickly becomes a frustration.  If this book ever gets a second edition these oversights need to be corrected.  Readers of a text like this might also appreciate a glossary of Chinese names and specialized terms.

 

The demands of making a nuanced argument about a moment of change ran up against the impulse to be as accessible as possible in other places as well.  Many readers will appreciate Chapter Three’s carefully laid out discussion of the system of filial piety and ancestor worship when it comes to understanding the nature of traditional (and even modern) Kung Fu schools.  Yet these sorts of discussions always run the risk of creating the illusion of an unchanging and static “ethnographic present.”  Authors like Faure and Wakeman have pointed out that some of the region’s most basic social structures (such as lineage organizations and clan temples) underwent substantial changes during the late imperial period.  This was especially evident during the middle years of the 19th century when the relationships between these larger social structures and the clan militias and other paramilitary societies began to shift.

 

Nor am I totally convinced by Nisan and Liu’s arguments about the ultimate authorship of the Bubishi.  To their credit they begin Chapter Four with a frank admission that it is just not possible to prove or reject theories in this area.  The historical record is too thin.  The best we can do is to decide which ideas seem the most credible. That is certainly a frustration that I can empathize with.

 

And in all honesty, I think that the authors made real progress in narrowing the dating of this text and locating it in the Fuzhou diplomatic compound.  Yet one cannot help but wonder whether their carefully constructed arguments in Chapter One actually cuts against their equally interesting theory in Chapter Four.  If the Bubishi really does fall into the “Bronze Man Notebook” genre, it seems much more likely that this text would have been inherited by one or more students in Fuzhou (who then made their own copies) rather than being substantially compiled or authored by them.  Indeed, the authors themselves argue that such works would be useless without the oral traditions of a master, and these insights could only have come from Chinese teachers.  It seems that the easiest way to read the presence of local dialects and orthographic errors is to argue that they were locally produced vernacular texts copied by the foreign students, rather than being notebooks that were composed and compiled by them.

 

I also tend to agree with Quast (p. 94) that the beautifully reproduced paintings in this edition of the Bubishi show Chinese martial artists rather than their Okinawan students.  In my reference collection I have a number of photographs of Chinese individuals who have arranged their queue as a “top knot” so that it cannot be grabbed in fighting or training.  To my eyes, many of the paintings strongly suggest that both the forehead and even the back of the head of these figures have been shaved, as one might expect if they were subjects of the Manchus.  The gauntleted boots/shoes of these figures certainly appear to be Chinese.  It seems eminently reasonable to assume that the Okinawan students were the ones who copied these paintings.  Yet they may very well have been working from Chinese models.

 

In many respects, it probably doesn’t matter whether the Bubishi was compiled by a group of Chinese instructors in the Fuzhou area or their foreign students.  In either case the critical insights of Chapter Five remain valid.  Yet this question does point to another issue.  When attempting to determine what is “unique” about this manuscript tradition, to what other texts should we be comparing it?

 

Many Ming era manuals had dozens of woodcuts, and the paintings in the Golden Saber Illustrated Manual are superior in their elegance and use of color to even this edition of the Bubishi.  One could easily argue that these comparisons are not valid.  The Ming dynasty publications were meant for an elite audience, and the painted sword manual came out of imperial court circles.  The Bubishi, in contrast, began life as a humble “Bronze Man Notebook.”

 

But what does that indicate?  To answer this question the authors would need to provide readers with a much more detailed discussion of this critical genre.  While we learned quite a bit about how these books were used, and their social function, we never saw any textually based discussions of other “Bronze Man Notebooks.”  We were assured that, by their nature, all such notebooks were unique.  But given the academic interest in traditional medicine (this is, after all, the sort of topic that university presses routinely publish books on), what sort of literature exists to describe this manuscript genre?  How many examples of these notebooks are known to exist?  What libraries or private collections can they be found in?  Are discernible “lineages” detectable in these manuscript traditions?  Or are they more personalized than the Bubishi as it came to be passed on in Okinawa?  Were certain boxing styles more likely to appear in one region than another?

 

While most chapters have footnotes throughout, this most critical discussion relied only on a few general comments by Meir Shahar in his work on the development of Qing era boxing (p. 152-153).  As noted above, it is clear that other manuscripts combing martial and medical chapters have played a role in the development of the Southern Chinese martial arts.  One suspects that at least some of these were passed on well into the Republic period (which is when Ip Man probably inherited his example).  Connecting the Bubishi to this larger medical tradition is almost certainly a step forward.  Yet we are not likely to reap the full benefits of this move (or to make progress on the issues raised in Chapter Four) until the basic textual research on this genre has been completed.  Indeed, a serious effort to gather, catalog, analyze and translate these texts is needed for our historical understanding of the Southern Chinese martial arts to advance.

 

This type of study would require both resources and the concerted efforts of multiple scholars.  What might we learn?  There can be no doubt that Nisan and Liu’s work stands as a prime example of the gains to be had through this sort of textual detective work.  The contributions of their book are manifold.  It will be valued not just by Karate and Kung Fu students, but it has made important contributions to our historical understanding of the regions martial arts development as well.  It is my hope that this volume inspires the next set of scholars to sharpen their tools and begin to seriously study the various notebook and manual traditions of the Southern Chinese martial arts.

 

 

oOo

If you enjoyed this review you might also want to read: Zheng Manqing and the “Sick Man of Asia”: Strengthening Chinese Bodies and the Nation through the Martial Arts

 

oOo


Li Pei Xian and the Evolution of Modern Chinese “Martial Arts”

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Chinese Sword Dance. A refined and middle-class vision of the Chinese Martial Arts. Vintage postcard. Source: Author’s personal collection.

 

***Greetings! I am currently preparing for the upcoming Martial Arts Studies conference in Cardiff.  As such we will be taking a deep dive into the archives for today’s post.  This essay and biographical sketch was first published four years ago in our “Lives of Chinese Martial Artists” series.  While not well known in the West, Li Pei Xian is one of the many interesting figures I encountered while researching the history of the martial arts in the Pearl River Delta.  Better yet, his life story provides students with a cross-sectional view of a critical period in the formation of the modern Chinese martial arts.***

 

 

Critiquing the Conceptual Coherence of “Chinese Martial Arts”

 

In this installment of the “Lives of the Chinese Martial Artists” series we will be looking at the life and career of Li Pei Xian.  While a regionally important individual I doubt that many of my readers will be familiar with this name.  Nevertheless, I am very excited to be able to include him in our growing collection of biographical sketches.

The central purpose of this series of posts is to remind modern readers of the variety of life experiences and careers that were experienced by late 19th and 20th century Chinese martial artists.  For current students, both in China and the west, this is a very real blind spot.

The problem starts with our terms.  We assume that we know what the “martial arts” are.  From our perspective they are a single, easily identifiable, activity.  Individuals who are involved in the martial arts are easily identified by their colorful traditional uniforms and can be found carrying on a certain type of economic activity in any self-respecting strip mall.  Further, modern martial artists usually self-identify as such.  They even have trade organizations and publications that usually include the words “martial arts” in their titles to limit the possibility of confusion.

The situation in 19th century China was very different.  I would go so far as to guess that many, maybe even most, individuals who studied martial skills would have been surprised, and in some cases even offended, to discover that they were mere “martial artists.”  When asked about their identity most of these people would have responded that they were professional soldiers, night watchmen or runners for the local yamen.  Many would have been farmers who out of necessity joined a local crop watching society.  Being a “respectable peasant” was a much higher class occupation than being a boxing instructor or guard.  Others may have been traditional medical doctors or opera performers.  In a few cases you might even encounter members of the gentry who studied boxing or archery as a form of self-cultivation and entertainment.

If you would have grouped these individuals together and told the soldier, the farmer, the opera singer and the gentleman that the skills they practiced were all functionally equivalent or interchangeable they would have been very confused.  The idea of the “martial arts” as we use it in contemporary conversation is a modern construction.  These things look similar to us because of our modern perspective.  Indeed many of these categories got mixed together in the early 20th century.

If you search for an 18th century Chinese word that encompassed all of these skills and life experiences what you will quickly discover that there wasn’t one.  The arts of war practiced by soldiers were conceptually distinct from “Quanban” (an archaic term favored by the Qing administration translating roughly to “Fist and Pole”) which by definition could only be studied by a civilian.  And all of that was quite distinct from “medicine” and “theater training.”

Later in the 19th century all of this starts to change.  As China came into deeper contact with the western world conceptual categories were loosened and rearranged.  Ideas like “Chinese culture” and “traditional culture” took on a new relevance when there was an accessible alternative.  Suddenly categories like “traditional dress,” “traditional painting,” “traditional music” and even “traditional physical culture” came into daily use.

By the turn of the century, and even more so in the 1920s, certain intellectuals were scrambling to collect the remains of China’s “traditional culture” and preserve elements of it for posterity.  Yet this entire exercise is predicated on the creation of categories of thought and types of associations that could not have existed a century before.  The modern world never really preserves the past, it recreates it.

This is why I personally tell people that the traditional Chinese martial arts are a product of the late 19th and early 20th century.  Were there schools of boxing and wrestling that existed before this?  Certainly.  We have wonderful accounts of martial performers in the Song dynasty, and many still extant manuals on boxing and fencing from the Ming period.  Daoist medicine involving gymnastics and breathing exercises goes back even further.  But thinking about the “martial arts” as a distinct, coherent, conceptual category that unites all of this within a world of civilian commercial activity?  That is a product of the late 19th and early 20th century.

This is why the exercise behind the “Lives of the Chinese Martial Artists” series is so important.  It helps to explore the variety of life experiences that existed in the past as well as allowing us to study the unification and modernization of the traditional fighting styles.

Indeed, the traditional Chinese arts have gone through an impressive conceptual evolution.  This has not always been a smooth process.  There have certainly been some episodes of high drama.  One can almost follow the story of the creation and the evolution of the modern “martial arts” like the plot of a novel.

A wide variety of mostly unnamed folk combat traditions have existed from time immemorial.  These skills have formed an important means of escape for youth from the countryside looking to move and better their lot in life.  However, with the advent of modernization, different sorts of movement and economic activity are now possible.

Responding to this challenge the “martial arts” reorganize themselves and gain conceptual coherence.  In so doing they reposition themselves from “local traditions” to elements of “national culture.”  This was not possible in previous eras as “the nation,” as a conceptual category, did not yet exist.  While initially resisted by some, this movement of the traditional fighting style proves to be successful.  It was actually so successful that factions within the state (who were actively looking for tools to extend their reach into local society) decide that they could use these newly minted “traditional arts” to craft and reinforce their preferred vision of popular political identity.

However, alignment with a single political faction creates the opportunity for a violent backlash once other forces come to power (as has happened multiple times, including during the Cultural Revolution).  Finally, as the economy advances new types of problems emerge.  Now the martial arts are called upon to address the problems that inevitably accompany rapid urbanization and the growth of a fast paced capitalist society.

The flexibility of the Chinese martial arts in the face of this degree of social change is nothing short of amazing. No character better exemplifies these 20th century trends than Master Li Pei Xian.  While less well known in the west his own stories mirrors each of these larger twists and turns with uncanny precision.

Also Chinese “martial artists.” Troops from the Ma Clique train with Dadao, probably in north western China.

 

 

Li Pei Xian: Local Boy Makes Good

 

I first encountered Li Pei Xian while researching the history of the Foshan branch of the Jingwu (sometimes Chinwoo or “Pure Martial”) association.  Foshan plays an important role in the evolution of Guangdong’s modern martial arts.  As I have discussed elsewhere, one cannot understand the history of this town’s Republic era market for martial arts instruction without coming to terms the role of the local Jingwu chapter.

After the Hung Sing Association, it was the largest martial arts club in the town.  While Hung Sing appealed to the traditionalist sentiments of working class individuals, Jingwu, which had been influenced by the YMCA movement in Shanghai, sought educated middle class students.  More than any other force in China at the time, it sought to modernize the martial arts and to place them in the service of the nation.

The Foshan branch of the movement was large, with thousands of students and dozens of instructors.  It even succeeded in embedding its members as physical education instructors in local schools. Jingwu is also critical to the history of Southern China’s martial arts because of its longevity.  While the Association ceased to exist in most of the country after a financial disaster in 1925, the Foshan branch was well funded and very popular.  Li Pei Xian, its longtime “Director of Athletics and Martial Arts,” was at least partially responsible for this.  As a result the Foshan Jingwu actually managed to survive into the post WWII period.

Li Pei Xian (1892-1985) was born at the end of the Qing dynasty in Xinhu, a town in the Jiangmen area of Guangdong.  His beginnings were rather unremarkable and Jiangmen was economically depressed for much of the early 20th century.  Luckily Li was interested in the martial arts as a youth and was able to study Hakka Kuen.  This art, which originated within the Hakka ethnic minority community, is a classic example of a traditional southern style.  It seems that like so many other country boys with few prospects Li turned to the martial arts both as a form of education and as a means to move up in the world and better himself.

His fortunes began to look up in 1910 when he moved to the bustling, dangerous, metropolis that was Shanghai.  Many of the stories of rural immigrants to this city end in despair and tragedy.  Entire industries were devoted to fleecing hapless and naïve newcomers who arrived seeking opportunity and employment.

Li seems to have avoided the worst of this.  In fact, his background in the martial arts may have even given him a leg up in his new home.  Many important boxers were in and around Shanghai in the first few decades of the 20th century.  This would have been an exciting place to live for any martial artist.  Li appears to have thrown his lot in with the newly created Jingwu Association.  This group was created the same year that Li arrived in Shanghai allowing him to get in on the “ground floor” of a good thing.

In fact, Li likely even had a chance to meet the martial saint Huo Yuanjia, who died on August 20, 1910.  While formally the chief instructor of the Jingwu Association Huo died very shortly after its creation.  His institutional contributions were limited.  However, once the story of his supposed murder by “scheming Japanese imperialists” began to spread, Huo Yuanjia was elevated in the national consciousness to the status of a god.

A dedicated publicity campaign engineered by the young business minds behind the Jingwu Association ensured that the story spread.  Huo’s supposed martyrdom helped to make the group China’s first truly national martial brand.   A heady combination of sanitized and modernized martial arts, nationalist mythology and sophisticated marketing meant that within ten years every major city in eastern and southern China had a branch of the Jingwu association.

Li Pei Xian had bet on the winning horse.  He was already a trained martial artist, but of course it was necessary to retrain and certify in Jingwu’s northern styles and “scientific methods” before he could begin to move up in the organization.  By 1916, he had completed the six years of study necessary to become an instructor within that system.  He studied Shaolin boxing with Zhao Lian He, Northern Mantis with Lo Kuang Yu and Eagle Claw from Chen Zi Zheng.  He also mastered a large number of miscellaneous hand and weapons forms.

Li was hired directly by the Jingwu Association central office after receiving his advanced level certification and he later worked at the organizations headquarters in Shanghai.  Of course there was always more to Jingwu than just the martial arts.  It was meant to be a “one stop shop” for middle class entertainment, so it actively promoted modern and western pastimes.  In addition to teaching martial arts Li also acted as a director in the dance and photography departments.

This wide range of skills would later be critical to his career advancement.  Jingwu encouraged its member to become renaissance men (and women).  Li was no exception.

Founded in 1920 (though classes did not start until 1921) the Foshan branch of the Jingwu association would become one of the organization’s most prosperous and innovative chapters.  It was also one of the longest lived.  In fact, it still exists today in a modified form.

Unfortunately this branch did not enjoy overnight success.  For reasons that go well beyond the scope of this article, after an initial burst of enthusiasm Jingwu struggled to establish itself in Foshan.  The situation deteriorated rapidly over the first few years.  By about 1923 the local organization had almost completely ground to a halt.

The situation only began to recover after a strategic change in leadership.  In 1922, Zhong Miao Zhen, who had been a very passive leader, resigned as president of the Foshan branch.  He was replaced by the much more dynamic and capable Liang Du Yuan.  Liang was a local businessman with excellent organizational skills and a burning faith in the new group.  He had suffered from ill health until he joined the association and began to intensively study martial arts.  As his health improved he became an enthusiastic advocate of Jingwu’s mission of “national salvation.”  Liang would remain the president until the Japanese invasion in 1938.   Under his leadership, the Foshan branch finally gained a central place in the local martial arts subculture.

Upon taking office Liang Du Yuan began an aggressive policy of community outreach.  Under his watch the organization opened schools, free medical clinics, hosted western style sporting events, published newspapers, and held classes on topics as diverse as music, painting and public speaking.  The broader Jingwu Association had always found it necessary to use these more accessible events to attract urban middle class investigators.  Those that stayed could then be convinced to enroll in martial arts classes.

The Foshan Jingwu Association went well beyond this general pattern.  During its first few years the organization had been plagued by the popular perception that it was populated by outsiders who were hostile to the local community.  What is more, that perception may not have been entirely incorrect.  Liang decided that the key to success was to embed his organization within the local community by providing a wide range of subsidized opportunities to the middle class, such as roller skating expeditions or photography classes, and highly publicized charitable projects for the less fortunate.  This allowed the organization to begin to build what sociologists call “social capital,” or mutual bonds of trust and reciprocity.  As people became more familiar with the group and its aims they came to trust it and viewed it as a part of the local community.

Building these bridges proved to be absolutely critical.  Not only did student enrollments begin to rise, but the Foshan branch secured sources of local support and income that were not dependent on Shanghai.   As a result, the collapse of the national Jingwu movement in 1925-1926 had little impact on the Guangdong chapters.

Other changes in the chapter’s organization were also made.  In 1923, Li Pei Xian was transferred to Foshan where he remained as the “Athletics and Martial Arts Director” until 1938.  It is interesting to note that while the branch president was chosen locally the director of athletics (essentially the chief martial arts instructor) had to be appointed directly by the central office in Shanghai.  In fact, all of the martial arts instructors in the Foshan branch came from Shanghai.  This appears to have been a critical aspect of how the central Jingwu Association ensured the integrity of their brand.

The fact that Li was actually from Guangdong, spoke Cantonese and had a background in a southern boxing style may have helped him gain credibility within Foshan’s crowded martial marketplace.  However, his actual teaching activities did not deviate from the orthodox, strictly northern, Jingwu teaching curriculum.

One of his first reforms after taking office was to create a number of “small groups” within the broader student body of the Foshan Branch.  These structures were essentially study groups designed to keep students motivated, allow for mutual support and a sense of belonging.  It is easy to see how these qualities, which are still essential to successful martial arts schools today, could become lost in the Jingwu Association’s more megalithic teaching structures.  These groups were a great success and more were created from 1924-1926.

Li also oversaw the successful introduction of Taiji to the Foshan Jingwu curriculum.  This art, in all of its various guises, has become spectacularly popular throughout China and the Pearl River Delta region is no exception.  The regional success of Taiji demonstrates once again the critical role that the Jingwu Association played in bringing northern styles of hand combat to the south.

Li was also responsible for the martial arts columns published monthly, then weekly, in the branch’s newspaper.  While in Foshan he served both as an editor and author for his organization main mouthpiece.  Li should probably receive much of the credit for the success that the Foshan Jingwu branch eventually enjoyed.

Of course Li Pei Xian’s career extended far beyond his involvement with this one organization.  The Japanese invasion severely hampered the functioning to the Foshan Jingwu Association.  In 1938 he resigned his position and left to join Gu Ru Zhang’s Guangzhou Martial Arts Association where he is supposed to have trained an anti-Japanese Dadao (“military big saber”) squad.

The “internal” martial arts and other Qigong practices tend to be especially popular among senior citizens and others who are seeking relief from chronic conditions.

 

A third image of traditional martial artists.  “Monkey Boxers” performing in a public market in Shanghai circa 1930. Source: Taiping Institute.

 

 

Government Support, Retrenchment and Rehabilitation

 

I have not been able to track down much information on Li’s career between 1945 and 1949.  He did not follow the lead of so many other traditional masters who fled Guangdong after 1949.  If anything his career actually became more active and better supported following the communist takeover.

Prior to 1938 Li had been best known for his classic Jingwu Eagle Claw and Northern Shaolin techniques.   However, after 1949 he became an advocate of Wu style Taiji in Guangzhou.  In fact, Li quite successfully negotiated the change of regimes that ended the careers of so many other local martial artists.  He achieved a degree of official recognition and government support that he had never enjoyed during the 1930s (when the KMT’s Central Guoshu Institute was attempting to craft its own martial arts movement).  In 1957 Li even led the Guangdong provincial martial arts team to Beijing to compete in the National Martial Arts Award & Observation Conference.

In 1959 he was appointed the director of Physical Education Teaching and Research at the Guangzhou College of Traditional Medicine.  There he established a martial arts team which continued to campaign for the overall health benefits of China’s traditional physical culture.  In 1961, he began to offer courses in Qigong, in conjunction with the provinces Department of Health, at a number of universities and high schools.

This interlude is quite significant for a number of reasons.  As both David Palmer and Nancy Chen have demonstrated, the 1950s were something of a turning point for traditional Chinese medicine.  While the Communist Party had traditionally favored western “scientific” medicine, the debate between the “foreign experts” (many of whom were sympathetic western doctors) and the “Reds” (local communist cadres) motivated them to take a second look at traditional Chinese medicine.  Traditional movements and breathing exercises, termed “Qigong” by local medical officials, were vastly cheaper than western medicines.

Of course creating a new branch of traditional Chinese medicine, freed from “feudalism” and “superstition,” was not an easy or quick process.  New clinics and departments of medicine were founded.  These employed a wide range of medical doctors, traditional Qigong practitioners and quite a few martial artists.  Li advanced his career in the late 1950s by moving into this newly opened, relatively well funded area.  In short his sudden interest in TCM reflects both broader social trends and the funding priorities of the Chinese state.

The real tragedy of this burst of government support of Qigong in the 1950s and 1960s is what happened next.  The Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution were in no way convinced that Chinese medicine had freed itself from its superstitious and un-scientific past.  As a result many doctors, martial artists and even healthcare administrators’ suffered their wrath.  It is not clear exactly what Li’s specific situation was like but he appears to have survived the Cultural Revolution relatively unscathed.

In 1960, 1962 and 1977 he released major works on Qigong and Taiji, all published by the People’s Sporting Press.  In 1982, just at the start of the Kung Fu and Qigong “Fevers” he emerged as an expert on the national stage and published an extended series of articles on Shaolin Boxing in Wulin magazine.  In the years before his death he produced literally dozens of articles on different aspects of martial arts for various publications.

 

Conclusion

 

Li’s life story clearly illustrates the opening to the broader national culture that Guangdong’s martial artists faced in the early 20th century.  Born in a relatively undeveloped area and educated in Hakka Kuen, this young martial artist went on to make a name for himself promoting Taiji and traditional medicine on the national stage.  It seems unlikely that any of this would have been possible without the Jingwu Association.  While its classes mostly catered to the urban and well off, within martial arts circles it still filled the traditional role of providing a path for advancement for young men of talent who lacked resources.

Just as important is what Li’s career illuminates about the evolution of China’s traditional fighting arts during the 20th century.  Over the span of his lifetime we have seen the arts move from a strictly local practice, to one with implications for regional and even national identity.  New and sophisticated forms of management were introduced into hand combat organizations including modern advertising, funding and franchising structures.  All of this allowed the “traditional arts” to be expanded on a vast commercial scale.

Once these arts had been established in society they became available to the state as a tool to advance its own agenda.  That included the crafting of political identity during the Republic period (where the state supported Guoshu) and the Cultural Revolution (when the party turned on the traditional arts to promote “scientism”), as well as advancing economically and socially driven agendas (e.g., state backing of Qigong and Taiji during the 1950s and 1980s.)

In each of these cases officials, public intellectuals and hand combat teachers have struggled to redefine how we understand the term “martial arts.”  Economic development and the evolution of efficient markets have also had a huge impact on this process.  All of these factors are illustrated in the life and career of Li Pei Xian.


The Soldier, the Marketplace Boxer and the Recluse: Mapping the Social Location of the Martial Arts in Late Imperial China.

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***As I mentioned earlier this week, I am currently preparing for the upcoming Martial Arts Studies conference in Cardiff.  As such I have decided to revisit one of the earlier major essays that I wrote for this blog (all the way back in 2013).  Kung Fu Tea was just starting to grow at that point, so my guess is that this will be new material for most of you.  And its always interesting to look back and see how the conversation has evolved over the last couple of years.  Enjoy!***

Introduction

 

How should we understand the traditional Chinese martial arts?  Are these practices really intended to be a form of practical self-defense, or are they actually some other sort of social performance? Are the arts that we practice today “authentic?”

These are a few of the large questions that really drive the field of Chinese martial studies.  Recently I reviewed a now classic article by Charles Holcombe (“Theater of Combat: A critical Look at the Chinese Martial Arts” in the Historian (Vol. 52 No. 3, May, 1990) which attempted to provide an answer to each of these queries.  The author argued that the traditional Chinese martial arts are largely ineffective as actual combat systems as they were never really intended to function as such.  Rather than being a practical program of military training, Holcombe claimed that these fighting systems were really an outgrowth of popular Daoist and Buddhist mystical practices.

Henning has argued elsewhere that this aspect of Holcombe’s argument falls flat because of his extensive reliance on Joseph Needham.  While a preeminent historian Needham never made the martial arts the main focus of his research and his conclusions on this subject should be regarded with caution.

Nevertheless, Holcombe was on firmer ground when he pointed to the centrality of opera and other forms of public entertainment in late imperial China.  The martial arts could always draw a crowd, and this is how a great many professional hand combat experts made a living.  Holcombe argued that in the minds and rhetoric of millennial cult leaders it was all too easy to conflate the staged performance of social violence with the real thing.  This then is the true nature of the Chinese fighting systems.  They are primarily social in orientation, and it was really the modernizers and reformers of the 1920s-1930s, intent on transforming them into a practical system of self-defense, who were fundamentally mistaken.

Much of the subsequent development of the martial studies literature has argued against this early thesis.  Shahar, Henning, Lorge, and Kennedy have all argued that the martial arts were both more tied to actual violence than their critics might like to admit and much less dependent on any specific philosophy or theology.

This sounds like progress, except that we are still having the same very basic conversation that Holcombe introduced in 1990.  The historians in the field have introduced a lot of important nuance into our discussion.  Yet the anthropologists who write on the Chinese martial arts simply take it for granted that they are mostly about social performance.  Nor do their ethnographic observations do anything to challenge that view.  If this is true today it is entirely possible that it was also true in the past.  Further, while the persistent connection between boxing societies, millennial cults and late imperial rebellions may be difficult to theorize, one cannot simply ignore it.

I concluded my review of Holcombe by arguing that the problem may not actually be in how we are looking at the historical record.  Indeed, Holcombe and his later critics actually show a remarkable degree of agreement on this front.  Rather, the real issue is that we have not thought carefully enough about our core concepts.  This creates a certain degree of slipperiness in our theories.  The end result is that some individuals have one view of what constitutes the “authentic martial arts,” while other students may come to very different conclusions.

This is not surprising.  The idea of the martial arts was introduced and popularized in the west by the Japanese.  Their ancient feudal structure and later program of promoting “Budo” as an official ideology in the early 20th century led to a very unique relationship between their hand combat systems and the rest of society.  There is simply no reason to think that these basic ideas should provide a workable map for understanding the intricacies of Chinese popular culture.

Conceptually speaking the term “martial arts” is a modern invention.  It is an attempt to group like categories (from many cultures and different areas of the world) together because that project makes sense in relation to certain other modern ideas.  But it is extremely unlikely that a 19th century bandit in the hills of southern China would see himself as a member of the same class of beings as a medieval Japanese warrior/bureaucrat simply because they both owned a couple of swords and a rifle.

The current post attempts to expand on this same basic idea.  In my last essay I focused on how Chinese martial culture might look if we were to break things down by occupation and profession.  Of course that is not the only way to map out what these relationships may have looked like.  In fact, it simply pushes our question one step back.  It is all well and good to say that village militia members may not have identified all that much with urban street performers, but the real question is why?   Why did some groups develop shared identities, in certain times and places, while others were excluded?

If we could answer that question we might start to actually open a new window onto popular culture in late imperial China.  Further, we might also have a better understanding how it was possible to eventually craft the (relatively) unified identity behind “Guoshu” (National Arts) and “Wushu” (Martial Arts) in the 20th century.  Exploring these questions in depth would take a book, but in the current post I hope to point to a few places where we can start.

Taijiquan being practiced at Wudang. Source: Wikimedia.

 

 

Mapping the Social Landscape of Late Imperial China

 

Dr. Victoria Cass (currently a visiting professor at Johns Hopkins University) writes on Chinese literature and religion.  She is perhaps best known for her 1999 volume, Dangerous Women: Warriors, Grannies and Geishas of the Ming (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers).  This popular work provides a highly accessible introduction to many of the central questions of gender studies in late imperial China.  In fact, I used it as a source in my recent discussion of the literary antecedent of Yim Wing Chun and Ng Moy.

One of the reasons why Dangerous Women works so well as a general introduction is that Cass realizes that it is not possible to talk about complex social structures as though they exist in a vacuum.   These things occur in a specific time and place, and it is vitally important to understand that terrain.  The social geography of late imperial China is complex and far from uniform.  It is bisected by political upheavals and colored by competing vision of what the ideal society, and life, should look like.

As a result it is not enough to discuss “Chinese women” in the abstract.  Rather, to have any level of real comprehension they must be examined in relation to these larger structures.  The variety of choices and life-pathways that different women adopted are meaningless without at least some explanation of the environment that they lived in and the social and philosophical currents that informed their world.

Of course it is possible to make exactly the same argument about the “martial arts.”  The traditional hand combat styles were a specific expression of larger trends within “martial culture.”  However, like gender, martial culture is such a broad category of thoughts and values that it touches on practically everything.  It is simply not enough say that it affects something.  Rather the question is why does it express itself in a specific way in this setting, and yet it looks very different in another environment?  In short, why is there no simple answer to the riddle of the Chinese martial arts?

To begin to examine these questions we need a map of the social geography of late imperial China.  Since this is a brief blog post we will need a simple map that still has the necessary information to get us where we need to go.  Luckily Cass provides us with just such an outline in the introduction to her volume.  If you are interested in understanding more about Ming and Qing era popular culture, but you lack a background in the subject, this one chapter provides a pretty useful overview of the big trends that you should be aware of.  Obviously Cass’ essay focuses on the role of women, but the basic discussion that she gives could inform any number of investigations.

Her basic argument is that popular culture in the late imperial period can be thought of as a dynamic interaction between three different sets of norms.  In turn these yielded three competing visions of the ideal society.

The Cult of Piety

The first of these, and most widespread, was a “cult of piety” focused around proper behavior in the family (its major center of worship).  The more common term for this “cult of piety” is Confucianism.  Prof. Cass dislikes this label as the actual social performance of “virtue” often went beyond what any scholar or philosophical thinker might explicitly demand.  Further, when discussing Confucianism the emphasis has historically been placed on elite males who comprised the government bureaucracy and local gentry.  However, the more general cult of piety found expression in every facet of Chinese culture, even within areas that were traditionally treated with disdain, such as among women and martial artists.

The City Centered Romantic Movement

The Ming was also a time of economic growth and dynamism.  This was seen in a number of areas but it was the most obvious in the expanding cities that attracted large populations during this period.  The rise of a new strain of urban culture was most obvious in the south, in areas like Fujian and Guangdong.  Both provinces were blessed with a number of good ports and they were nourished by the triangular trade between South East Asia, Southern China and Japan.

Urban spaces had definitely begun to develop their own character during the Song dynasty.  However this process quickened during the late imperial period.  Cities developed a new middle class with their own sense of identity and value.  This new urban class gave rise to its own unique culture.

The cult of piety (which reigned in the countryside) was premised on an absolute devotion to the ancestors who had gone before; individuals who had quite literally become “household Gods,” who could only be appeased through the rigorous observation of propriety and filial decorum.  This was the basis of all proper family arrangements, and by extension the state (which was seen as a family on an almost cosmic scale).

The piety demanded by this cult was dangerous because it called for the sacrifice of the self to uphold the norms of the systems, not just in abstract ways, but often also in very concrete and final terms.  Scholars who accepted death rather than serving a new government, widows who committed suicide at the death of their husband and soldiers who fought hopeless battles against impossible odds were the saints and martyrs of this system.

Cass argues that these were not marginal or victimized people.  Rather they were the fanatical followers of a very specific set of moral ideas.  They believed that by enacting huge sacrifices to maintain virtue in their own lives, their families, communities and even the state would be blessed with stability and prosperity.  Further these beliefs were reinforced and supported by the state who, through the Bureau of Rites, sought out those who had made heroic sacrifices and built monuments in their honor.

Yet this “Confucian” view of the family and the ideal society did not sit well with many members of the newly ascendant middle class.  After all, these were the values of social elites and the rustic peasants who had a limited sense of their own class identity.  Merchants and craftsmen were not particularly well regarded in the traditional Confucian social hierarchy and it seems that for many members of the middle class the feeling became mutual.

While success in the official examination system remained the only real means for political advancement, many of these urban families decided to instead turn their attention to building their own personal economic empires.  I know from my historical work on Foshan that while these families continued to produce degree winners, very often these individuals made no effort to seek a career in government.  Instead they turned their attention to the economic marketplace and the development of their own local communities.

China’s cities during the Ming were among the largest and most sophisticated in the world.  Compared to those of a previous era, these would have been remarkably recognizable with businesses dominating the downtown and smaller shops and housing spreading out in rings.  Entertainment was a major part of city life.  Theaters, tea houses, street performances, displays of art and poetry, sophisticated geisha establishments and martial arts demonstrations were among the luxuries that could be found in any southern urban area of sufficient size.

What is most interesting to me about these urban areas is that they were so self-conscious of their identity and status.  They fully realized that they were developing a new culture that differed radically from the cult of piety.  They even coined a name for the process.  It was called “ju bian” or the “great change.”

“Passion” and “authenticity” were at the heart of this transformation.  Traditionalists found meaning through group membership and sacrifice.  Yet the process of urbanization disrupted many of the most important traditional groups.  The clan and the extended family became less relevant in urban areas as it was simply too expensive for all but the richest families to maintain a clan temple (though they did provide economic advantages if you could afford to build one).  Instead smaller social guilds, literary schools and reading groups came to dominate the social scene.  Some of these groups even adopted a reformist and political stance.

These associations helped to spread a new philosophy of the life throughout the urban middle class.  They claimed that the key to a good life was to live with “passion” or “qing.”  In modern terms we might say that this was a decisive turn away from the repression of the self for the benefit of others in favor of living an authentic life based on the expression of powerful and impulsive feelings.

The word “qing” refers specifically to romance and passion.  Not surprisingly this new philosophy led to a profound shift in family life.  Husbands and wives started to view each other as potential artistic and life partners rather than simply leaders and subordinates.  Yet the “qing revolution” went far beyond the bedroom.

This same sense of authenticity came to be applied to every aspect of daily life.  Urbanites came to appreciate, and find ecstatic meaning, in a well carved ink-stone, a miniature potted tree or the perfectly poured cup of tea.  Some educated members of this class were even responsible for the renewed interest in Chan Buddhism which happened during the late imperial period.

The Revival of Reclusive Living

Taken to its furthest extreme the urban middle class evolved into something very different.  The third social movement that Cass described was the path of the mystical (or simply mad) recluse.  Such individuals were by no means a new element in Chinese culture.  Daoism had long promoted a certain political quietism, encouraging truly cultured gentlemen to shun office, seeking instead the solitude of wild places and deep contemplation.

Nor, in all honesty, was this basic impulse really confined to a single philosophical movement.  The Chinese popular religion had venerated mountains and grottos as sacred spaces from time immemorial. Nor was it all that uncommon for certain schools of Confucianism to claim that one could not be a truly cultured gentleman without being a recluse.  Ironically it actually became something of a prerequisite for high office in certain times, meaning that it was not uncommon to find a fair number of “urban recluses” in Beijing or other important cities.

The obsession with living a natural and authentic life among the urban middle class in late imperial China set the stage for an explosion in the number of mystical recluses.  These individuals tended to follow certain social scripts which made them easy to identify.  Some hermits were actually able to find a place in the countryside, while others, because of career and business commitments, were instead forced to live out their calling in the cities.  For such individuals a natural looking garden, a rustic study and an art collection assembled to express the power of wild, untamed spaces was the key to living the proper life.

On a certain level it did not really matter where most reclusive individuals lived.  Indeed they could be found all over the country.  Yet they were all united by a few key characteristics.  What motivated them was a burning desire to somehow transcend the normal and “mundane.”  Whereas the peasant might extoll the virtues of the clan, and the merchant the consumption of fine object, the hermit wished to rise above all of this.  A return to nature and a “natural state” suggested one obvious way to accomplish this.

In practice this turn to the transcendent often necessitated some sort of ascetic practice.  For the less dedicated urban recluse this might simply mean making a big show of turning away callers.  But many individuals made more substantial sacrifices.

It was not uncommon for famous recluses to adopt vegetarian or other odd diets.  Ascetic practices were the norm.  Of course the Daoist longevity arts were pretty common, including both breathing exercises and more vigorous gymnastics.  Military training occasionally fell into the realm of ascetic practices that might be adopted by an eccentric gentleman.  If you really were planning on living by yourself deep in the wilderness such skills became very practical.

Confiscated weapons. Shanghai Municipal Police Department, 1925. University of Bristol, Historical Photographs of China.

 

Bringing the Martial Arts Back Into Popular Culture.

 

I think we are now in a good position to reintroduce the traditional fighting styles to our conversation.  We can gain a much better understanding of what the Chinese martial arts were by asking how they might have been expressed within each of these three different movements within popular culture.

In many ways the “cult of piety” forms the baseline that the other two social movements described by Cass grow out of and react against.  As such it is appropriate to start here.

One might assume that the hand combat would be shunned in this sector of popular culture given Confucianism’s discomfort with martial values.  Yet there were probably more martial arts practitioners who emerged out of this milieu than anywhere else.  In fact, I would speculate that one of our great failings as a field has been our lack of attention to how Confucianism informed the ways that ordinary soldiers and militia members thought about their craft.

Where in the historical record do we find instances of martial artists coming out of, and responding to, the “cult of piety?”  Many important military officers clearly fit this model.  Traditional Confucian models of authority and social order are important for understanding the life of General Qi Jiguang.  For instance, while he initially included a now famous chapter on the use of unarmed boxing in the training of military units in the military encyclopedia that he authored as a young man, he actually omitted that same discussion from the much better known second edition that was published later in his career.  Why?  It is likely that the more mature officer decided that the subject was not fit for high level official discussions.  After all, boxing itself was a marginal practice that was often seen as being at odds with good social order.

The Loyal Soldier

Perhaps the most obvious place where you see these values played out are in the various clan militias of Southern China.  Clan structures exist across China but for reasons that go beyond the point of this post they tended to be much stronger and more influential in Guangdong and Fujian.  These clans routinely owned large amounts of property and even controlled local industries.  In effect they functioned both as kinship groups and large private corporations.

Their need to collect rents, taxes and to protect their assets from encroachment by other clans, led these organizations to create their own military organizations.  These existed “off the books” and were largely independent from state control.  Such units would often hire professional martial artists to act both as instructors and as mercenaries to “stiffen the ranks” of their part-time militia members.

It was not unusual for clashes inspired by the economic interests of the various clans to escalate and turn deadly.  When that happened the state was forced to step in.  Of course the local government had no interest in actually dismantling the clan militias.  These family based fighting units were the basic building blocks that the state controlled and gentry led militia system was constructed out of.

Still, publicly delivering “justice” is a critical aspect of good governance.  When this happened the clan that was determined to be responsible for a death or outbreak of severe violence would be forced to turn over to the state a number of individuals.  Interestingly these were usually not the actual individuals who were responsible for the actual attack (at least if they had any value), but were instead much less important male members of the clan who were probably already wanted for a more minor offense.  The state could then make a great show of publicly executing these individuals who, in effect, sacrificed themselves for the protection of the clan as a whole.

Many of our more modern Kung Fu tales also make extensive use of the cult of piety.  In the martial novels of Jin Yong heroes willingly sacrifice themselves for the nation and will go to almost any length to avoid breaking a promise of marriage.  Their behavior is in line with the expectations of the cult of piety.

Such exaggerated acts function as important signals to the readers.  In normal society physical violence is frowned upon and it raises serious questions about an individual’s character.  Yet an exaggerated sense of loyalty, chastity or patriotism all demonstrates that a hero is capable of self-denial.  In this way he is able to enact the quintessentially masculine virtue of the Confucian system.

Big City Boxers

All of this stands in stark contrast to the vision of martial excellence that emerged in the rapidly growing cities of late imperial China.  Here the call to arms was not glorious martyrdom but rather commerce and enrichment.  Of course the average soldier was not paid very much and it seems that many militia members made even less, so it is fortunate that the urban markets created new opportunities for a skilled boxer to monetize their skill.

Street performers and patent medicine salesmen were everywhere.  They used martial arts displays to attract a crowd and sell their wares.  Opera companies that could only perform a few times a year in the countryside found steady employment in the red-light districts of southern China’s cities.  Further, organized crime needed a never ending supply of muscle.

Chinese cities could be dangerous places, and local businesses took precautions.  Boxers were hired as warehouse and pawnshop guards.  While steady employment these jobs lacked the prestige and pay of a position as a bodyguard or a position with an armed escort company.  Professional martial arts instructors, some retired from the military but others from the civilian realm, were needed to teach all of these people.  And the fact that they were paid in actual money meant that they could in turn pay for their instruction.

Other urban professions also called upon the expertise of martial artists.  It was not uncommon for medical doctors or pharmacists to occasionally employ boxing training as a means of improving a patient’s health or stamina.  Some of the most famous martial artists in all of southern China, including Leung Jan and Wong Fei Hung, actually made their living in medicine.  While the connection between TCM and the martial arts would become much deeper and more robust in the Republic era, it is important to note that the roots of this connection can clearly be seen in the thriving urban culture of the late imperial period.

If martial arts training was motivated by simple necessity and service to the group in the countryside, when transplanted to the city it found itself incorporated into the larger structures of the rapidly growing economic markets.  A wide variety of instructors, guards, gangsters, performers and even doctors had an opportunity to mix and exchange notes.  In this way they formed their own “martial arts subculture,” one that was probably quite distinct from the militias and military units that dominated the country side.  It is interesting to note that it was this urban faction of hand combat experts who probably contributed the most to the martial arts which were actually passed on to the modern era.

Retreating from the World of Rivers and Lakes

Still, this does not exhaust the list of social possibilities.  As Cass reminds us the urbanization of the late imperial period gave rise to (or enabled) a resurgence of interest in the “reclusive life.”  The most dedicated of these individuals hoped to attain a mystical level of “transcendence” beyond the concerns of ordinary life by cultivating the proper aura and engaging in certain ascetic practices.  No doubt there were others who simply followed the fad as it was fashionable.

Cass makes it clear that this movement was so popular that it touched practically every area of Chinese popular culture and social life.  As she eloquently (and ironically) put it, everyone knew a recluse.  In what ways do we see these same basic tendencies reflected in the Chinese martial arts of the period?

This question gets to heart of our current controversy.   Holcombe explicitly tied the martial arts to Daoist longevity practices and eccentric heterodox religious teachers.  In effect he claimed that the “reclusive current” dominated the development of the Chinese martial arts.  Others have argued against this.  In basic historical terms there is a lot more evidence of purely secular practice than Holcombe was willing to admit.  But where in the Chinese martial arts do we actually see the influence of the reclusive and mystical school?  Again, it would be very odd if this trend touched all other areas of Chinese popular culture at one time or another, but managed to totally miss boxing.

Zhang Songxi (c. 1520- c.1590) was a martial artist from the city of Ningbo, a busy port in Zhejiang Province (immediately north of Fujian).  The oldest and most reliable information we have on Zhang Songxi comes from Shen Yiguan (1531-1616).  Shen was a Confucian scholar who served as the Emperor’s Grand Secretary from 1594-1606.  While it is not clear what Shen thought of martial artists in general, he was from Ningbo and was quite proud of his hometown and its role in fighting off the Japanese.  In fact, it was Shen who actually ordered trade with Japan suspended, triggering the Piracy Crisis that would catapult Qi Jiguang to national fame.  Shen recorded and discussed the careers of some of his hometown’s local “heroes” in his essay “The Biography of Boxer Zhang Songxi” which was part of the larger “The Government Records and Annals of Ningbo City.”

Shen begins by noting that Zhang Songxi is not the best known martial artist from the area.  That honor would go to one named Bian Cheng.  However Bian Cheng was a rude fellow.  His life did not conform to Confucian values (the cult of piety).  Instead he sought fame and wealth.  He must have been unusually persistent because even managed to find it, twice.

Bian turned to the martial arts to solve his personal problems and he taught widely, without showing any discrimination about the character of his students.  On the bright side he did manage to defeat a group of Shaolin Monks, brought to the area to help quell the pirates, when they sought to challenge him.

Better still in Sheng’s opinion was Zhang Songxi.  He was taught by another formidable, socially unreconstructed, local boxer named Sun Thirteen.  Shen describes Sun as “rough and brutal.”  We also know that he valued simplicity and directness.

Apparently he also valued theoretical parsimony, a trait still seen in Southern China’s compact, jewel-like, hand combat systems today. Sun claimed that his entire art could be described by just three keywords or guiding principles.  His most talented disciple was Zhang Songxi.

Zhang was not a full time professional boxer but was actually a tailor by trade.  He earned the respect of Shen because he took what he learned from his master and he added the dimension of ethical refinement to it.  Rather than Sun’s three principles, Zhang taught five, with the last two being ethical and highly Confucian in nature.

Whereas Bian had sought fame and brawled with the ill-behaved Shaolin monks, Zhang Songxi was retiring and refused guests or callers who were interested in his martial skills.  He spent time in isolation, and favored the life of an eccentric gentleman farmer.

The contrast between Bian and Zhang is fascinating.  Clearly Bian and Sun represent the milieu of southern urbanism.  They were professional teachers and they accepted money for their services.  They advertised their skills widely and invested in building a reputation that could support them.

Zhang appears to have taken a different path.  Not only did he refuse to serve the government, but he also withdrew from the life of the city.  He is portrayed as having turned towards the reclusive path precisely because he had a richer understanding of the philosophy of boxing.  Further, his biographer seems to grant him a certain level of transcendence.  Of course this is only a single account, but it does indicate that even court historians were willing to admit that martial artists could become recluses or mystics.

A number of other examples of important martial artists being influenced by these same currents also come to mind.  For instance, Chen Zhong You, famous for his Ming era study of Shaolin fighting techniques, spent the better part of his youth following martial monks on their various military missions and studying at Shaolin.  Yet Chen was not from a military background.  He was a younger son from a well to do gentry family.  One would normally expect an individual like him to dedicate his life to earning a degree in the imperial exams.  Instead he decided to leave home, live in the mountains and make a decades long study of pole fighting.  It is hard to imagine a more ascetic route to personal cultivation.

There are a lot of things about his life and personal motivations that we do not know, and probably never will.  However, it seems that one possible strategy for interpreting the facts that we do have would be to situate them within the “reclusive current.”  Like so many other young men in the late Ming he seems to have developed an interest in the esoteric side of life and to have turned his back on more normal pursuits.  Even the title of his volume on the Shaolin fighting arts, “Techniques For After-Farming Pastime” indicates that he was consciously emulating the mode of the outwardly rustic (yet inwardly cultured) hermits who dominated the period’s public imagination.

Of course otherworldly recluses have always been closely tied to the martial arts in the world of Kung Fu fiction.  Countless stories, and more creation myths than I can count, start when the young hero meets a mysterious monk, nun, priest or hermit on the side of a mountain.  Most of these stories are pure fiction.  Yet in both the Ming and the current era a number of people did go to sacred or wild places explicitly to transcend the concerns of a normal life through one dedicated to practice and natural living.

A typical market place demonstration featuring socially marginal martial artists.

 

Conclusion

 

It may be impossible to give any simple answer to the question of whether the traditional Chinese martial arts were actually meant to be an effective means of self-defense.  Not only did the profession of individual students and practitioners vary, but there are other factors that need to be considered as well.  The late imperial period saw a number of different trends within Chinese popular culture.  In the current post we have reviewed three, but a more detailed treatment would certainly reveal others.

Each of these currents was broadly based and affected many areas of Chinese society.  We should probably not be surprised to learn that they also had an important impact on the way that the traditional martial arts were expressed.  In fact, the core values of “martial culture” could vary tremendously depending on whether the individuals in question were coming out of the “cult of piety”, the new urbanism or the resurgent rustic tradition.

If we wish to really appreciate the lives of China’s various martial artists, whether they were war heroes like Qi Jiguang, urban instructors like Chan Wah Shun and Leung Jan or reclusive masters like Zhang Songxi, it is important to situate them within the social landscape of their day.  Only then can we really understand what they hoped to accomplish through their mastery of the martial arts.

 

oOo

 

If you enjoyed this essay you might also want to read:  “The Professor in the Cage”: Can Gottschall Bring Science to the Study of Violence?

 

oOo


Imagining Ip Man: Globalization and the Growth of Wing Chun Kung Fu

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Ip Man.Title Image

 

***I am current on the road for the annual Martial Arts Studies conference at Cardiff University in the UK.  As soon as I return home I will be posting a full report of the event and sharing the text and slides from my keynote (titled “Show, Don’t Tell: Making Martial Arts Studies Matter.”)  In the mean time, here is the text from my 2015 keynote, which draws on themes discussed in my book The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts.  Enjoy!***

 

Introduction

 

In a recent post I discussed some of the major themes and ideas to emerge from the keynote addresses delivered at the recent Martial Arts Studies held at the University of Cardiff.  Astute readers may have noticed that something was missing.  Due to the constraints of time I omitted any mention of my own presentation from that first report.  Now that a few weeks have passed and I have had a chance to get settled, its time to rectify this omission.

This task was made even easier when I received an email from the conference organizer letting me know that a recording of my talk was going to be made available on Youtube.  A number of presentations were taped (with permission) and some of the graduate students at Cardiff have been editing and compiling footage so that this can be shared with the public.  Rather than simply reading my account of my paper, you can go and watch the original presentation here.  The total running time on this video is just over an hour.  Special thanks go to Ester Hu and Ning Wu for their hard work in preparing this and the other recordings.

I am also happy announce that two of the other keynote addresses have also been uploaded and are made available to viewers.  These are the conferences opener by Stephen Chan (“Martial Arts: The Imposture of an Impersonation of an Improvisation of Infidelities (amidst some few residual fidelities”)  and D. S. Farrer (“Efficiency and Entertainment in Martial Arts Studies: Anthropological Perspectives”).  While by no means exhaustive, I think that together these three presentations do convey a sense of the work being done in this newly emerging interdisciplinary field.

Of course not everyone loves video.  I for one would always prefer to read a paper.  For those of you who share my inclination I am also posting the text of the remarks that I prepared below.

Before launching into the substance of this discussion a few words of explanation may be in order.  This paper summarizes some of the final arguments made in my forthcoming volume (with Jon Nielson) The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts (State University of New York Press, 2015).  It can almost be thought of as a public reading of the volume’s concluding chapter.  Except that it isn’t.  The conclusion would have been too long and it presupposes that one has just read the preceding book.  So this talk combined discussions from both the books introduction and conclusion, as well as some other material bringing it all together.  Still, one might think of this as a “reading” from the upcoming volume. Enjoy!

 

 

Flight Crew.Wing Chun 1

 

 

Imagining Ip Man: Globalization and Growth of Wing Chun Kung Fu

 

In April of 2011 Hong Kong Airlines did something seemingly out of character. Most airlines seeking a share of the lucrative business class market attempt to impress the public with photos of their genteel and sumptuous cabins. Some seem to be engaged in an arms race to find ever more attractive and demure flight attendants. Instead Hong Kong Airlines announced that their flight crews would be taking mandatory training in a southern Chinese form of hand combat called Wing Chun. Having earned a reputation as a street fighting art on the rooftops of Hong Kong in the 1950s, this move appears paradoxical. It is one thing to quietly train cabin crews in rudimentary self-defense skills. It is quite another to offer press releases, give interviews, and post internet videos of how an unruly customer might be restrained.

It would be wrong to suggest that there is no glamour attached to Wing Chun. This was the only martial art that the iconic Bruce Lee ever studied. Nevertheless, when one juxtaposes the image of a bloody Lee (straight from the promotional material for Enter the Dragon) with a petite flight attendant from any competitor’s television commercial, one must ask what the advertising executives of Hong Kong Airlines know about their regional markets that we do not.

On purely historical grounds, it is rather odd that anyone seeking the past should “remember” Wing Chun, or any other traditional martial art, at all. The blunt truth is that for most of China’s history, the martial arts have not been very popular. While there has always been a subset of people who took up these pursuits, they were something that the better elements of society studiously avoided.

In the mid-1950s, when Bruce Lee was learning Wing Chun from his teacher Ip Man, there were probably less than a 1000 practitioners of the art in all of Hong Kong. When Ip Man learned the style from his teacher (or Sifu) in Foshan at the turn of the 20th century, it seems likely that there were less than two dozen students of his version of the art in total. The first realization that we need to wrap our minds around is that in many ways studying the “traditional” Chinese martial arts is actually a quintessentially modern activity.

Given this disconnect, much of my research over the last couple of years has sought to understand how exactly these arts have come to be such effective symbols of local identity and continuity with the past in southern China. But in today’s address I would instead like to shift my focus slightly and ask why some arts, like Wing Chun, have succeeded in the global system while others slipped quietly into obscurity.

What does this success indicate about the nature of the martial arts in general? And what does it suggest about the challenges that individuals perceive in the face of rapid economic, social and cultural dislocation?

The techniques of the traditional Chinese martial arts have a history that stretches back hundreds if not thousands of years. Yet the story of Ip Man, Bruce Lee, and the success of Wing Chun nicely illustrates the degree to which these arts have succeeded precisely because they are modern and global practices. Of course this is not how we generally think about or discuss the “traditional” martial arts.

While Ip Man and his student Bruce Lee are headlining today’s address, in many ways it is “globalization” that actually provides the terrain that we will explore. Originally rooted in the birth of European modernity this system of rapid social, economic and cultural change has since expanded to mark every corner of the globe.

Like much of the world China was first touched by globalization during the rush to construct a free trade system based on open markets during the 19th century. One simply cannot dismiss the influence of larger systemic forces when thinking about critical events in recent Chinese history like the Taiping Rebellion, the growth of regional imperialism or the Opium Wars.

It is also fascinating to note that so many of the martial arts that are popular today, including practices like Taijiquan or Wing Chun, were actually either created or reformulated and disseminated during this late period. Authors like Douglas Wile have suggested some reasons as to why this should not be a surprise. And then we see these same practices explode onto the global scene in during the 1960s-1970s as globalization hit another peak.

Yet just as the martial arts are a complex subject that must be examined from multiple perspectives, there is more than one way of thinking about the challenges posed by globalization. A more conventional, empirically driven, reading of the phenomenon claims that globalization is present when we see three things: the increased flow of goods (meaning trade), capital (or money) and labor (people) crossing state boundaries.

This rather simple conceptualization of globalization is the sort of thing that I was introduced to in my graduate economics training. It’s a very materialist approach to the problem. But it does direct our attention to some factors that are absolutely critical in understanding the challenges that an art like Wing Chun faced as it has sought to expand its presence throughout international markets.

Yet this isn’t the only way to think about globalization or the obstacles and opportunities that it has presented the Asian martial arts. Peter Beyer, in his work on the survival and evolution of religion in a modern era, suggests that we can also conceptualize globalization as the increased flow of ideas or “modes of communication” between previously isolated communities.

Beyer goes on to note that this sort of transformation can have important implications for any social institution responsible for transmitting fundamental social values, and during the late 19th and early 20th century, that is exactly how the Chinese martial arts came to be understood.

Modernization theorists long suspected that traditional types of identity such as ethnicity and religion would vanish in the modern era, and for the most part China’s May 4th intellectuals agreed. They also claimed that the traditional martial arts with their feudal and backwards values could not survive in the current era. Needless to say this hasn’t actually happened. Regional identity is strong, religions still exist in the world today, and more people are currently practicing Wing Chun than at any other time in its past.

So how do practices survive in a hanged world? By evolving. More specifically, while rapid modernization may resolve one set of dilemmas, it often creates a whole host of secondary problems.

This presents the guardians of more traditional ways of defining social meaning with an opportunity. On the one hand they can either find a new problem to offer a solution for, in essence turn themselves into a purveyor of a specialized skill and conform to the demands of modernization. Or they can double down on the more basic question of identity and meaning in a world where these things have become somewhat scarce commodities. But the critical thing to realize is that both of these strategies represent a transformation to accommodate modernity, even if one continues to market your brand based on its long history.

This is where the debates about Ip Man, who he was, what he taught, what sort of art Wing Chun really is, enters the picture. As we look at discussions within the Wing Chun community and other traditions we see exactly this discussion taking place. Do the martial arts need to evolve in order to survive, or does their value come from the timeless message of who we really are? Note also that this dynamic can help us to make sense of the powerful drive to find the supposedly “ancient” and “authentic” roots of these practices that currently dominates so many discussions of the martial arts including, once again, Wing Chun.

 

Bruce Lee. Detailed portrait.

Bruce Lee. Detailed portrait.

Wing Chun as a Commodity in the Global Marketplace

 

Ip Man did much to increase Wing Chun’s profile as a regional martial art after 1949 and he set the stage for its eventual rise to prominence within the larger hand combat community. Still, one cannot understand the global growth of this system, or any of the Asian fighting arts, without appreciating the role of his better known student, Bruce Lee.

Lee is the axiomatic figure in any discussion of the late 20th century internationalization of the martial arts. While some individuals in both North America and Europe had been exposed to these systems during the tumultuous middle decades of the 20th century, often as a result of military service in the Second World War, the Korean War or Vietnam, the appeal of the traditional Asian hand combat systems had remained limited.

These limitations manifest themselves in different ways. Fewer individuals in the west practiced these arts in the 1950s and 1960s than is the case today. Nor did they enjoy the almost constant exposure in the popular media that we have become accustomed to.

A survey of the pages of Black Belt magazine, then the largest American periodical dedicated to the martial arts, shows that most of the articles published in the early to middle years of the 1960s focused on Japanese hand combat systems. Karate and Aikido were probably the best known alternatives to Judo. Indeed, much ink was spilled during the decade debating the relative merits of these different systems.

Bruce Lee’s initial appearances on television, where he played the role of Kato on the Green Hornet (1966-1967), and then on the big screen in the 1973 sensation Enter the Dragon, had a profound effect on the place of the Asian martial arts in western popular culture. Given their current popularity we often forget that prior to the 1970s very few individuals were familiar with the term “kung fu” or even knew that the Chinese had also produced hand combat systems of their own.

Bruce Lee’s appearance on the Green Hornet had an immediate impact on the North American martial arts community. What was not evident at the time was that the boundaries of this still relatively small community were about to be fundamentally redrawn. 1973 saw the release of both Enter the Dragon and the news of Lee’s death at the shockingly young age of 32. The film captivated western audiences with its innovative fight choreography, nods to Asian philosophy (something else which had been growing in popularity with western consumers since WWII) and unabashed violence.

Concerned that the public might not identify with a single leading Asian actor, the film featured a diverse cast which gave important roles to both John Saxon and Jim Kelly. These fears proved to be unfounded as audiences around the globe were drawn to Lee’s charismatic performance. Still, the self-conscious decision to feature an ensemble cast of martial artists from a variety of racial, national, economic and social backgrounds had a powerful impact on viewers. It broadcast once and for all that the potential for both self-realization and group empowerment promised by the martial arts lay within every human being regardless of their personal circumstances or nation of origin.

Lee’s untimely death in 1973 crystallized his image at a single moment in time. He became a prophet to his followers, snatched away at the very moment of revelation. Rather than looking forward to what Lee would have done next, those who struggled to understand the promise of this message were instead forced to look back to his previous films, television appearances, interviews and assorted writings. All of these things could be easily commoditized.

Martial arts instruction could also be commoditized and distributed to the public. The wave of enthusiasm unleashed by Lee’s sudden eruption into the popular consciousness filled martial arts classes of seemingly every style with new students. As one might expect, the previously obscure Chinese martial arts were major beneficiaries of this new attention. Wing Chun’s development was forever shaped by its association with Bruce Lee.

While Lee had been involved with the film industry since his youth (when he starred in a number of movies as a child actor), he was also a dedicated martial artist. Lee had first been introduced to Wing Chun in Hong Kong in the 1950s when he became a student of Ip Man.

After coming to the United States he continued to teach and promote the Chinese martial arts. His skills, personable nature and TV roles led to appearances in Black Belt magazine where he mentioned his background in Wing Chun and his teacher. Multiple articles published in this period actually featured images of Ip Man sitting beside, or practicing chi sao with, his increasingly famous student.

Given how little western media exposure the Chinese arts as a whole received, this was an unprecedented amount of publicity. Even before the advent of the “Kung Fu Craze” in 1973, Bruce Lee had assured that his Sifu would be among the best known Chinese martial artists in the west.

The Bruce Lee phenomenon boosted the ranks of many different Asian martial arts styles. In truth Karate schools, because of their popularity, probably benefited more from his appearance than anyone else. Yet this transformation in the way that the global public perceived these fighting systems was not enough to preserve every fighting style that had been practiced earlier in the 20th century. At the same time that arts like Wing Chun, Taijiquan and the various schools of Karate were reaping the benefits of this unexpected windfall, other traditional Chinese systems were slipping into obscurity.

What are some of the other more material factors that may have facilitated Wing Chun’s spread throughout the international system?

The first, and possibly most critical variable to consider, is geography. Exporting any good, whether physical or cultural, is expensive. All forms of trade are ultimately limited by the size of the “transaction costs” associated with the exchange. These costs include factors such as the expenses of adapting, translating and shipping goods for sale in other markets.

Ip Man’s flight to Hong Kong late in 1949 was, without a doubt, the single most important factor in explaining the subsequent success of his art. Why? This city occupied a unique place in the post-WWII economic order. It had traditionally been a major transit port for trade between western markets and China. As a result residents of Hong Kong were connected to global markets in ways that most individuals on the mainland were not.

These links were manifest in many areas, all of which served to reduce Wing Chun’s transaction costs. Hong Kong itself was one of the most urban and modernized sections of southern China. It had a highly efficient educational system which actually produced more students than the local universities could absorb. Some of these individuals were fluent in English and had either family or business connections abroad. In fact, a number of Ip Man’s younger students in the 1950s and 1960s came from relatively affluent middle class families and traveled to North America, Europe or Australia to pursue additional educational opportunities.

Ip Ching, the son of Ip Man, has noted that this pattern of out-migration was one of the main ways in which the socioeconomic status of his father’s students contributed to the spread of the Wing Chun system. When the Bruce Lee phenomenon hit in the early 1970s, there were already a number of individuals studying and working in various western cities who were able to take on students and begin to teach the Wing Chun system. More soon followed. The transnational flow of labor, in this case students and young adults, was critical to Wing Chun’s eventual success.

Other arts, even ones that had been very popular, had fewer opportunities to take advantage of this outpouring of enthusiasm if they were located in areas less connected to the global transfer of capital, ideas and individuals. The various martial systems of south-west China struggled to gain a foothold within the global market as comparatively few individuals from this region had emigrated to the west prior to the 1970s. Likewise, not all of Hong Kong’s arts were blessed with a relatively affluent group of students who had access to international employment and educational opportunities.

It is also important to consider the general attitude of these students and how that may have interacted with their socio-economic status. It seems to me that in the current era there seems to be a push to reimagine the Wing Chun of the 1960s as something more “traditional” than it actually was. This can be seen in a number of areas, from the re-emergence of the “discipleship” system in a number of schools to the enthusiasm with which some students have greeted the rediscovery of “lost lineages” claiming direct descent from either the Shaolin Temple or late Qing revolutionary groups.

While discussing the Wu Taijiquan community from Shanghai Adam Frank has argued that the shifting economic opportunities presented by global expansion will not always lead to more openness within a fighting style. At times the pressures and potential profits of international markets may actually lead to a renewed emphasis on secrecy and exclusion as organizations attempt to differentiate their product and control the flow of financially valuable teaching opportunities. We should not assume that the process of globalization will necessarily lead to more open or liberal styles.

So how did Wing Chun, and its various students, appear to observers prior to the explosion of interest that would make it a leading Chinese art? Did it give the impression of a forward looking system, or one that was basically reactionary, seeking to preserve tradition?

In 1969 a Wing Chun student named Rolf Clausnitzer and his teacher Greco Wong published a book titled Wing-Chun Kung-Fu: Chinese Self-Defence Methods. Clausnitzer had lived in Hong Kong as a youth and was one of the first westerners to practice and closely observe the Wing Chun system. He had initially interviewed Ip Man in 1960 and later studied with his student Wong Shun Leung. After moving to the UK he continued his studies with Greco Wong, who was a student of Moy Yat.

Readers should carefully consider the timing of this publication. In 1969 the general explosion of interest in the martial arts (and Wing Chun in particular) that would be unleashed with Enter the Dragon was still a few years off. So this early work offers us a suggestion of how Ip Man’s Wing Chun system might have appeared to western martial artists prior to the launch of the “Kung Fu Craze” and the orientalist urges that it seems to have embodied.

Originally from Kwangtung province he migrated to Hong Kong where he still resides. An outspoken man, Yip Man regards Wing Chun as a modern form of Kung Fu, i.e. as a style of boxing highly relevant to modern fighting conditions. Although not decrying the undoubted abilities of gifted individuals in other systems he nevertheless feels that many of their techniques are beyond the capabilities of ordinary students. Their very complexity requires years if not decades to master and hence greatly reduced their practical value in the context of our fast-moving society where time is such a vital factor. Wing Chun on the other hand is an art of which an effective working knowledge can be picked up in a much shorter time than is possible in other systems. It is highly realistic, highly logical and economical, and able to hold its own against any other style or system of unarmed combat.

Even more thought-provoking is Clausnitzer and Wong’s description of Ip Man’s students and how they compared to other groups in Hong Kong’s hand combat marketplace.

An interesting characteristic common to most practitioners of Wing Chun lies in their relatively liberal attitude to the question of teaching the art to foreigners. They are still very selective when it comes to accepting individual students, but compared with the traditional Kung Fu men they are remarkably open and frank about the art. If any one Chinese style of boxing is destined to become the first to gain popularity among foreigners, more likely than not it will be Wing Chun.

Bruce Lee’s rise to superstardom ushered Wing Chun onto a wider stage than Clausnitzer and Wong could have imagined in 1969. Yet, as we have seen, the system did possess certain characteristics that allowed it to capitalize on this windfall during a time when other traditional Chinese styles were falling into obscurity. Perhaps the most important of these were Ip Man’s decision to streamline the art following his move to Hong Kong and the nature of the students that his school attracted. Clausnitzer and Wong’s early observations appear almost prophetic in light of the system’s subsequent emergence as one of the most popular fighting arts within the global arena.

 

 

Ip Man visiting Ho Ka Ming's School in Macau.

Ip Man visiting Ho Kam Ming’s School in Macau.

Two Visions of the Wing Chun Community

 

Some accounts (such as those left by Chu Shong Tin) suggest that Ip Man liked to play the role of the Confucian gentleman. This embodiment of traditional cultural values attracted a certain type of student during the Hong Kong period. Yet, as the previous quotes remind us, Wing Chun succeeded in large part because Ip Man understood it as a modern fighting system.

Even Lee’s films, while examples of visual fantasy, retained a veneer of gritty social reality. His protagonists stood up to racial, social, national and economic oppression in an era when those problems were acutely felt. And Lee’s fame has done much to facilitate the subsequent success of Ip Man as a media figure.

Still, the Ip Man that seems to be the most popular with audiences today is a different sort of hero than his later student. Whereas Bruce Lee’s early films appeared to carry a politically radical subtext, Ip Man as he is imagined on-screen has been a much more conservative figure. Portrayed as a local and national hero, he fights to retain the values and hierarchies of the past rather than to overturn them.

There are a number of ways to approach this disjoint. When reimagining Ip Man for the big screen it is no longer enough to see him only as a local kung fu teacher. For these movies to be a commercial success they had to be embraced by wide audiences in both Hong Kong, on the mainland and in the west. As such a dual discourse was adopted where Ip Man found expression as both a local and a national figure. Wilson Ip’s 2008 effort succeeded precisely because it managed to strike a masterful balance between these various audiences.

So what is the significance of the current reimagining of Ip Man’s legacy for those of us in martial arts studies? Peter Beyer might remind us that there is more than one way to think about the process of globalization. While ultimately a continuation of the drive towards modernity that was launched in 19th century Europe, we can also understand it as a transformation of the ways in which meaning is communicated between society and individuals. This more conceptual understanding of globalization may shine a different light on the sorts of roles that the martial arts, and Wing Chun in particular, are being called on to perform in the current era.

According to Beyer, the process of globalization has resulted in traditional means of value creation being displaced by schools of thought that privilege efficiency and professionalism. Religious modes of communication have been one of the great losers in this process. Indeed, Beyer’s work is centrally concerned with the fate of organized religion in an increasingly global world.

To create systems of meaning (which can then be used to support a variety of administrative and political functions) Beyer argues that religions, and other “generalized” modes of communication, begin by positing the existence of two realms, a “transcendent” and an “imminent.”

Given that the imminent defines the totality of our daily existence, we actually have trouble talking about it as we have no exterior points of reference from which to define abstract values and concepts. This problem is overcome by postulating the existence of a “transcendent” state in which none of the basic conditions that define daily life are said to exist. Through their monopoly on socially meaningful communication, religions (and other ritual systems) were traditionally able to make themselves essential in all sorts of social spheres.

This balance was upset by the rise of more professionalized modes of action during the modern era. Why? Highly focused types of communication are more efficient than those based on general cultural ideas. Modern societies value this increase in efficiency. As a result the priests and nuns that had overseen so many elements of western life were replaced with doctors, nurses, teachers, counselors, lawyers and bureaucrats.

This same process of increased specialization and professionalization has now found expression all over the globe. Nor are religious institutions the only ones to be challenged by these fundamental shifts in social values. Any “generalist” mode of communication can potentially find its social influence threatened by the rise of professionalism and increased rationalization. In fact, when individuals talk about the declining popularity of many martial arts in mainland China today, it is often this sort of narrative that they turn to. The traditional martial arts are seen as incompatible with the demands of modernity.

This is a very brief summary of Beyer’s complex argument as presented in his volume Religion and Globalization (2000). Yet contrary to the expectations of the early modernization and secularization theorists, religion, ethnicity and the like has not simply vanished. Instead the disruptions created by globalization have presented new opportunities for these institutions to retain some degree of social relevance.

On the one hand, they can focus on new aspects of “public performance” by addressing the secondary problems caused by this massive economic and social transformation. This more liberal strategy proved to be popular and can be seen in places as diverse as the rise of “liberation theology” in Latin American or the increased concern with environmental protection by a number of different types of churches in the more affluent west.

Other organizations have instead adopted a more conservative approach by refocusing their energies on the question of “fundamental communication” about the transcendent.
This second strategy is especially useful if one wishes to address questions of identity, and hence the definition and boundaries of the community, in the face of increased global pressures and dislocation. Such approaches have proved to be popular and their influence can be seen in the rise of fundamentalist communities in many world religions.

Nor is there any reason to think that these two adaptive strategies are restricted to discussions of religion. Douglas Wile has noted that the disruptions which imperiled the Chinese empire in the middle of the 19th century (including the Taiping Rebellion and the Opium Wars) badly shook society’s self-confidence. This, in turn, became a critical moment in the formation of modern Taijiquan.

He argues that the Wu brother’s subsequent research and development of the Taiji Classics can be understood as an attempt to find, reevaluate and reassemble what was valuable in Chinese culture in the face of a rapidly evolving existential challenge from the modern west. While Taijiquan clearly has technical roots which stretch back for centuries, it is this late 19th century social agenda, expanded and reimagined in explicitly nationalist terms during the 20th century, which defines how many people experience the system today.

Still, there are debates as to what Taiji should become. On the one hand there are groups who see in the art a cultural repository of what is essentially “Chinese.” While foreign students might learn the techniques, it is doubtful that they could even gain the deep cultural knowledge necessary to correlate and perfect this mass of material. For some practitioners what lies at the root of the system is an essentialist ideal of racial or national identity.

Other reformers have claimed that for Taiji to survive in the modern world it must adapt. Specifically, it must evolve to meet the needs of its changing student. An aging population can benefit from the increased feelings of health, balance and well-being that come with daily forms practice. Busy corporate executives can turn to simplified versions of the art for stress relief and lifestyle advice. I think that the idea of Sifu as life coach is something that many of us are probably familiar with.

Here we see the two adaptive strategies that Beyer suggested were open to all traditional modes of communication threatened by globalization. The first camp has focused on the question of primary communication, which in the modern era so often finds its expression in the exploration of cultural and national identity. The second group has instead sought to adapt the art to deal with the ancillary problems created by life in an increasingly fast paced and interconnected modern society.

This same process can also be seen in the Wing Chun community. Certain schools continue to focus on the “solutions” (be they self-defense, health or psychological well-being) that Wing Chun can provide. Yet not every discussion of the art trends in this utilitarian direction. The endless debates of the deep (and basically unknowable) origins of this style signal an ongoing interest in the idea that a hidden and somehow more “real” identity is out there. It is interesting to note how often that search leads back to nationally motivated myths of resistance grounded in either the Shaolin Temple or legendary rebel groups.

Indeed, the impulse to see Ip Man as something more than a martial arts teacher is not confined to recent films. It also reflects a fundamental current within the Wing Chun community. What defines the heart of this system, and what should it become in the future? Is this a style built around the solutions to pressing technical and social problems? Or is it instead one that attempts to imagine a space in which its members have a better, and more empowered, understanding of who they are?

 

ip man.chair
Conclusion

 

In conclusion I would like to turn to a few lines of dialogue from a more recent reimagining of Ip Man, one that seems almost self-reflective about what he is becoming not just in Chinese popular culture but on the world stage. In an early scene of Wong Kar-wai’s 2013 film The Grandmaster we find Ip Man accepting a challenge from a northern master looking to pass on the mantle of leadership. When mentioning the divide between the Southern and Northern styles of the martial arts Ip Man asserts:

“The world is a big place. Why limit it to “North” and “South?” It holds you back. To you this cake is the country, to me it is so much more. Break from what you know, and you will know more. The southern [martial] arts are bigger than just the North and South.”

This scene is fascinating as it seems to contemplate the rise of Ip Man as a cultural icon and then goes on to address this debate in almost explicit terms. What is the value of the Southern Chinese martial arts? Are they an expression of local identity? Are they subservient to nationalist dreams? Or do they somehow transcend this? Can they become more? Nor, if Beyer is correct, should we expect to see this debate resolved in the near future. A dispute between positions representing such fundamentally different sets of possibilities simply cannot be resolved.

The dialectic tension between these two competing visions generates much of the emotional power that drives the Chinese martial arts today. While these fighting systems may appear to be “traditional,” in their present form they are inescapably the product of a modern global world. Ip Man’s actual genius lay in his perception and embrace of this fundamental truth.

oOo

 

If you enjoyed this presentation you might also want to see the Keynote addresses by Stephen Chan (“Martial Arts: The Imposture of an Impersonation of an Improvisation of Infidelities (amidst some few residual fidelities”)  and D. S. Farrer (“Efficiency and Entertainment in Martial Arts Studies: Anthropological Perspectives”), which have also been uploaded to Youtube!

oOo


Lightsaber Combat and Wing Chun: The Search for Meaning in the Modern Martial Arts

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The title slide of my keynote address at the July 2016 Martial Arts Studies Conference.

The title slide of my keynote address at the July 2016 Martial Arts Studies Conference.

 

***I am current on the road for the annual Martial Arts Studies conference at Cardiff University in the UK.  As soon as I return home I will be posting a full report of the event and sharing the text and slides from my keynote (titled “Show, Don’t Tell: Making Martial Arts Studies Matter.”)  In the mean time, here is my 2016 keynote, which examines the nature and purpose of hyper-real martial arts.  Enjoy!***

 

“Liminoid Longings and Liminal Belonging: Hyper-reality, History and the Search for Meaning in the Modern Martial Arts” A keynote address delivered at the July 2016 Martial Arts Studies Conference, Cardiff University, UK.

by Dr. Benjamin N. Judkins

 

Introduction

 

You can learn a lot about a martial arts class by the ways in which it begins and ends.  They all have their own small rituals and verbal incantations.  Consider the closing of a fairly typical class at the Central Lightsaber Academy.

Sweating, in a not sufficiently air-conditioned space, the fourteen of us gathered, saluted the instructor, deactivated our weapons and received a few parting words of advice on the drills we had run for the better part of an hour.  After which our leader, Darth Nihilus, said “Your basic combat applications are looking better, and next week we will be working on our choreography again.   Lastly, anyone wanting to spar should use the set of mats at the back of the gym.  And remember, this is all just for fun!”

This is, give or take a few details, how every class ends.  Unrelentingly upbeat and supportive, it is not the parting benediction that one might expect from a self-style “Dark Lord of the Sith.”

The students standing around me broke into groups as the class dispersed.  Four of them grab fencing masks and armored gloves so that they could get in a few last rounds of sparring before heading home.  Others exchanged contact information and planed times to get together to practice their choreography, or just hang out, during the week.  And one martial arts studies researcher stood in the middle of it wondering, “Why does someone as intense as Darth Nihilus repeatedly, multiple times a class, insist that this is all just for fun?”

Certainly the students who meet at the CLA have a lot of fun.  You can see it in the expressions on their faces, and the intensity of their engagement with the curriculum.  The atmosphere of the class is relaxed but focused.  There is not a lot of talking as letting your concentration slip might very well mean getting smacked in the head with a heavy polycarbonate blade emitting a cool blue, green or a more sinister red glow.  Weapons work always requires a high degree of mental discipline, even when the blades in question do not actually exist.

For an activity that is “just for fun,” the students of the CLA show a surprising degree of dedication.  Half of them practice daily (a few for up to an hour).  Everyone in the room has purchased their own stunt sabers, even though the school always has plenty of loaners.  Most of these are economical models, costing less than $100.  But some individuals have paid up to $500 for a replica weapon that is personally meaningful.

When asked about their reasons for coming they provide a wide variety of responses.  Perhaps the most common is a desire to find a fun way to get in shape and stay active.  For the self-described martial artists in the room the lightsaber is an irresistible thought experiment and a release from the stresses, constraints and “politics” of the traditional Asian martial arts.  And for about half of the students, the lightsaber class is an extension of their Star Wars fandom.  As one of my classmates, a self-styled Jedi Knight, memorably stated, the CLA “is where bad-ass nerds are made!”

Yet after a few weeks what almost everyone focuses on is the community.   As another member of class noted:

 

“When I heard about a lightsaber class I thought that it was so dorky that I was totally in.  I thought that we were just going to be goofing off and hitting each other with lightsabers.  I totally did not expect what it has come to be, which is a new group of friends unlike anything that I have encountered before.”

 

In her comments Darth Zannah goes on to describe the degree of personal empowerment and confidence that she discovered as she became a more competent duelist over the last several months.  Recently she even competed in an open tournament against a number of much more experienced swordsmen from a variety of backgrounds.

Darth Zannah’s sentiments seem to be widely shared and probably accounts for the Central Lightsaber Academy’s excellent student retention.  Between the fast paced classes, wide variety of activities and the general social dynamic, there can be no doubt that these students are objectively “having fun.”  Yet I found the frequency of Darth Nihilus’ refrain puzzling.

While I have always enjoyed my martial arts training, I suspect that “just for fun” is not a turn of phrase that most practitioners of the traditional arts would be willing to embrace.  What we do in the “real martial arts” is almost always couched in a rhetorical framework that at once justifies and apologizes for the resources spent on training.

Taekwondo builds “character” in American school children. Kendo teaches other children what it means to be Japanese.  Styles as diverse as MMA and Wing Chun claim to teach vitally important “real world self-defense skills.”  While many individuals enjoy martial arts training, very few would admit that we spend our means on a hobby that is “just for fun.”  We almost always shift our discussion into the realm of “investment” and “hard work.”

In this regard Darth Nihilus is no exception.  When not moonlighting as a Darth Lord of the Sith, he is a professional martial arts instructor.  The CLA is actually housed within a cavernous 2,500 square foot commercial space in an enclosed suburban shopping mall which, for most of the week, is the home of the “Central Martial Arts Academy.”  Nihilus, along with a business partner, offer classes in wing chun, kali and JKD.  The mall itself is located in a more affluent suburb of a medium sized rust-belt city.

The atmosphere in his other, more traditional, classes is notably different.  Social interactions are inflected by vertical hierarchies marked by an explicit system of colored sashes layered over the more traditional system of “senior students.” What had been a generally relaxed atmosphere is somewhat tenser, and that tension shows in the posture and body language of the students.  It reads in the way they automatically form hierarchically graded straight lines at the end of their classes.  This is something you never see in the CLA which manages, at best, lazy semi-circles.

The rhetoric of these traditional martial arts classes is grimmer, featuring frequent outburst like “really hit him!”; “Remember, he could have a knife!” and the warning “If you get lazy it won’t work on the street.”

Students do not come to these classes simply for fun.  Their motivations are those that we would generally expect in a martial arts school.  Some are interested primarily in self-defense, others are looking for a challenging route to self-improvement, and a few are drawn to the school’s successful kickboxing team.  No matter what goals brought them in, everyone in the Central Martial Arts Academy is engaged in “hard work” and expects to be held to a high standard.

The code switching that Darth Nihilus exhibits when the discussion shifts between these two realms is, at times, remarkable.  When talking about wing chun he is serious, adamant in his views, historically informed and visibly frustrated by the state of lineage politics within that art.  He speaks as a martial artist.  A tension enters his body language and facial expressions.

When the conversation turns to lightsaber combat he relaxes, adopts a remarkably ecumenical view of the world, is eager to explore a vast range of activities (from kata practice, to competitive tournaments to cosplay).  Here he favors horizontal forms of cooperation and association between a wide range of groups with very different sorts of goals.  It is all, as he frequently reminds us, “Just for fun.”

In strictly empirical terms, this sort of “fun” is essentially a part time job for Nihilus, occupying many hours a week.  The CLA also brings a notable number of new paying students to his classes who, in many cases, have never set foot in a gym or martial arts school before.  In the world of small, and often struggling, suburban martial arts schools, that is an economic reality that simply cannot be ignored.

In a recent article I looked at the history and basic characteristics of lightsaber combat and argued that while it is a hyper-real practice, meaning that it draws much of its inspiration from a set of fictional texts, universally acknowledged as such, it nevertheless fulfills all of the basic criteria of a martial art.  I further suggested that the invention of hyper-real martial arts might help us to better understand the processes by which all martial arts are created, as well as the varieties of social functions that they fulfill in modern societies.  That, in turn, might suggest some important hypotheses about who takes up different sorts of martial arts training, and what the future of these fighting systems might hold.

In this paper I suggest a possible framework for thinking about the varieties of the martial arts in the modern world and the motivations that fuel them.  Let us begin with two very basic questions.  What sort of martial art is lightsaber combat? Second, why would someone choose to practice it given the many other, better established, combat systems that already exist?

To address these puzzles we begin by examining a few additional details about the CLA.  Second, I turn to the work of the well-known American anthropologist Victor Turner for insights into the various ways that voluntary associations focused on transformative play might create meaning in the lives of their members.

CLA.class picture

 

Is Lightsaber Combat an American Martial Art?

 

What is lightsaber combat?  At the most basic level it is a collection of loosely associated combat and performances practices that began to coalesce in the wake of the release of the prequel Star Wars movies in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  As part of the marketing effort surrounding these films replica lightsabers with realistic metal hilts, motion driven sound and lighting effects and colored polycarbonate blades were released in 2002.  Other elements of Lucas’ media empire then began to develop an invented history for lightsaber training, selling it to a public eager for the “relics” of that far away galaxy.[i]

The creators of this new mythology had a surprisingly free hand as the actual Star Wars movies say very little about this iconic weapon.  Much of this invented history was organized around the idea that within the Jedi Order there had been “seven classic forms of lightsaber combat” which had evolved over a period of thousands of years.[ii]  As described each of these seven forms has a unique combat philosophy as well as specific strengths and weaknesses, essentially making them distinct fencing systems.

From the start a clear equation was made between the fictional fighting systems of the Jedi and their real world Asian counterparts.  Each form was given a vaguely Eastern sounding name (Form I is “Shii-cho”) and an Orientalist animal association (again, Shii-cho is “the Way of the Sarlacc”).  Popular notions of what a “proper” martial arts should be seem to have shaped much of what the seven forms became.

The first lightsaber group to gain national and international notoriety (if perhaps not the first to offer a public performance) was “NY Jedi”, founded in Manhattan in 2005 and still holding weekly classes.  They combine instruction in traditional martial arts techniques with a heavy emphasis on choreography and stage performance.  After their rise to prominence other groups quickly coalesced and began to articulate their own vision of what lightsaber combat should be.

Some focused on costuming, public performance and charity work.  Others opted to create something more akin to a bladed combat sport.  More recently, a number of groups have dedicated themselves to combining the mythology of the “seven forms of lightsaber combat” with historically based fighting traditions to create an authentic martial arts system.

The Central Lightsaber Academy falls into this latter category.  However, a number of members, led by Darth Nihilus himself, enjoy producing the occasional fan-film.  This sort of mixing of interests seems to be more common in the lightsaber community than in other areas of the martial arts where practitioners sometimes seek to draw strict boundaries (often based on competing definitions of legitimacy) between “practical” and “performance” based arts.

We know that lightsaber combat is a hyper-real martial art.  It is a fairly new, and also a market driven, creation.  What else is it?  Is it an American martial art?

In the current era many martial arts have come to be seen as indicators of national and regional identity.  In some places the practice of these systems has even become a mechanism for producing a certain sort of citizen, typically ones dedicated to the nation, embodying certain identities and capable of carrying out the state’s demands.

In Japan the Budo arts are seen as revealing the essence of Japanese identity and they have been closely associated with the state since the late Meiji period.  In China the Jingwu Association rose to prominence during the 1920s by promising to create a rationalized, modern, middle class martial art that would increase the physical and spiritual strength of the people, ensuring “national salvation.”  With some variation of emphasis this same mission was carried on by the later Guoshu and Wushu movements.  This interest in uncovering the “national essence” and “cultural heritage” of an art can even be seen in popular discussions of “Israeli” Krav Maga, “Korean” Taekwondo, “Thai” Kickboxing and “Brazilian” Capoeira.

The rise of the martial arts as a tool that both states and other social groups adopt to define their identity and promote their values is one of the most striking trends of the 20th century.  This strongly ethno-nationalist turn has become a means by which the martial arts do social and political work.  They first labor in the production of mature and strong citizens, and then in the promotion of certain identities both at home and abroad.

What sort of “social work” does lightsaber combat do?  Is it an American martial art projecting American cultural values and identities within the global marketplace?  Or is it something else?

 

Return of the Jedi Poster.Japanese

 

The Star Wars franchise has already attracted attention from critical theorists and academic students of cultural studies.[iii]  Many have looked at the project with some ambivalence.  They have seen in these films some of the most conservative and reactionary elements of American society.  One could certainly see the export of these films as a clear case of the global spread of American popular culture.

I suspect that these theorists, if they were to ever consider the question, would not hesitate to label lightsaber combat as a uniquely American martial art.  After all, it is hard to think of any film franchise that is more culturally American.  The opening chapter in the series was a mashup of a western and classic Hollywood swashbuckler reimagined in the universe of Flash Gordon, mixed with a hint of Kurosawa.  How could be it be anything else?

Without denying those basic facts, it is nevertheless fascinating to see how resistant the global lightsaber community has been to such labels.  Lightsaber combat has been culturally translated and localized with surprising ease.  Indeed, one of the most striking things about this movement has been its near universal popularity, from South East Asia to Europe and, of course, in the Americas.  How has this been possible?

Through a wide variety of books, DVD special features, documentaries and interviews the Star Wars mythos actively presents itself to audiences as culturally universal.  The creators of these products explain the on-going appeal of their story lines by invoking the structuralism of Joseph Campbell and Carl Jung.  While these sorts of theories do not sit well with scholars today, they seem to have become an important element of how many of the more thoughtful Star Wars fans around the world understand their own engagement with the franchise.  The end result is to partially obscure the national and ideological origins of the story’s core value systems in favor of a more psychological and universal discourse.

The students of the CLA have also sought to construct lightsaber combat in ways that escape the ethno-nationalist pull that surrounds many other martial arts.  Again, these are not ideas that they are ignorant of.  Their classes take place in a space that prominently advertises training in “Chinese” Wing Chun and “Filipino” Kali.

Surrounding mall storefronts offer Taekwondo, Karate, Hung Gar and Olympic fencing (among other options).  Anyone coming to a lightsaber class must make a conscious choice to physically pass by a number of competing alternatives, most of which are culturally associated with a specific national or regional identity.  The question is why?

Some of the more experienced martial artists in the class have drawn explicit connections between the “culturally neutral” aspect of their practice (as they see it) and the possibility of pursuing more creative types of martial play and research. Multiple of them stated that Western, Chinese, Japanese and Filipino styles could be brought together and tested under the guise of lightsaber sparring in ways that would not normally be possible in a traditional instructional environment.

When discussing his lightsaber class Darth Nihilus, repeatedly noted the sense of freedom he enjoys in leaving behind the lineage politics that dominate the more traditional Chinese martial arts.  This has translated into a greater technical freedom to combine multiple approaches free from the sorts of social surveillance that would normally inhibit this type of hybridization.  It also manifests in an ability to engage in performance based activities like cos-play, choreography and hero-building.  Such activities were actually the origin of Darth Nihilus’ memorable name and in-universe identity.

It would seem that lightsaber combat is not seen as an “American martial art” precisely because those who adopt its practice are seeking a specific type of freedom.  This manifests in a self-conscious turning away from the constraints of historically grounded and ethno-nationalist martial arts.  Many individuals are drawn to an activity that is like the martial arts on a technical level, but one that does different sorts of work.  In lightsaber combat we see a rejection of constructed nationalist histories and a move towards a system of forward looking, and open ended, mythic play.

To better understand the details of the social “work” done within the traditional martial arts, as well as the means by which more recent hyper-real systems might seek to escape it, we will need a set of theoretical tools focused on the ways in which voluntary associations mediate the relationship between “creative play” and the process of personal transformation.  In his writings on the nature of liminality in the modern western world Victor Turner has provided one such framework.

 

Victor Tuner.liminal and liminoid

 

Liminal History and Liminoid Mythology

 

Turner is particularly helpful in the present case as much of his research and writing touched on the question of how meaning is generated through ritual and drama.  In his ethnographic research he expanded on the ideas of Van Gennep to better understand the ways that symbols and rituals functioned during “rites of passage,” or those instances in which people leave one social status (a child, single individual or uneducated person) for another (a married, adult, university graduate).[iv]  Anthropologists had noted that through rites of passages such transitions could be made both socially legible and personally meaningful.

Following Van Gennep, this transition has often been described as a three part process.  Transformative ritual starts with a period of separation, in which the individual is removed from her normal community, a liminal period in which the previous identity is stripped away, leaving the initiate in Turner’s famous term “betwixt and between.”  Lastly, the transformed individual is reincorporated back into a society that will now support them in playing their newly constructed role.

Much of Turners writing and thinking focused on the middle (or liminal) stage.  What exactly happens when an individual enters a threshold state but has not yet passed beyond it?  How is social meaning created and social knowledge bestowed through ritual and symbolism?  According to Turner this often happened in very creative ways.

Through a rich combination of rituals, myths, rites of reversals and other modes of symbolic teaching, Turner found that individuals can engage in a period of cosmic play in which they themselves rearranged the symbolic building blocks of the social order, often in ways that seem chaotic or disordered.  In so doing they confront fundamental truths about the community that were not previously accessible.  By going through this process, initiates learned something both about their own identity and the nature of society.

While Turner’s work (like others in his generation) tended to focus on what were then referred to as “primitive societies,” both he and his students immediately recognized many parallels to these processes in their own, much more modern, lives.  Indeed, there may have been too many parallels for comfort.

Turner’s later critics would note that there was a certain strain of universalism and cultural essentialism in his work that may have led him (and Van Gennep) to project these basic patterns onto other non-Western cultures inappropriately.  Nor did Turner spend enough time exploring the “borderlands,” or those areas of society comprised of individuals who either refused to integrate through totalizing social processes, or who found creative ways to subvert this process and use similar structures to create counter-systemic identities.[v]

It is not difficult to find striking similarities between the ritual and initiatory processes described in classic ethnographic accounts of rites and passage and current practices in modern Western society.  The process associated with fraternity initiations on college campuses, religious baptisms in neighborhood churches, or joining a social order like the Masons, all exhibit something very much like the same three part structure of separation, liminality and reintegration.

Nor would we be the first to note that martial art training is full of rituals, both large and small.  They can be seen in the wearing of special clothing (the white karate gi symbolizing burial clothing) and the grueling public ordeals endured in some rank tests or tournaments.  All of this is explicitly designed to fulfill two functions.  First, to elevate an individual’s status within the community, transforming them from novice to expert.  Second, to create a sense of social meaning and fulfillment by passing on a specific set of physical practices or cultural philosophies which (we are constantly reminded) have their truest applications beyond the confines of the training hall.

Is it surprising that in the current era Western consumers have come to see the martial arts as vehicles of personal transformation?[vi]  In an increasingly secular society they appear to be taking on essential social and psychological roles that might previously have been fulfilled by other sorts of community rituals.[vii]

 

navy.japanese kendo

 

Nor are individuals the only ones to have taken note of the transformative powers and liminal potential of the martial arts.  States such as Japan, China and Korea, to name a few of the better known examples, determined during the 20th century that martial practices could be adapted not just to improve civilian fitness and public health, but to create institutions through which individuals would be inducted into a new, specifically curated, vision of the nation and society.

Martial arts reformers, eager for government patronage, designed specific programs, and lobbied to have them included in school curriculums, to do just that.[viii]  The emergence of a close association between some Asian martial arts and ethno-nationalism was neither a coincidence, nor a reflection of the essential nature of these practices.  Both martial arts modernizers and government reformers worked hard to make this connection happen and then to promote their new creations on the international stage.

So, on one hand, individuals adopt these processes as a means of personal improvement, or just recreation.  On the other, powerful social and political forces have attempted to co-opt them as modern rites of passage, ones that could do the social work of producing certain kinds of citizens and favored identities.  Of course there is no necessary reason why these two goals must contradict each other.  Yet sometimes they might.

To grasp what this implies for our theoretical understanding of the nature of lightsaber combat, we must return to one of Victor Turner’s fundamental questions about ritual.  What, exactly, is transformed in a rite of passage?  Is it the initiate?  Or should we instead be focused on the community?

Turner argued that the intended subject of transformation in a classic rite of passage was actually the community.[ix]  While the individual was affected, the fundamental issue was actually how the group processed and this change.  Turner noted that his students were thus mistaken when they described their own initiatory experiences as “rites of passage.”  He cautioned in his 1974 essay that true examples could only be found in small scale societies characterized by primary social interactions.[x]

Given the obvious structural similarities, what exactly separates the two scenarios?  The fact that these rites were often compulsory in small scale communities betrays the fundamentally social nature of the exercise. These rituals were events through which society understood itself.  Even seemingly riotous rites of reversal and bacchanalia were, for Turner, examples of social work that demanded the participation of the entire community.

All of these activities are socially mandated and therefore a type of labor, no matter how much “fun” the participants might be having.  None of them fall into the category of “leisure” as we typically use the term in the modern West.  Turner argued that this slightly different category is really a byproduct of the commodification of labor that occurred during the period economic and social transformation that Karl Polanyi called the “Great Transformation.”

An individual who joins a modern church, fraternity or martial arts class is in a very different position.  These are activities that, within modern Western society, explicitly occupy our leisure time.  They cannot be compelled.  Individuals participate in these activities and rites because they themselves feel drawn to them.  This takes what was once social work and makes it a much more personal experience.

Nor are all of these experiences exactly the same.  Turner concluded that at least two distinct types of institutions structure modern voluntary activities.  The first category was still referred to as “liminal” as they most closely resemble the rituals of previous eras that they may have, in some cases, grown out of.  These include things like formal initiations into religious groups, seasonal celebrations or a traditional wedding ceremony.

Yet while they resembled older rites of passage, they are still voluntary.  Simply put, no one can force you to join the Rotary Club. As such, he noted that his continued use of the term “liminal” needed to understood as metaphorical.

Turner then identified another group of activities which were even less socially focused in nature, and more oriented to individual play, experimentation and self-expression.  These could still induce a process of personally meaningful transformation, but they were less likely to be focused on conforming one’s life to a hegemonic social pattern.  At times they could even take on an anti-systemic nature.  Turner termed this second group of practices, “liminoid.”

By Turner’s own admission, his exploration of these categories was partial and experimental in nature.  As a first cut he found that liminal practices tend to be community oriented.  They emerge out of larger social patterns and are comprised of symbols that are universally intelligible. They are fundamentally eufunctional, meaning that they reinforce widely held social, economic and political identities.  A baptism or religious wedding ceremony fit this pattern.

In contrast, liminoid activities tended to arise later in history and are more focused on individual attainment.  They are often distributed via economic markets and develop at the margins of society.  Thus they are fragmentary and experimental in nature.  Liminoid activities can rearrange symbols in highly idiosyncratic (even monstrous) ways, and have the potential to critique dominant social discourses.  Common examples include the creation of art and literature or the development of many sports and games.

These categories may help us begin to make sense of what is going on with Darth Nihilus’ two seemingly contradictory martial arts institutions.  They may also suggest something about the variety of social work that martial arts are called on to perform in the modern global system.  Lastly, a closer examination of how these ideas function in the realm of the martial arts might suggest some way to refine Turner’s original concepts.

liminal vs liminoid.chart

 

From Liminal Work to Liminoid Play in the Martial Arts

 

It is not difficult to discern a liminal aspect within the Chinese martial art.  While students of martial arts studies tend to classify wushu as a voluntary activity, one suspects that many of the young children that fill the wushu based technical schools of Henan and Shandong province were not full consenting participants in the decision making process that sent them to these grueling boarding schools.  Instead their guardians made the decision that this was a better environment for their children as it would give them the technical and cultural foundation to become a certain sort of adult.  Specifically, one who could get a job with the police or military.

The martial arts have come to be an accepted aspect of childhood education in the West as well.  What do we hope that our children gain from these exercises?  To listen to the rhetoric surrounding these practices, confidence and compliance are the actual goals of our efforts.  Regardless of what is actually accomplished, these classes are often framed as a means to create certain sorts of adults, ones that will succeed within society’s dominate cultural and economic paradigms.

Many of these same more liminal tendencies are evident in adult martial arts classes as well.  As Jon Nielson and I reported in our book, The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts, Ip Man’s notable martial arts abilities were not the only thing that attracted teenage and young adult students to him in the early 1950s.  After all, in the aftermath of the 1949 liberation of the Mainland, Hong Kong was quite literally overrun with talented martial artists.  So what set him apart?

Ip Man had grown up as a member of the “new gentry” in Guangdong. As such he received a dual Confucian and Western education.  He had deep cultural knowledge of a past that young adults in the crown colony of Hong Kong felt isolated from.  He was an individual who had synthesized the lessons of two worlds and could model the value of an unapologetically Chinese identity in a modern, globally connected, metropolis. Many of his younger students idolized the Confucian glamor that he radiated.

Contemporary government sponsored wushu and the wing chun community that existed in Hong Kong during the 1950s and 1960s are very different types of institutions.  Yet both of them are engaged in the social work of producing certain sorts of citizens.  In the first case this takes on a more statist cast, while Ip Man’s project was more social and cultural in nature.  Yet in both instances, we see that martial arts training attempts to produce a certain sort of student, one accepting of important social values, through a process of physical transformation.

This is one of the reasons why the creation myths of the various Chinese martial arts are so interesting.  It would be a mistake to view them only as poorly recorded history.  Instead they function as a lens by which the community sees itself, defines core values, and finds its place in the social landscape.  Yim Wing Chun, Wong Fei Hung or the many monks of Shaolin are important because they point the way.  They illustrate a destination that the initiate has set out to achieve.

A traditional martial arts class is characterized by a type of liminal play.  We set aside our mundane professional identity when we enter the training space and submit ourselves to a new social hierarchy.   We reverse and rearrange many of the most basic cultural values that we brought with us as we suddenly find ourselves punching, throwing and choking our fellow initiates.  Yet all of this happens within limits and is subordinated to a single, unified, transformative vision.

All of this conforms to Turner’s expectations for a more traditional liminal experience in the modern world.  Creative play is possible, but only up to a point, and only in the service of certain goals.

I have spent a number of years observing Wing Chun classes.  And while you might hear individuals expressing admiration for Ng Moy and Yim Wing Chun, or in other cases doubting their existence, I have yet to hear anyone declaring their allegiance to the villains of that particular creation myth.  After all, the Manchu banner troops did succeed in burning the Shaolin Temple to the ground, which much say something about their martial prowess!

 

Darth Nihilus.stock photo

 

Yet that is exactly the sort of thing that happens multiple times a day at the Central Lightsaber Academy.  At first glance one might think the biggest difference between it and a traditional martial arts class is the non-reality of their chosen weapon.  It is easy to become fixated on the glowing, buzzing blades.  Much more important is the open ended and free-wheeling way in which symbol can be manipulated, reversed and hybridized in one environment, but not the other.

We have already noted that such extended play exists on the technical level.  Yet this ability to creatively rearrange symbols is not limited to the act of fencing.  Consider the fact that the CLA is led by a figure who has adopted the title Darth Nihilus (or Dark Lord of Hunger) as his public persona for interacting with the lightsaber combat community.

For those who may be unfamiliar with the Star Wars lore we should note that individuals who go by the title “Darth” are not the heroes of this story.  Instead they are the masters of a malignant political and metaphysical philosophy that is said to have been responsible for billions of deaths during their age old war against the Jedi.

The specific story-lines behind the various “Darths” are interesting to consider, though a full account would take us too far afield.  At the most basic level many of these Dark Lords have, through a process of corruption, become something less than human.  In many cases their loss of emotional empathy is mirrored by physical damage or decay.  The Sith do not call on the healing and life sustaining energy of the force.  Many have become monstrous human machine hybrids.

Sith characters are always sociopathic, and often psychotic.  That makes them an interesting foil for storytelling.  And when not teaching either wing chun or lightsaber classes, Darth Nihilus spends time on what might be called “hero building” (or in his case maybe “villain construction”).  This includes crafting back stories, engaging in cosplay and producing fan films in which his alter ego kills large numbers of Jedi knights (played by his students) along with the requisite innocent bystanders.

Not all of the CLA students follow this left handed path.  Others have invested considerable time and resources in the creation of more traditionally heroic Jedi persona.  A third group, turned off by the psychotic nature of the Sith and the overly disciplined lives of traditional Jedi have turned to creating “Grey Jedi” characters.  These are becoming quite popular as they allow students to mix and match symbols and histories in ways that fit their real world personalities.  Occasionally even characters from outside of the Star Wars universe are remixed into the world of lightsaber combat (a trend pioneered by the creators of NY Jedi).

Well over half of the students ignore these exercises all together.  They might instead focus on Star Wars trivia or collecting lightsabers.  Other students see themselves primarily as martial artists and arrive at class wearing wing chun or kali T-shirts.

This last contingent reminds us of an important, somewhat paradoxical, fact.  Not all of the members of the CLA identify themselves as Star Wars fans.  While pretty much everyone has seen the movies, a fair number of students have never attempted to explore the expanded universe of videogames, novels or television shows.

While some students may understand lightsaber combat as an aspect of their fandom, other participants see it primarily as a way to stay in shape with the help of a supportive community of likeminded friends.  While everyone views their practice as important and transformative, the goals that they seek are strikingly personal in nature.  There is no single symbolic pathway that all lightsaber students share.

LSC.its all just for fun

Conclusion

 

Lightsaber combat presents us with a powerful example of Turner’s concept of the liminoid.  In comparison, the wing chun classes of the Central Martial Arts academy are vertically structured and designed to advance a very specific skillset. Its curriculum is meant to have a transformative impact on students, one that will see them replicate a eufunctional set of behaviors outside of the school.  That is the very definition of the liminal.

In contrast, the Central Lightsaber Academy exists to cooperatively fulfill individual desires for highly creative, fractured, idiosyncratic, and sometime monstrous, play.  Students are free to focus on sparring and practical lightsaber combat, or to skip that in favor of forms training and choreography.  They can engage in cosplay and hero building, trying on villainous or heroic alter egos.

The individuals in this community are not socioeconomically marginal compared to similar martial arts groups in the area.  Yet they actively choose to play at the social margins.  This cacophony of goals and purposes coexists both within the CLA and the broader lightsaber combat community as a whole.

We should be cautious about reifying these two categories, liminal and liminoid, as binary opposites.  Certain students of the anthropology of athletics have noted that Turner’s categories sometimes have trouble categorizing specific activities.  Sharon Rowe has argued that while an amateur basketball league at the local YMCA is liminoid in character, much as Turner expects, professional sports often exhibits a much more liminal nature, both in terms of their social function and the discourses that surround them.  She has questioned whether sports should ever be classified as liminoid.[xi]

Our current case suggests instead that the liminal and the liminoid may exist on a continuum.[xii]  While Darth Nihilus’ Wing Chun class appears to be liminal compared to the lighsaber group, the degree to which it is “upholding dominant social discourses” pales in comparison to the previously discussed wushu boarding schools in China.  They are literally indoctrinating and training thousands of children for future careers in a vast state security apparatus. Clearly we must consider matters of degree as well as kind when evaluating the nature of martial arts institutions.

Still, Turner’s basic distinction between the liminal and the liminoid is helpful to students of martial arts studies precisely because it suggests that totalizing statements about the role of these combat systems in modern society are bound to miss the mark.  Rather than being one thing, Turner suggests that there are different types of social work that we can expect to see within the martial arts.

The success of hyper-real arts, divorced from the myths of nationalism and focused on enjoyment, rather than the “hard work” of producing even more ideal citizens, should force us to think deeply about the future of the martial arts in the current era.  Lightsaber combat demonstrates a world in which the plural, fragmentary and horizontal can succeed despite the existence of the universal, disciplined and hierarchically organized.

It may be that Darth Nihilus’ frequent refrain that this is “all just for fun” is as much a warning for us as a reassurance to his students.  Accepting his statement might signal the disruption of our understanding of what the martial arts can be, as well as the basic desires that motivate their students.  But what else would we expect form a Dark Lord of the Sith?

 

oOo

Are you interested in reading more about Light Saber Combat?  If so click here or here.

 

oOo

 

[i] For a detailed discussion of this process see Judkins, Benjamin N. 2016. “The Seven Forms of Lightsaber Combat: Hyper-reality and the Invention of the Martial arts. Martial Arts Studies 2, 6-22.

[ii] Reynolds, David West. 2002. “Fightsaber: Jedi Lightsaber Combat.” Star Wars Insider 62, 28-37.

[iii] Carl Silvio, Tony M. Vinci. 2007. Culture, Identities and Technology in the Star Wars Films: Essays on the Two Trilogies. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co.; McDowell, John C. 2014. The Politics of Big Fantasy: The Ideologies of Star Wars, the Matrix and the Avengers. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co.;  Lee, Peter W. 2016. A Galaxy Here and Now: Historical and Cultural Readings from Star Wars. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co.; McDowell, John C. 2016. Identity Politics in George Lucas’ Star Wars. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co.

[iv] Gennep, Arnold Van. 1960. Rites of Passage. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  First Published 1909.

[v] See for instance Weber, Donald. 1995. “From Limen to Border: A Meditation on the Legacy of Victor Turner for American Cultural Studies.” American Quarterly. Vol. 47, No. 3 (Sep.), pp. 525-536.  A more far reaching critique of Turner’s relevance to historical discussions of the Western world (particularly as they apply to women’s narratives) has been offered by Caroline Walker Bynum. 1984. “Women’s Stories, Women’s Symbols: A Critique of Victor Turner’s Theory of Liminality,” in Robert L. Moore and Frank Reynolds (eds). Anthropology and the Study of Religion. Chicago: Center for the Study of Religion. pp. 105-125.

[vi] Berg, Esther and Inken Prohl. 2014. “‘Become your Best’: On the Construction of Martial Arts as Means of Self-Actualization and Self-Improvement.” JOMEC 5, 19 pages.

[vii] Jennings, George. 2010. “‘It can be a religion if you want’: Wing Chun Kung Fu as a secular religion.” Ethnography Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 533-557.

[viii] Gainty, Denis. 2013. Martial Arts and the Body Politic in Meiji Japan.  Routledge. Chapter 4; Judkins, Benjamin and Jon Nielson. 2015. The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of Southern Chinese Martial Arts. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.148-154. Judkins, Benjamin. 2016. “Lives of Chinese Martial Artists (17): Chu Minyi – Physician, Politician and Taijiquan Addict.” Kung Fu Tea. https://chinesemartialstudies.com

[ix] This is amply illustrated by the fact that the third and final phase of the ritual transformation is always reintegration into the social whole.  Such transformations are rarely undertaken purely for the edification of the initiate.  For more on Turner’s theories of ritual see The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Nbembu Ritual (Cornell UP, 1967) and The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).

[x] Turner, Victor. 1974. “Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: An Essay in Comparative Symbology.” Rice Institute Pamphlet – Rice University Studies, 60, no. 3 Rice University: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/63159.

[xi] Rowe, Sharon.  2008. “Liminal Ritual or Liminoid Leisure.” in Graham St John (ed.) Victor Turner and Contemporary Cultural Performance. Berghahn Books  pp. 127-148

[xii] This same point has also been argued, in a different context, by Andrew Spiegel.  See 2011. “Categorical difference versus continuum: Rethinking Turner’s liminal-liminoid distinction.” Anthropology Southern Africa (Anthropology Southern Africa) 34, no. 1/2: 11-20.

 


Read it Now: Summer 2017 Issue of Martial Arts Studies!

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Martial Arts Studies. Issue 4 (Summer) 2017.

 

Get the Issue Now!

The last week has been a whirlwind of travel, fieldwork and conferences.  I am now back and cannot wait to tell you more about it.  But before we delve into conference discussions and after-action reports, I have some very exciting news.  The latest issue of the interdisciplinary journal Martial Arts Studies (an imprint of Cardiff University Press) is now on-line and available at no cost to anyone with an internet connection and a desire to see some of the best work in the field today.  Simply click this link or the cover image above.

If you are wondering where to start, be sure to check out the opening editorial, authored by Paul Bowman which asks the provocative question, “Is martial arts studies trivial?

Abstract

Before introducing the articles comprising this issue of Martial Arts Studies, this editorial first undertakes a sustained reflection on the question of whether the emergent field of martial arts studies might be regarded as trivial. In doing so, it explores possible rationales and raisons d’être of the field in terms of a reflection on the legitimation of academic subjects, especially those closest to martial arts studies, from which martial arts studies can be said to have emerged. The first draft of this reflection was originally written by Bowman in response to certain reactions to his academic interest in martial arts (hence the occasional use of the pronoun ‘I’, rather than ‘we’), but Judkins proposed that the piece form part of this issue’s editorial, because of the importance of thinking about what this ‘martial arts studies’ thing is that we are doing, what the point of it may be, and whether or not it may be trivial.

Not only will this editorial help to introduce and conceptually tie together the various papers in this issue of the journal, but it constitutes one possible jumping off point of my own keynote at the recent MAS conference titled “Show, Don’t Tell: Making Martial Arts Studies Matter” (which will be posted on the blog next week.)  Anyone concerned about the state and development of the field will want to start here.

 

 

 

Research Articles

 

This issue of the journal features four major research papers (two of which are quite lengthy) which will be of great interest to anyone interested in the Chinese or Malay martial arts, questions of pedagogy or the interaction between on-line and embodied martial communities.

 

Douglas Wile

Abstract

 

Martial arts historiography has been at the center of China’s culture wars and a cause célèbre between traditionalists and modernizers for the better part of a century. Nowhere are the stakes higher than with the iconic art of taijiquan, where, based on a handful of documents in the Chen, Wu, and Yang lineages, traditionalists have mythologized the origins of taijiquan, claiming the Daoist immortal Zhang Sanfeng as progenitor, while modernizers won official government approval by tracing the origins to historical figures in the Chen family.

Four new document finds, consisting of manuals, genealogies, and stele rubbings, have recently emerged that disrupt the narratives of both camps, and, if authentic, would be the urtexts of the taijiquan ‘classics’, and force radical revision of our understanding of the art. This article introduces the new documents, the circumstances of their discovery, their contents, and the controversies surrounding their authenticity and significance, as well as implications for understanding broader trends in Chinese culture and politics.

Lauren Miller Griffith

Abstract

 

Previous research on capoeira suggests that face-to-face training is the ideal mode of learning this art. However, there is a robust corpus of capoeira tutorials available on YouTube. This paper asks what the function of these videos is. I analyze six comment threads taken from YouTube that exhibit a common pattern, concluding that beyond the video’s utility as a source of information, the comments shared by community insiders serve as an invitation for aspiring students to join the embodied capoeira community, paving the way for their adoption of the underlying ethos of capoeira by socializing them into the ‘anyone can do it if they work hard enough’ discourse that is common in capoeira academies. And while this discourse itself is somewhat deceptive insofar as not everyone can do all of the moves of capoeira – even if they work hard – it is actually the mediating link between technical mastery, which could theoretically be achieved from watching videos, and embodiment of capoeira’s generative grammar, which must be learned in an embodied community setting.
Gabriel Facal

Abstract

 

This article explores continuities in fighting techniques of martial ritual initiations found across the Malay world (Dunia Melayu). Comparison with other neighboring Asian and Southeast Asian regions shows that these techniques follow patterns and principles that can be considered as ‘properly Malay’. I argue that ‘Malayness’ is socially and politically consolidated through these initiations, not least because the techniques mobilize local cosmologies and notions of the ‘person’. These cosmologies and notions are mainly articulated through conceptions of space and time, an aspect that is underlined by the transmission processes themselves. Transmission steps show parallels with life processes such as maturation, growing and purification. The correspondences between these processes are also expressed through a specific material culture. The structures of the technical fighting systems are oriented towards principles based on religion and morality, cosmology and philosophy. All of this suggests that the efficacy of techniques should be analyzed in conjunction with larger questions of the efficacy of rituals.
Mario S. Staller, Benjamin Zaiser, Swen Körner

Abstract

 

Physical assaults are an inherent problem of modern society. One strategy available to try to prevent violence is to strengthen one’s personal capacities to defend oneself. This is the scope of various self-defence programs and systems within the civil domain. While training in self-defence facilitates the use of self-protective strategies in real life situations, it is important to ascertain whether individuals learn the skills taught in self-defence classes and whether they are able to perform the skills when these are required. In order to test the effectiveness of self-defence skills in an ethically acceptable way, instructors and scholars have to design environments in which valid and practically relevant results about the performance of the learner can be obtained. The imprecise nature and the multidimensional use of terms like ‘realism’ and ‘reality-based’ leads to difficulties in designing such environments. In this article, we argue for the need to shift the emphasis from ‘realistic’ to ‘representative’ design in testing and learning environments, with the aim of developing transferable self-defence skills within the civil domain. The Trade-Off Model of Simulation Design that we propose is intended to help instructors and scholars to make more informed decisions when designing tasks for testing or training.

 

 

Reviews

 

The issue concludes with a number of discussions of newly published Martial Arts Studies volumes, all reviewed by scholars in the field.  As always, it is gratifying to see so much good work coming out.

Sixt Wetzler
Kyle Green
Benjamin N. Judkins

 


On the 44th Anniversary of Bruce Lee’s Death: Cult (Film) Icon

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Bruce Lee with his favorite onscreen weapon.

 

 

 

Introduction

My original plan for the day included writing a conference report on the recent Martial Arts Studies gathering at Cardiff University (which, as always, was a blast).  However, when I opened my email this morning I found a note from Paul Bowman reminding me that today is the 44th anniversary of Bruce Lee’s death.  Paul was kind enough to send me a copy of a draft chapter that he had written for the occasion and offered to share it with the readers of Kung Fu Tea as a guest post.  Normally I would post this early on Friday morning, but given that today marks the actual anniversary, I thought it would be better to break with tradition and get this up a bit early.  In addition to his more recent work on Martial Arts Studies, Paul Bowman has written multiple books on the cultural and social significance of Lee’s films and martial arts career.  As such, he is ideally situated to discuss Lee’s continuing legacy.  Enjoy!

 

 

Bruce Lee: Cult (Film) Icon

 

Paul Bowman

Cardiff University

 

Draft chapter written for a collection on cult film, edited by Ernest Mathijs and Jamie Sexton.

 

 

I write these words on the 44th anniversary of the death of Bruce Lee (July 20th 1973). When he died I was two years old. Lee was at the height of his fame. At the time of his death, his fourth martial arts film, Enter the Dragon, was being released internationally. He was already well known around the world: in Asia he was stellar; in the West his films had a growing cult status (Hunt 2003; Teo 2009; Lo 2005). For all audiences, he was becoming the exemplar of a new type of masculine cool invincibility – a simultaneously impossible yet (possiblyalmost) achievable ideal (Chan 2000; Nitta 2010). It was impossible because Lee was invincible, but it seemed (quasi) achievable because Lee’s invincibility was always shown to be the product of dedicated training in kung fu. So, his image wasn’t simply fictional. His image wasn’t merely fake. He wasn’t magic. He was simply a kung fu expert. This meant that all you had to do to be like him was train. Anyone could train. Everyone could train. So, very many people did. And this became known as the ‘kung fu craze’ of the 1970s (Brown 1997).

 

At the time of his death, Enter the Dragon was about to push Lee into the mainstream of global popular consciousness. If up until this point he had achieved ‘cult’ status in the West, he was about to attain the status he had already attained across Asia: superstardom. But this would not involve selling out or dampening down any of the ‘cult’ features that characterised his kung fu films. Rather, Lee’s success would amount to the international explosion of martial arts film and martial arts practice: its leaping out from the shadowy margins and into the bright lights of the mainstream.

 

This explosion is still referred to as the kung fu craze of the 1970s. Bruce Lee was the image and the name that exemplified this ‘craze’. There were other martial arts stars, of course, both before and after Bruce Lee; but he was and remains the quintessential figure. His name still sells books. Documentaries are still being made about him (Webb 2009; McCormack 2012). Martial arts magazine issues that have his image on the cover still sell more copies than those which don’t. Blog entries about him still generate spikes.[i] He is still credited as an inspiration by athletes, boxers, UFC and MMA fighters, and martial artists of all stripes (Miller 2000; Preston 2007). YouTube continues to throw up new Bruce Lee homages and montages. Computer games still have Bruce Lee characters. He is still used in adverts. He is universally regarded as having been a key figure for non-white film and TV viewers of the 1960s and early ’70s – a kind of oasis in a desert of white heroes and (at best) blackspoitation (Prashad 2003, 2002; Kato 2007; Bowman 2010; Chong 2012). He was immediately (and remains) a complex and important figure for diasporic ethnic Chinese the world over (Hiramoto 2012; Teo 2013; Marchetti 2001, 1994, 2012, 2006). And he forged the first bridge between Hong Kong and Hollywood film industries.

 

There is so much more to say about all of this. I could go on with this list. But I have said much of this before (Bowman 2010, 2013). So instead, having set the scene, however fleetingly, let’s pause to reflect on whether this makes Bruce Lee a ‘cult’ figure.

 

In order to focus principally on Bruce Lee as a cult icon, we cannot undertake too much of a digression into a fully elaborated discussion of the controversial and problematic term ‘cult’ in film and cinema studies (Shepard 2014; Mathijs and Mendik 2008; Mathijs 2005). Suffice it to say that in and around film studies the ongoing academic disputes about the notion of ‘cult’ centre on the question of what makes something a cult object. Is the thing that makes an object (normally a film but sometimes an actor, director or even genre) into a ‘cult’ object to be found in the properties of the object itself, or in the status of that object in relation to other objects, or in an audience’s response to it?

 

There is a lot of disagreement about this. My own sense is that cult is principally a useful descriptive term, but that it is less useful analytically. Nonetheless, in attempting to think about Bruce Lee through this lens, some hugely stimulating insights can emerge. In what follows, I will principally concern myself with responses and relations to the cinematically constructed image of Bruce Lee, rather than with attempting to adjudicate on the matter of whether this or that feature of his films (Barrowman 2016) or his cinematic, media or spectacular image fit into his or that categorisation or definition of ‘cult’ or ‘not-cult’. So rather than worrying about taxonomies, I will translate the ideas and associations of the word ‘cult’ into the sense of a variably manifested passionate relation to or with something – in this case, the textual field of objects known as ‘Bruce Lee’.[ii]

 

I do this because there is not now and there never has been a single or singular cult of Bruce Lee. It has always been cults, plural. The ideas, ideals, injunctions and aspirations associated with Bruce Lee were always multiple. In effect, there have always been several Bruce Lees – different Bruce Lees for different people. Lined up side by side and viewed together, the ‘Bruce Lee’ constructed by each group, audience or constituency often appears, on the one hand, partial and incomplete, yet on the other hand, larger than life and impossibly perfect. There are biographical, technological and textual reasons for this.

 

Firstly, Lee died unexpectedly, very young, in obscure circumstances, and for a long time afterwards much of his life remained shrouded in mystery – a mystery that largely arose because of a lack of reliable, verifiable information about him, his life, and the circumstances of his death. It is arguably the case that his family, their advisors, and his estate made a series of less than ideal decisions around the dissemination of information about Bruce Lee both in the immediate aftermath of his death and in the subsequent years and even decades (Bleecker 1999). These decisions all seem to have arisen from a desire to paint Bruce Lee hagiographically, as a perfect figure, a kind of saintly genius. Somewhat predictably, then, other voices have more than once come out of the woodwork to make somewhat contrary claims and to paint Bruce Lee in rather different lights . Through all of the mist and murk, one of Lee’s many (unauthorised) biographers, Davis Miller, makes an important point when he observes in his 2000 publication, The Tao of Bruce Lee, that surely there has been no other 20th century figure, so globally famous, about whom so little was actually known for so long (Miller 2000; Bowman 2010).

 

The film theorist André Bazin might have disputed such a claim, however. For, as he argued when discussing the cinematic images of Joseph Stalin, the cinematically constituted, disseminated and experienced image does much to create a kind of double or doubling effect (Bazin 1967:1-14). Of course, there may be a world of difference between Bruce Lee and Joseph Stalin, but Bazin’s observations can be applied to the figure that viewers felt they experienced when they experienced Bruce Lee. Indeed, it can be extended to apply to many other cinematic or media experiences of many other kinds of celebrity image too. The logic is this. Firstly, the cinematic image can make the figure seem larger than life. Baudrillard would call this ‘hyperreal’: more real than real (Baudrillard 1994). But Bazin also notes that the image on the cinema screen is, in a way, already dead, absent, out of reach, ‘mummified’. Yet, at the same time, and paradoxically by the same token, the nature of the cinematic image can make us feel we personally have intimate, personal, access to the person we are watching (Bazin 1967: 1-14; Chow 2007: 4-7).

 

Ip Man and his best known student, Bruce Lee.

 

These kind of observations about the cinematic image can serve as an entry point into thinking about the ‘technological’ reasons why there has never simply been one cult of Bruce Lee, but always more than one. We each see a very distant, larger than life figure, and yet we can also come to feel that we have an intimate insight into him – whatever that may be. He is there, and we can see what he is saying and doing; but he is gone, and we have to construct an interpretation.

 

This is where the textual or semiotic dimension becomes fully active. For, like any other media image, ‘Bruce Lee’ is essentially and irreducibly textual. When we think of or speak about Bruce Lee we are dealing not with one single or simple thing, but with complex pieces of textual material, woven into different textual constructs (films, documentaries, books, magazines, posters, anecdotes, memories). In fact, taken to its most ‘radical’ extreme, the theory of textuality essentially dispenses with the need for there to be an actual ‘text’ (such as a film, a book or a magazine article) in front of us at all. For, as elaborated by Jacques Derrida, the theory of textuality (aka deconstruction), holds that for each and every one of us the entire world is a text. We relate to everything the same way we relate to texts: we look, we listen, we think, we try to interpret, to make sense, to extract or establish meaning, and so on. According to the infamous phrase of Derrida (who was the most famous proponent of textuality as an approach to more or less everything), ‘there is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida 1976: 158-9).

 

Whether we go this far or not, according to most theories of text and textuality, the meaning of any given text is produced in the encounter with the reader. So, although the creators of any given text (literary, cinematic, TV, radio, etc.) will have had intentions, and will have wanted to create certain effects and induce certain responses, the buck stops with the reader, or the person who experiences these devices and combinations of elements. Accordingly, whilst some viewers may watch Bruce Lee’s filmic fights with his opponents and find them thrilling, tense, exciting, brilliant, even tragic, other viewers may find them boring, turgid, unintelligible, or even comical, and so on. Elsewhere in his acting, where some may perceive ‘cool’ others may see ‘wooden’; where some may perceive genius others may see idiocy.

 

Nonetheless, despite the range of meanings that could be attached to any aspect of Bruce Lee, it is certain that he had a massive impact. Although many in the Western world had seen ‘Asian martial arts’ on TV and cinema screens more and more since the 1950s (most famously perhaps in the TV series The Avengers and the James Bond film, Dr No), the effect of Bruce Lee on many viewers was instant and transformative. More than one documentary about the impact of Bruce Lee contains newsreel footage showing children and young teenagers leaving cinemas and movie theatres in the UK and US and performing the cat-calls, poses and attempting to do the flashy moves and kicks of Bruce Lee (BBC4 2013). In fact this scenario has come to constitute something of a ‘creation scenario’ in stories about the birth of what has long since been referred to as the ‘kung fu craze’ that swept through the US, Europe and much of the rest of the world, starting in 1973 (Brown 1997).

 

This was the year of the box office release of Enter the Dragon – a film that is notable because it was the first Hollywood and Hong Kong co-production, the first Hollywood film explicitly framed as a ‘martial arts’ film, and perhaps the first ‘formal’ introduction of many Westerners to the imagined world of Asian martial arts (Bowman 2010). It is also the year that Bruce Lee died in obscure circumstances. In many countries news of Bruce Lee’s death came out shortly before the film was actually released (Hunt 2003). All of which immediately made both the film and the man extremely intriguing. It is true that this was not the first martial arts film that had been available to audiences in the West. Several Hong Kong martial arts films had been successful in the US before. Indeed, it was their increasing success that had given Hollywood producers the confidence that this venture could be successful in the first place. But Enter the Dragon is without a doubt the most important martial arts film of the period, precisely because of its mainstreaming of Asian martial arts.

 

There are perhaps no rigorously scientific ways of establishing ‘importance’, ‘effect’ or ‘influence’ in the realms of media and culture (Hall 1992), but it can be said (with the benefit of hindsight) that from the moment of the release of Enter the Dragon it was absolutely clear that Bruce Lee was not merely influential but actually epochal. The historian, philosopher and cultural critic Michel Foucault came up with the notion of a ‘founder of discursivity’ (Foucault 1991). For Foucault, a founder of discursivity is something or someone that generates a whole new discourse, or that radically transforms an ongoing discourse. Although not discussed by Michel Foucault, my contention is that Bruce Lee should definitely be accorded the status of founder of discursivity.

 

Robert Downey Jr. sporting a Bruce Lee T-shirt. Source: Business Insider.

 

The meaning of the term ‘discourse’ in this sense is quite precise. In the tradition of Foucault, a discourse is also but not only a conversation. Discourses in this sense also involve actions. For example, the discourse of architecture is not the conversations and arguments of architects, town planners, residents’ associations, lawyers, and so on. The discourse of architecture also refers to the processes, practices and results of these conversations and arguments: what buildings look like, how they are made, the changes in their styles and configurations, and so on. In Foucault’s sense, there are discourses in and of all things: law, religion, science, fashion, music, taste, you name it. So, a founder of discursivity may be identified in a person (for example, Elvis or Jimi Hendrix), or in a technological change (the electrification of music). The point is, we are dealing with an intervention that disrupts and transforms states of affairs. Bruce Lee was precisely such a disruption and transformation.

 

Let us return to the mythic scene of our origin story: the excited or excitable young viewers of a new Bruce Lee film, who have just left the cinema. They are not merely discussing the films. They make cat-calls. They try to throw kicks and punches in ways that two hours previously were completely unknown to them but to which they have just very recently been introduced and instantly become accustomed. What is there to say about this scene or situation?

 

Bruce Lee made only four and a half martial arts films before he died. He only used his signature screams and cat-calls for dramatic cinematic effect within those films. There is no evidence that he made his signature noises off-screen. Moreover, few cinematic or actual martial artists ever really followed Bruce Lee in using these kinds of noises in fight scenes, never mind in sparring or in competition. If and when such mimicry occurs, it is always in some sense what Judith Butler would call a ‘parodic performance’. And yet, to this day, when children in the playground strike improvised/invented ‘kung fu’ poses and throw what they think might be cool kung fu shapes, they still very often make the Bruce Lee cat-calls, screams and kiais – in performances that are in one sense parodic but in another sense completely sincere.

 

Evidence for this claim is anecdotal, of course. But I often observed it personally at my own children’s primary school, four decades after Bruce Lee’s death. At the same time, people from both my own and other countries have recounted the same observation to me. Of course, there may be various kinds of confirmation bias at play here. I may actually only be remembering a highly select few instances, and blowing them up, out of all proportion, while forgetting or ignoring cases where children’s martial arts play is not accompanied by Bruce Lee sounds. Similarly, my interlocutors may be telling me what they think I want to hear. But, unlike trying to establish ‘influence’ and ‘effect’ directly, perhaps a research project could be constructed that could explore what children ‘do’ when they strike ‘martial artsy’ poses. And my hypothesis would remain that they very often make noises that can directly and unequivocally be traced back to no one other than Bruce Lee. The fact that few such children are likely to have any conscious knowledge or awareness of Bruce Lee makes this even more interesting. But, in such a situation, are we still dealing with a cult? And what is the relation of any such conscious or unconscious cult with ‘cult film’?

 

Bruce Lee’s films constituted an intervention, definitely. A transformation, certainly. In the realms of film, Bruce Lee’s fight choreography changed things, raised the bar, set new ideals in film fight staging. But this remains in the realm of what we might call ‘film discourse’ or ‘film intertextuality’, relating as it does to the ‘internal conversations’ and changing practices and conventions within, across and among films. But we are not yet really dealing with the effects of these films on actual people – or at least actual people other than film fight choreographers.

 

To turn our attention to ‘real people’, we might refer back to our creation scenario one more time, and ask what happened to all of those impressionable and impressed boys and girls who left the cinema with a newly inculcated desire for this new ‘ancient’ thing called kung fu. As a range of commentators and historians have remarked, the scarcity and rarity of Chinese martial arts schools in Europe and the US forced people who desired to learn kung fu ‘like Bruce Lee’ to take up the much more readily available arts of judo and karate. There were comparatively more judo and karate clubs in Europe and the US than kung fu clubs. This disparity has geopolitical and historical causes that are too complex to cover adequately here. Suffice it to say that kung fu clubs gradually emerged in response to the demand. But the first big explosion in participation in Asian martial arts in the wake of the ‘kung fu craze’ was an uptake of judo, karate, and taekwondo, not kung fu. The films that inspired the interest came from Hong Kong, but the Asian martial arts on offer in the West came from Korea and Japan, generally via some connection to the military.

 

Over time, more was learned about Bruce Lee’s art. He had trained in wing chun kung fu as a teenager in Hong Kong. Wing chun is a close range fighting art with short punches, locks, grapples, and a preference for low kicks. When he moved to the USA at the age of 18, he was definitely a competent martial artist, and apparently blessed with incredible speed and grace of movement. His speed reputedly impressed even very senior and well established Chinese martial artists. Famously, however, his iconoclasm didn’t (Russo 2016).

 

Stories about and studies of Bruce Lee’s iconoclasm, irreverence and various fights and tussles abound. Rather than recounting them here, the point to be emphasised in this context is that when Bruce Lee gradually began to enter into the TV and movie business, first as a trainer, then choreographer, and supporting actor, he clearly knew that what mattered most on screen was drama. Hence, his screen fights always involved high kicks, jumps, and big movements. Everything was exaggerated and amplified (although those closest to him have claimed that he really struggled to move slow enough to enable the camera to capture his techniques).

 

Because of the complexity of this chiasmus, Bruce Lee can be said to have always sent his ‘followers’ moving in one of two or more directions. First, his Chinese kung fu sent people flocking into Japanese and Korean style dojos and dojangs. Second, Bruce Lee publicly disavowed formal stylistic training – first claiming to have abandoned wing chun, then naming his approach ‘jeet kune do’, then coming to regret giving it a name at all (Inosanto 1994; Tom 2005). Nonetheless, fans flocked to find wing chun classes. Others sought jeet kune do classes. Others took his message of ‘liberate yourself from styles’ or ‘escape from the classical mess’ to mean that one should reject any and all formal or systematic teaching and work out how to ‘honestly express yourself’, as Lee was fond of saying (Lee 1971).

 

Furthermore, within the jeet kune do community itself, a sharp divide appeared immediately after Lee’s death. Some of his students felt that they should continue to practice and teach exactly what Bruce Lee had practiced and taught with them. Others felt that the spirit of his jeet kune do was one of innovation, experimentation and constant transformation, and that what needed to be done, therefore, was to continue to innovate and experiment in line with certain principles or concepts. Hence a rift emerged among Lee’s closest friends and longest students. It continues to this day.

 

As such, all different kinds of people with all different kinds of orientation believed and continue to believe that they are ‘following’ Bruce Lee, that they love him and honour him and respect him. Yet they are all doing very different things and adhering to very different images and ideas. For all of them, Bruce Lee was ‘The Man’. I use this term because I have heard these words – and words like them – in many countries and contexts, from many different kinds of people, the world over.

 

The most memorable occasion was in Hong Kong, after a kung fu class. The style we were practicing was choy lee fut kung fu. This is very different to the wing chun kung fu that Bruce Lee studied as a teenager in Hong Kong, and a world away from the jeet kune do style that he devised as an adult in the USA. In fact, choy lee fut is often positioned as wing chun’s nemesis. It is certainly the style that is mentioned most frequently in the various versions of mythical stories of the young Bruce Lee in Hong Kong. In these stories we are told that wing chun students and choy lee fut students would often have formal style-versus-style duels on the city’s rooftops. Sometimes in these stories Bruce Lee is depicted as the scourge of all rivals. In other versions, an innocent young Bruce Lee is depicted as starting his first rooftop fight and immediately recoiling in pain and shock, before being told to get back into the fray, doing so, and emerging victorious.

 

In all of the Hong Kong based wing chun kung fu stories about Bruce Lee, choy lee fut kung fu comes off badly. Perhaps this is the reason for the frequent animosity that exists between wing chun and other styles of kung fu in Hong Kong. I certainly witnessed some of this during a visit there in 2010. The sense among practitioners of other styles of kung fu seemed to be that wing chun kung fu only became famous because of Bruce Lee’s fame. In this sense, the global success of wing chun itself could be regarded as a kind of cult formation that is indebted to Bruce Lee (Bowman 2010; Judkins and Nielson 2015). Certainly, I was also told in Hong Kong that among the ‘traditional’ Chinese martial arts community of Hong Kong, wing chun was regarded as simply too new and too local to deserve the global fame it had achieved in the wake of Bruce Lee.

 

Bruce Lee’s first apearance (of many) on the cover of Black Belt Magazine. October, 1967.

 

Knowing this is doubtless what made my choy lee fut colleague’s declaration that ‘Bruce Lee was the man’ so significant for me. On the one hand, Bruce Lee popularised a rival style of kung fu, and stories about his martial arts encounters often involved the disparagement of other styles (specifically choy lee fut). But on the other hand, for all who had eyes to see, Bruce Lee was unequivocally brilliant – amazing to watch, astonishing, inspiring, graceful, powerful, elegant. So, even practitioners of ‘rival’ styles, even traditionalists who may disparage either or both wing chun and jeet kune do, could easily concede Bruce Lee’s brilliance and their admiration for him.

 

Of course, some may say that none of the examples of influence and importance that I have so far given really fall into the category of ‘cult’ as it is normally used, either conversationally, colloquially or as technically conceived within film studies. Neither children parroting and copying moves after a cinema visit, nor an expansion of martial arts classes as part of an international boom, nor the elevation of a once obscure southern style martial art constitute evidence of a ‘cult’ – certainly not one organised by devotion to a personality or a celebrity. Nonetheless, my claim is that all such examples are ripples that attest to a significant and generative intervention.

 

For, in the end, Bruce Lee most often functions as a kind of muse (Morris 2001). People have been inspired by Bruce Lee in myriad ways: musicians, athletes, artists, thinkers, performers, dancers, and others, have all referenced Bruce Lee as an inspiration. In the realms of martial arts practice and film fight choreography, Bruce Lee arguably dropped a bomb, the effects of which are still being felt. But, being forever absent, forever image, forever a few frozen quotations, what we see are a diverse plurality of practices of citation.

 

The different ways in which bits and pieces of ‘Bruce Lee’ are picked up and used (and abused) attest to the nature of his intervention. Before Bruce Lee, one could dream of being any number of things – footballer, athlete, rock star, and so on. After Bruce Lee, one more gleaming new option was definitively out of the box, on the table, in the air, everywhere: martial artist. This is why the impact and importance of Bruce Lee has always exceeded the world of film, and seeped into so many aspects of so many lives. This is another way in which Bruce Lee can be said to be like water.

 

Bruce Lee statue in Hong Kong. Source: Wikimedia.

 

Works Cited

 

Barrowman, Kyle. 2016. ‘No Way as Way: Towards a Poetics of Martial Arts Cinema’. JOMEC Journal 0 (5). https://publications.cardiffuniversitypress.org/index.php/JOMEC/article/view/282.

Baudrillard, Jean. 1994. Simulacra and Simulation. Body, in Theory. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Bazin, André. 1967. What Is Cinema? / [Vol. 1]. Berkeley: University of California Press.

BBC4. 2013. ‘Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: The Rise of Martial Arts in Britain, Series 12, Timeshift – BBC Four’. BBC4. February 24. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01p2pm6/clips.

Bleecker, Tom. 1999. Unsettled Matters: The Life and Death of Bruce Lee. Lompoc, Calif: Paul H. Crompton Ltd.

Bowman, Paul. 2010. Theorizing Bruce Lee: Film-Fantasy-Fighting-Philosophy. Rodopi.

———. 2013. Beyond Bruce Lee: Chasing the Dragon through Film, Philosophy, and Popular Culture. Columbia University Press.

Brown, Bill. 1997. ‘Global Bodies/Postnationalities: Charles Johnson’s Consumer Culture’. Representations, no. No. 58, Spring: 24–48.

Chan, Jachinson W. 2000. ‘Bruce Lee’s Fictional Models of Masculinity’. Men and Masculinities 2 (4): 371–87. doi:10.1177/1097184X00002004001.

Chong, Sylvia Shin Huey. 2012. The Oriental Obscene: Violence and Racial Fantasies in the Vietnam Era. Durham: Duke University Press.

Chow, Rey. 2007. Sentimental Fabulations, Contemporary Chinese Films: Attachment in the Age of Global Visibility. Film and Culture Series. New York: Columbia University Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip075/2006039237.html.

Derrida, Jacques. 1976. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1991. The Foucault Reader. Penguin reprint. Penguin Social Sciences. London: Penguin Books.

Hall, Stuart. 1992. ‘Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies’. In Cultural Studies, edited by Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler Lawrence Grossberg, 277–94. New York and London: Routledge.

Hiramoto, Mie. 2012. ‘Don’t Think, Feel: Mediatization of Chinese Masculinities through Martial Arts Films’. Language & Communication 32 (4): 386–99. doi:10.1016/j.langcom.2012.08.005.

Hunt, Leon. 2003. Kung Fu Cult Masters: From Bruce Lee to Crouching Tiger. London: Wallflower.

Inosanto, Dan. 1994. Jeet Kune Do: The Art and Philosophy of Bruce Lee. London: Altantic Books.

Judkins, Benjamin N., and Jon Nielson. 2015. The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts. SUNY Press.

Kato, T.M. 2007. From Kung Fu to Hip Hop: Revolution, Globalization and Popular Culture. New York: SUNY.

Lee, Bruce. 1971. ‘Liberate Yourself from Classical Karate’. Black Belt Magazine.

Lo, Kwai-Cheung. 2005. Chinese Face/Off: The Transnational Popular Culture of Hong Kong. University of Illinois Press.

Marchetti, Gina. 1994. Romance and the ‘Yellow Peril’: Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction. University of California Press.

———. 2001. ‘Jackie Chan and the Black Connection’. In Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies, edited by Matthew and Villarejo, Amy Tinkcom. London: Routledge.

———. 2006. From Tian’anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989-1997. Temple University Press.

———. 2012. The Chinese Diaspora on American Screens: Race, Sex, and Cinema. Temple University Press.

Mathijs, Ernest. 2005. ‘Bad Reputations: The Reception of “Trash” Cinema’. Screen 46 (4): 451–72. doi:10.1093/screen/46.4.451.

Mathijs, Ernest, and Xavier Mendik. 2008. The Cult Film Reader. Maidenhead: Open University Press.

McCormack, Pete. 2012. I Am Bruce Lee. Documentary, Biography.

Miller, Davis. 2000. The Tao of Bruce Lee. London: Vintage.

Morris, Meaghan. 2001. ‘Learning from Bruce Lee’. In Keyframes: Popular Cinema and Cultural Studies, edited by Matthew and Villarejo, Amy Tinkcom, 171–84. London: Routledge.

Nitta, Keiko. 2010. ‘An Equivocal Space for the Protestant Ethnic: US Popular Culture and Martial Arts Fantasia’. Social Semiotics 20 (4): 377–92. doi:10.1080/10350330.2010.494392.

Prashad, Vijay. 2002. Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity. Beacon Press.

———. 2003. ‘Bruce Lee and the Anti-Imperialism of Kung Fu: A Polycultural Adventure’. Positions 11 (1): 51–90. doi:10.1215/10679847-11-1-51.

Preston, Brian. 2007. Bruce Lee and Me: Adventures in Martial Arts. London: Atlantic.

Russo, Charles. 2016. Striking Distance: Bruce Lee and the Dawn of Martial Arts in America. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Shepard, Bret. 2014. ‘Cult Cinema by Ernest Mathijs and Jamie Sexton. Walden, MA and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011’. Quarterly Review of Film and Video 31 (1): 93–97. doi:10.1080/10509208.2011.646214.

Teo, Stephen. 2009. Chinese Martial Arts Cinema: The Wuxia Tradition. Edinburgh University Press.

———. 2013. The Asian Cinema Experience: Styles, Spaces, Theory. Routledge.

Tom, Teri. 2005. The Straight Lead: The Core of Bruce Lee’s Jun Fan Jeet Kune Do. North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing.

Webb, Steve. 2009. How Bruce Lee Changed the World. Documentary. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1437833/.

[i] I have been told this numerous times by editors of martial arts magazines and bloggers, both UK, US, and transnational/online.

[ii] I discuss the ways in which the term ‘Bruce Lee’ organises a complex field of images, ideas, citations and allusions in Beyond Bruce Lee (Bowman 2013).



Looking Forward and Looking Back: The 2017 Martial Arts Studies Conference

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The dedicated core who stayed to the end of the Thursday afternoon workshop.

 

 

Conference Report

 

I recently had the chance to attend (and deliver a keynote at) the 3rd Annual Martial Arts Studies conference, held at the Cardiff University.  Having also attended the 2015 and 2016 conferences I can state with confidence that the field continues to move from strength to strength.  Each of these gatherings has been a dynamic and exciting affair, and each has had its own unique strengths and topics of focus.  Cultural and film studies marked the first gathering, anthropology and theatre studies were prominent topics at the second, while history and sociology seemed to play a more visible role in these meetings.  Taken as a set the three conferences have showcased the breadth of questions asked in Martial Arts Studies.  And the professionalism of the papers that I saw this year (a notable improvement over the already good quality of work being showcased in previous years) spoke to the increased expertise that a variety of scholars are bringing to these topics.

 

This year’s conference also felt “fresh” for another reason.  After a couple of years I was finally able to convince my wife to come with me on this trip.  I have often thought that she might be the hardest working woman in the field of martial arts studies who no one knows.  There is no way to count the number of draft chapters that she has edited, or the hours that she has listened to me talk about these topics.  It would be literally impossible for me to have dedicated this much time and energy to Martial Arts Studies without her support.  Naturally I wanted her to come and see what she had helped to promote and create.

 

Cardiff is a fun, surprisingly walkable, city.  It is full of gastropubs, clubs, theaters and shopping.  The water front looks fun, though I admit that I have never taken the time off to visit.  I suspected that my wife would probably come to see my keynote and spend the rest of the time exploring the city or the countryside.  But to my surprise she instead decided to read the abstracts, found the papers that were the most interesting, and attended all of the conference panels! The result was that I got to hear someone’s impressions of the gathering who, while familiar with general outlines of the martial arts studies literature, has no professional investment in it.  And that is always a refreshing point of view.

 

The conference formally began at 3:00 in the afternoon of July the 11th.  My wife and I barely made it into the city as we had arrived in London the day before and stayed to do some ethnographic fieldwork with a martial arts school near Finsbury Park.  Luckily, we made it to the conference venue in time to get checked in and to hear Prof. Peter Lorge’s opening keynote address titled “Inventing ‘traditional martial arts.’”  Professor Lorge (author of Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty First Century) began by noting how exciting it was, after 15 years of often solitary research, to finally be in a room where everyone could appreciate and take seriously the notion of the martial arts as a valid subject of academic discussion.  Indeed, with the rapid success of the last few years, it is easy to lose track of how far we have come.  He then delved into the discussion of a research project, currently in the works, looking at the topics outlined in his title. Hopefully his talk will be posted on the Martial Arts Studies Research Network homepage in the next few weeks.

 

Peter Lorge, opening the 2017 Martial Arts Studies Conference.

 

 

His keynote was followed by drinks and a “speed-networking” activity which was a great way to get to meet everyone at the conference on the first day.  According to the program there were about 45 papers and presentations given this year, and Paul told me that 70 people had registered for the conference in total.  Those numbers looked about right give or take a couple of people who could not make it due to last minute travel difficulties, and few last minute walk-ins.

 

As I met people both in this activity and at dinner it became clear that this was a substantially new crowd.  It is my impression that many of the presenters at the first conference returned for the second with some new people joining the crew.  This year was a bit different.  While there were several familiar faces (including a healthy contingent of scholars from Germany and the continent, most of the presenters were individuals I had not met before.  While it would have been great to catch up with some friends from past years, overall this was a great sign and speaks to the growing size of the Martial Arts Studies community.  Not only is the quality of our work getting better, but our bench is also getting deeper.

 

Wednesday was the conferences “main event.”  The morning started with some push-hands in the park across from Bute Hall (for those who were so inclined) or a late breakfast in Aberdare Hall for those of us still dealing with jetlag.  The morning keynote was delivered by my good friend Dr. Sixt Wetzler.  He opened the session with a frank assessment of the ways that martial arts are used as a coping strategy for the problem of violence.  As well as calling for a greater focus on the problem of violence, Sixt also sought to expand the sorts of situations that Martial Arts Studies scholars might seek to address in thought provoking ways.

 

The rest of the morning was then dedicated to four concurrent panels.  I chaired a great session that had three papers that all examined different aspects of the martial arts in Hong Kong.  Hopefully I can rope each of the three presenters into sharing some of their research on the blog in the near future.  Following lunch Prof. Meaghan Morris turned to the subject of both classic and modern kung fu films to explore the concept of the “river and lakes” in Chinese society as well as the role of the individual who turns their back on the martial arts in Chinese cinema.  Hopefully her talk with be on YouTube soon, and I found myself scribbling down the titles of half a dozen movies that I suddenly realized that I needed to see.

 

After a quick break it was time for another set of panels.  This time I attended a more historically oriented panel looking at various issues in the Chinese martial arts.  It was then my turn to deliver an evening keynote titled “Show, Don’t Tell: Making Martial Arts Studies Matter.”  Given that the full text of this paper will probably be posted sometime next week I am not going to review it here.  I will say that I attempted to offer an assessment of the status of martial arts studies and made an argument about what is necessary to more effectively communicate the work we are doing to individuals who may not be as familiar (or enamored) with the martial arts as we all are.

 

Following this talk everyone left for another conference dinner and many hours of happy socializing.  But there is no rest for the wicked.  My wife and I broke ranks and headed out to meet with another martial arts group and put in two or three hours of additional field work.

 

Thursday morning began with a note by Paul Bowman.  This was followed with a Keynote by Professor Gitanjali Kolanad who offered a comparative study of her experience in the worlds of traditional Indian dance and martial arts.  Her paper sparked a vigorous discussion of the role of video in the study of embodied disciplines and other methodological issues.  The final section of panels was then held.

 

I had to make a painful decision as to whether to go to a panel on the state of Martial Arts Studies, or a different one that looked at questions of narrative and identity.  Eventually I chose the later and the papers by George Jennings, Leo Istas and P. S. Gowtham did not disappoint.  All three scholars had fascinating projects which would make wonderful guest posts (hint, hint….).

 

After lunch, my wife and I had to leave so we could make it back to London in time for our departing flight.  This was unfortunate as it meant missing the final workshop which attempted to tackle both a famous quote by the sociologist Loic Waquant and the more general topic of how we in martial arts studies should understand and approach the discussion of embodied knowledge.  While I missed this final discussion, I understand that Paul Bowman, Sixt Wetzler, Daniel Jaquet, and Eric Burkart had a lot to say on the topic.  Afterward Paul told me that there were some suggestions that the journal should offer a special methodology themed issue, which sounds exciting.

The Norman Keep at Cardiff Castle. Photo by Benjamin Judkins.

 

 

Impressions and Assessment

 

There are two kinds of conference reports that one can give, and one type is considerably more fraught than the other.  Its easy enough to outline the structure, panels and keynotes of a conference; to talk about the warm and welcoming conference venues, or the hours of pleasant discussion and socialization.  Yet no two people will attend the same mix of panels, or have the same conversations.  In a very real sense no two of us ever attend the exact same conference.  This makes the task of offering an overall set of “impressions” and “assessments” more difficult.  Still, it’s a task worth trying.

 

My overall impression was that this set of meetings showcased the remarkable growth of our shared interdisciplinary field over the last three years.  During the first set of meetings in 2015 we had serious discussions as to whether, and in what sense, Martial Arts Studies might be thought of as a “scholarly field.”  Now the journal has just released its fourth issue, the book series from Rowman & Littlfield has three titles out, with multiple more expected.  And the quality of the papers at this conference surpassed the mark set by our previous two efforts.

 

Still, the future presents us with both challenges and opportunities.  The most immediate challenge would have been visible to anyone exiting Cardiff Central Station.  The large glass and steel building being constructed just in front of the train station will be the new home of Cardiff University’s School of Journalism.  As Paul noted in a private conversation, that means that our time in Bute Hall is limited.  While that building will likely be closed next summer, its not entirely clear that the new one will yet be finished.  Indeed, the organization of these meetings is always a moving target.

 

Oddly, it is the remarkable success of the field which will dictate some of the challenges that we will face in the immediate future.  Larger conferences are more difficult and expensive to organize than smaller ones.  The growing profile of Martial Arts Studies means that more classes on the topic are being offered in universities around the world.  This opened the door to active discussions of what it would take to organize minors or majors in various places, yet such growth never comes without a measure of resistance.  Indeed, it is our success in the fields of publishing, grant writing and teaching that increasingly bring us into contact with the sorts of academic gatekeepers that were less of frequently encountered when this field was basically a hobby or personal interest.

 

Yet one thing became abundantly clear by the end of the conference.  In addition to laying down a track record of solid research and publications, a number of individuals are thinking about the next steps that need to be taken to both consolidate the gains that we have made, and ensure a pathway for growth in the future.  If our first conference asked whether martial arts studies could occupy a place within the university, these meetings made it clear that we were both present, and uniquely well placed to address a wide range of questions that are of interest to the scholarly community more generally.  Given that we have arrived, we now must ask “what is next?”

 

As Peter Lorge noted in his opening keynote, this is an exciting time.  It is no small thing that academics and interested practitioners were willing to fly around the globe to cooperatively advance the state of Martial Arts Studies.  And that is what these conferences really do.  Physically meeting in one place allows for a type of networking, relationship building and exchange of ideas that transform a shared conversation from mere “potential” to a realized fact.  Each gathering has spawned new collaborations, introduced us to new subjects and methods, and renewed our enthusiasm for the subject.  Meetings like these do not just document fields, they build them.  This is why these events are so very important.  And by that measure the 2017 conference foreshadows new and exciting things in the upcoming year.

 

Of course, I have my own wish list of things that I would like to see.  While the Chinese martial arts were well represented at this year’s meetings, I want to hear more about the scholarship on traditional and modern Japanese systems.  It was great to have multiple presentations that dealt with both HEMA and the South Asian martial arts, but other areas, including African and Caribbean fighting systems, still remained underrepresented. An increased emphasis on the global nature of these issues and fighting systems would be a wonderful thing.  It would also be great to see more scholars from North America presenting their research at these meetings in the future.  While it is certainly a long trip, in my experience, it is one that is absolutely worth making. Again, new fields are created in conferences like these, and it is an ever evolving process.

 

But do not just take my word for it.  Be sure to check out Daniel Jaquet’s report on this conference here! Cardiff University also did a short piece that might be interesting. And if you attended this year’s meetings feel free to post your thoughts or links to other conference reports in the comments below.

 

 

oOo

 

If you enjoyed this conference report, you might also want to read: Lineage and Social Analysis in Martial Arts Studies

 

oOo


Five Years of Kung Fu Tea: Making Martial Arts Studies Matter

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Happy Birthday

 

Attentive readers may have noticed a few changes here at Kung Fu Tea.  This blog launched its first post five years ago, on July 27th 2012.  Since that point we have published well over 500 posts.  Looking back at my drafts this adds up to over 2,500 pages of single spaced type.  This material has received more than a million page views by over half a million visitors.  At this point Kung Fu Tea averages over 20,000 page views a month.  That demonstrates a remarkable level of interest in the academic discussion of the martial arts, and far exceeds my expectations when I first posted this welcoming message.

All projects evolve over time.  Still, looking back on that first post what strikes me about this blog is how much has stayed the same.  It still seeks to provide a home for thoughtful martial arts discussions while showcasing the diversity and strength of Martial Arts Studies as a scholarly project.  It is my hope to continue to do that for many years to come.

Of course, some things have changed.  Since the launch of the blog I have published a book, started work on another, and helped to create the interdisciplinary journal Martial Arts Studies (an imprint of Cardiff University Press).  Thanks to the pioneering efforts of Paul Bowman (with whom I co-edit the journal), the field of Martial Arts Studies has evolved from a mere possibility to a realized fact.  We just concluded our third annual Martial Arts Studies conference at Cardiff University and it was wonderful to see so many old friends and new faces.  At this point in time new books and articles are coming out faster than I can read them.

Technology has continued to evolve and an increasing number of readers were having trouble accessing KFT‘s content on certain mobile devices.  As such I decided to treat the blog to an updated template that not only looks sharp, but will be easier to read across a wider range of platforms.

Nevertheless, if anyone deserves recognition on this anniversary it is you the reader.  Without your support none of this would be possible.  It only makes sense that you should receive a gift as well.  Please accept this essay, presented as my Keynote at the 2017 conference, as a token of my gratitude.  It begins with a discussion of the seeming triviality of a topic like Martial Arts Studies, ruminates on what it is that our field has to offer, and presents a frank assessment of some of the challenges that we may face over the next five years.

 

Rifles and bayonets for a school military drill class behind two Judo students. Vintage Japanese postcard, late 1930s. Source: Author’s personal collection.

 

 

Are Martial Arts Trivial?

 

Consider the following photograph taken from a vintage Japanese postcard printed in the 1930s.  It is one of the more powerful images of the traditional Asian martial arts which I have come across in the last couple of years.  At first glance, it might seem unremarkable.  Here we have two young men practicing Judo in the campus dojo of a local educational institution, much as young men in Japan had been doing for decades.  And much as they still do today.

Yet while the Asian martial arts are often associated with a sense of peace or harmony (occasionally for entirely orientalist reasons), this image is unsettling.  One’s eyes are immediately drawn to the racks of waiting rifles on the wall behind our martial artists.  And beneath them we can see a row of hanging bayonets.  Anyone familiar with Japanese military history will find this arrangement familiar.  Rifles and bayonets were stored on identical racks in the barracks where Japanese soldiers worked, ate and slept.  In this case these weapons are intended for the school’s drill team and military education classes.  Their presence was not intended to cause any alarm on the part of a contemporary Japanese viewer, who was simply supposed to register a well-stocked modern educational facility.

The very banality of the scene invites a set of subconscious associations to flower within our minds eye.   Compulsory military training became an increasingly pronounced component of the Japanese educational system during the 1930’s, at much the same time that Japanese aggression in China increased.  Indeed, this was an important decade for the Japanese martial arts.  Disciplines like Kendo were reformed to strip them of their sportive elements to better prepare students for battlefield encounters.  Jukendo, or bayonet fencing, which has been in the news recently due to the Chinese protests that erupted over plans to once again make it available in Japanese schools, took on an increasingly ideological character and became the most commonly practiced Budo in the immediate run-up to the second world war.

Yet this image is powerful precisely because none of that is shown.  We do not need to see Japanese naval landing forces in Shanghai, or soldiers digging pill boxes on Pacific Islands, to know what year it is.  We do not need elaborate backstories to understand who these young men are, or what their future holds.  And no one who looks at an image such as this is going to ask whether the martial arts are “trivial.”  Nothing answers that question quite like a row of neatly polished bayonets making an appearance in a Judo dojo on the eve of WWII.

Do the martial arts matter and, by extension, does martial arts studies matter?  Questions of triviality versus substance are interesting to me as a social scientist because they have a cyclic quality to them.  We are privileged to live in a time when we can ask that question in earnest.  In 1941 quite a few people may have been asking whether Kendo was an effective training mechanism for practical swordsmanship, or whether judo or western boxing would provide American soldiers with better self-defense skills.  But no one saw the physical, social or the ideological aspects of these systems as trivial.  During the post-WWII period the American occupation forces in Japan moved to tightly regulate and even ban martial arts organizations and activities because they understood that these things create social externalities that reach far beyond the realm of individual practice.

Nor were these observations restricted to discussions of the Japanese martial arts.  Consider this photograph, printed as part of an American newspaper report on the Chinese resistance to the Japanese occupation in Guangdong on June 7th, 1939.

“Back to Weapons of Forefathers in War with Japanese.” Vintage newspaper photograph. June 1937. Source: Author’s private collection.

 

Here we see a female Chinese militia leader, silhouetted against a stark sky. The empty expanse at the top of the frame visually highlights the blade of her long handled dadao, or great knife.  While American newspapers readers in the 1930s knew little about the details of the Chinese military, their exotic blades had acquired an iconic status, much like their counterpart, the Japanese Katana.  The reader cannot see where the woman’s gaze is directed.  Nor do we need to see an artillery scarred landscape to understand who she is and what is about to happen.

A backstory is ultimately unnecessary to understand who she is and whether the martial arts were socially significant in China during the 1930s.  Indeed, it is fascinating to compare these contrasting photographs of Japanese and Chinese martial artists, both caught up in the early stages of the same conflict.  On the one hand, Japanese consumers are meant to understand how the discipline of the Budo arts was producing a body of effective and efficient soldiers for the state’s highly modern army.  It goes without saying that they are all willing to make sacrifices for Emperor and country.

In contrast, American voters, wondering about the wisdom of sending war aid to China, were assured that this country’s martial traditions would produce heroes and heroines willing to stand up and individually oppose the Japanese no matter the personal cost.  While not a modern and disciplined fighting force, such brave individuals should enjoy more than our empathy.  They should also receive our support.  Again, it is the essential simplicity of these images that made their message effective.

In the introductory editorial of the Summer 2017 issue of Martial Arts Studies, Paul Bowman and I asked whether Martial Arts Studies is trivial?  These images suggest that the answers to this question are not always obvious.  We cannot really engage such a question without making explicit our scope and domain conditions.  Who is our intended audience?  To whom do these arts matter, or not matter?  When is this question being asked?  Is the year 1939, or 2009?  And by what standard should we evaluate the question of substance?

There is much that could be said about each of these conditions.  For the sake of time I think that we can simplify a few things.  While I have drawn on some historical resources, when asking how we can make martial arts studies matter I am most interested in the current era.

Likewise, the audience that we need to think about is not mysterious, though it has its complexities.  In my own writing, I try to imagine myself being read by an audience of three different persons.  The first of these could be anyone in this room.  I want my writing to speak to, and build off of, critical conversations that are already happening within the martial arts studies literature.  And yet every week I encounter scholars who are writing about the martial arts who do not yet know that our field exists, or who cannot quite figure out where the bridges lay between their projects and ours.  It is important that we continue to work to expand the scope of our discussion, bringing more of these voices into the conversation.

Second, I imagine myself writing for a certain type of practicing martial artist.  While not a processional academic, this individual generally has at least some college education and a burning passion for their chosen style.  They would like to see their art discussed with the same rigor and conceptual toolkit that they were introduced to in school, and yet they want to be able to identify some aspect of their personal experience in the resulting discussion.  Keeping these lines of communication open is not only rewarding, but it helps to ensure that we will continue to have access to the sorts of data needed to develop interpretive or causal theories in the future.

The final, and in many respects most challenging, reader is a fellow academic from one of the disciplines who has no long-term interest in the martial arts.  Given my background I tend to imagine a fellow political scientist, and I recently had an opportunity to present my current research to an entire conference venue full of political scientists, none of whom had any prior experience with martial arts studies. What such readers really need is an assurance that our discussion is both factually sound and theoretically relevant.  In other words, can Martial Arts Studies speak to the big questions in the discipline?

At this point in time our books and articles are likely to encounter all three of these types of readers. And this creates a challenge when asking what we can do to make martial arts studies matter.  Simply put, not every reader, academic committee or funding organization is looking for the same sort of thing.  We must be conscious of our audience and where their desires overlap at every stage in the research process.

It is this last aspect of the puzzle that brings us back to our introductory photographs and the title of this paper.  In truth, it has never been difficult to the make martial arts matter in a narrow disciplinary sense.  One locates a critical debate in the discipline, for instance, how national identity is invented and stabilized through the creation of an imagined past.  You find an aspect of martial arts history, practice or representation that speaks to these specific questions. Next one writes a case study or two in which the martial arts are used to stake out a position on this debate, critique some leading thinkers, and advance a theory of your own.

Success within a disciplinary framework is formulaic by design.  That is because (as Derrida noted) every discipline generates and publicizes its own standards of evaluation.  Knowing how our work will be evaluated, we know something about how to go about doing it.  And in some respects, this is a critical exercise.  As a purely practical matter, Martial Arts Studies must be seen to make contributions to the disciplines before anyone will be willing to engage with us on a more fundamental level.

Still, as we look around this room, it is clear that when writing for other parts of our audience, things become more complicated.  Martial Arts studies draws it strength from the fact that it is a resolutely interdisciplinary exercise.  We do not all share the same methodological orientation.  Indeed, we come from many fields, all areas of the globe and study fighting systems from every hemisphere.  And I have no interest in challenging that to impose a narrow understanding of what good “martial arts studies” must be, or to define substantive relevance in theoretical or methodological terms.

Yet how do we make martial arts studies matter in the absence of shared disciplinary or methodological perspectives?  Or even a shared perspective that these things should be central to an academic discussion?

It may be helpful to remember that we are not the first group of writers to face such a challenge.  Lacking an audience with a unified personal perspective, storytellers and filmmakers long ago discovered that the best way to create understanding was to cultivate a sense of personal investment and empathy.  If we want to continue to encourage the growth of Martial Arts Studies, we will need to do the same sort of thing as we encounter editors, colleagues and funding officers who, while not necessarily hostile to our project, will likely have never heard of, or have thought that much about, it before.

To draw on the classic piece of advice originally attributed to Anton Chekov, it will never be enough to simply tell these individuals that they should be excited about martial arts studies.  Rather, we need to write in such a way that we both show them what we can contribute, and demonstrate the unique perspectives that will be lost if our voices are not represented at the table.

 

Jukendo in the 1930s and today. Source: a slide presented at the 2017 MAS conference.

 

 

Connecting with a non-specialist audience

 

 

How then do we “show” that the martial arts, and by extension martial arts studies, matter?  Again, the introductory images of the Judo dojo and the female militia leader provide some hints on reaching a non-specialist audience.  Or perhaps we want to think about some of our favorite martial arts films and what makes for an effective visual story?

Authorities on screenplays have noted that good stories often share three basic characteristics.  First, they feature an active protagonist who reveals their character through the choices they make.[1]  Second, some aspect of this character’s beliefs, either about themselves or society, is challenged allowing the character to develop a meaningful story arc.  This is what K. M. Weiland poetically termed the “lie your character believes,” and heaven only knows that we have a few of these in the martial arts.[2]  Finally, effective writing needs to show that something is at stake.  The audience must feel that the actions of the characters have meaningful consequences both for themselves and other individuals in society.

Our images of the Judo students and the female militia leaders, while single photographs rather than entire screen plays, draw the audience in (and by extension reassure them that the martial arts matter) precisely because they hit each of these points in a remarkably effective way.  The female militia leader is clearly an active protagonist.  The lie that she believes is that her efforts, even in the absence of modern American military aid, will influence the outcome of the war.  That belief defines her story arc.  And obviously there will be meaningful consequences for what happens next if modern military aid is not forthcoming.

These same three hints, with a bit of translation, can also help us to communicate more effectively when discussing our own academic research with a non-specialist audience.   It is not simply enough for us, or half a dozen of our close colleagues, to understand why some aspect of the martial arts matter.  We must get much better at conveying these insights to groups of people who have less of a personal or professional connection to these questions than we do.  And again, editors and funding officers are right at the top of that list.  And these same three principals of communication: developing an active protagonist, describing complete story arcs, and emphasizing meaningful consequences, can with a bit of tweaking, be the key to demonstrating that Martial Arts Studies, as a field, really matters.

A slide presented at the 2017 Martial Arts Studies Meeting.

 

An Active Protagonist

 

Let us begin with the idea of having an active protagonist.  In a screenplay, or even a photograph, there is usually little question as to who or what the protagonist is.  Luckily, academic theorizing, whether interpretive or positive in nature, also forces us to focus our attention on certain key actors or variables.  In the social sciences, we sometime make a distinction between independent variables, by which we mean basic causal forces, and dependent variables, the thing that is being explained.  The question then becomes, where do the martial arts, or individual martial practices fit into this equation?

If we always approach these questions from the perspective of the various disciplines, where we start off by saying, “I am a political scientist,” or anthropologist or historian “who researches martial arts,” a certain bias can enter our research design without our realization.  After all, the big questions of political science often take political and social institutions as the key factors in any situation, and they might then ask how other groups, like martial arts movements, are co-opted and subordinated to these larger processes.

Perhaps, as in the previous example, the martial arts come to be tolerated, or even supported, by the state as they can provide a unifying mythology that serves the instrumental needs of a nationalist agenda.  That is basically the story that Andrew Morris told during his examination of the Central Guoshu Institute which was an organization backed by the Chinese state and the ruling KMT during the 1930s.  In a project like this the martial arts organization is examined, but only as an extension (or subsystem) on a larger and more fundamental project.

These can be very interesting sorts of questions, and they clearly focus on the martial arts.  Morris made important contributions to our understanding of the relationship between the modern Chinese martial arts and society.[3]  Yet as the dependent variable, or the thing that is explained and interpreted, the martial arts are being cast in the role of a “passive protagonist.”  As voluntary social institutions, these groups may face dilemmas, but because (in these models) their agency is limited, the choices they make reveal little information about their values or identities.  In this sort of structure, the martial arts might function as a lens for political or social analysis.  Yet they are only one potential lens among many.  Beyond a case study or two, both we and our editors will be forced to ask, is it necessary to look at the martial arts at all?  Why not labor movements, or film industries or sports leagues?

A wide range of other voluntary associations or popular culture phenomenon, most of which are probably better understood and more respectable, would work just as well.  Or to return to our original metaphor, passive protagonist can help us to explore the world.  Yet in the long run narrators tend not be very interesting guides.

In the hands of a skilled story teller, active protagonists reveal their character to the audience not through exposition, or as victims of fate.  Rather, the actions that they take reveal their core identities, values and strategies for navigating a challenging environment.  In our own writing, we can replicate this insight by remembering that individuals often join martial arts groups precisely because they seek to make changes in their own lives or in their communities.

Rather than simply accepting elite views of what a modern Asian state should be, authors like Hurst, Gainty and Morris have demonstrated that martial artists in both China and Japan spent much of the 1920s and 1930s actively opposing elite opinion and championing their own vision of what modern Japanese and Chinese society should look like, and what values should be represented in the educational system.[4]  Indeed, through savvy public relations work and making good alliances, martial artists in both states enjoyed more success than one might have thought in not just carving out a niche for themselves, but using government resources to spread their ideas throughout society.  It wasn’t the idea of the ministry of education to put all of those kendo classes in Japanese schools during the 1910s and 1920s.  Rather, they were the result of decades of lobbying by Japanese martial arts organizations.

In the work of authors like Hurst, Gainty and Morris the martial arts are transformed into independent variables that have a measurable effect on a broad range of other social institutions.  More precisely, the martial arts of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be ignored because they generated many interesting social externalities.  No longer are the martial arts merely a lens.  Cases such as these reveal that Martial Arts Studies is more than an adjunct to the preexisting disciplines, it is critical tool for understanding fundamental aspects of the human experience.

In practice, any sufficiently complex research agenda has the potential to approach martial arts as both dependent and independent variables.  The arrows of social meaning and causality are often deeply recursive, and some mix between the two will be necessary.  Yet we make the best case for the existence of Martial Arts Studies as a truly independent research area when we discuss the martial arts as an active protagonist.

Kickboxing trainig in the Hague. Source: Sports Provocation. Photo by Jasmijn Rana

 

 

 

Giving the Martial Arts a Story Arc – The Balance between Theory and Data

 

Now that we have established the martial arts as a potentially important social force, what do we intend to do with it?  Good screen plays encourage the audience to empathize with the protagonist as their actions reveal fundamental insights about who they are, and demonstrate how their view of the world evolves.  In short, the martial arts need to do something, they need a story arc.

And luckily for us in academics, engaging story arcs often focus on the process by which a character comes to realize that some of their beliefs, either about themselves or the world, are either false or mythic is nature. This is what K. M. Weiland called “the lie your character believes.”  It is when a confrontation between myth and reality finally erupts that we really discover who our protagonists are.

It seems that there are few areas of social life in which marketing myths, half-truths, lies and legends collide more frequently or forcefully than in the martial arts.  It is very difficult for anyone to think about the historic European martial arts without envisioning a world in which just knights charged around on white horses. Michael Ryan’s work on Venezuelan stick fighting, which I recently reviewed for the journal, evokes images of a world in which small land holders have resisted waves of outside oppression with nothing but their machismo and polished hardwood garrotes.  And it seems that every Chinese folk martial art practiced today must trace its origins to an imaginary burning of the Shaolin temple or it forfeits its right to the title of Kung Fu.

Yet this does not exhaust the potential misunderstandings or lies that seem to define the martial arts.  For every internally generated legend, historical exaggeration or marketing myth, there is also an externally imposed social myth.  In France and the Netherlands various social actors, including successive governments, decided that kickboxing was a good cultural fit for the immigrant Muslim community and so it encouraged the sport as an aid to cultural assimilation.  Yet as Jasmijn Rana points out in her article “Producing Healthy Citizens”, it’s hard to imagine programs like this actually working when supposedly naturally aggressive Muslim youth are encourage to join kickboxing classes, while all the rest of the citizens are given public pools and swimming leagues.[5]  And while all parents in the United States instinctively know that Taekwondo classes are a wonderful mechanism to instill self-discipline in children (the trait that society seem to value above all others), they also know that there is something just a little bit off about adults who continue with these hobbies, rather than turning to more serious pursuits. They get internet parody videos instead.

One would be hard pressed to find a more detailed examination of the stories that we tell ourselves than Paul Bowman’s recent, and highly recommended, volume, Mythologies of Martial Arts.[6]  After reading this book it would be impossible not to see the many ways in which the martial arts, and their social position in the modern world, have been shaped by these myths.  And there is an undeniable thrill that comes with the discovery that seemingly common-sense propositions might be anything but.  Sometimes this might lead to attempts to debunk certain popular misconceptions.  But in all cases students of martial arts studies should first strive to understand the social externalities, which might be either positive or negative, that these myths generate.

Or put a slightly different way, how is it that the lies that you believe about your own practice impact other people who have never thought of themselves as martial artists?  Students and instructors might believe anything they want.  Yet those belief are not without implications. Indeed, Douglas Wile, in his article “Fighting Words” demonstrates at length that the implications of current Chinese academic debate on the origins of Taijiquan stretch far beyond a handful of history buffs.[7]  It touches on vital question of both Chinese identity, academic freedom and the party’s control of traditional culture.  This seemingly arcane dispute has implications for everyone.

Indeed, if you follow the Chinese martial arts, and are wondering why a poorly recorded 10 second challenge fight between a low-level MMA trainer named Xu Xiaodong and the Taijiquan practitioner Wei Lei became such an important cultural moment (even though the vast majority of individuals in China do not really spend a lot of time thinking about either Taiji or MMA), you need to read Wile’s article.  The sudden interest of massive numbers of Chinese citizens in the fate of Taijiquan, not to mention the Chinese government, will become clear.

To fully explore these implications any research project needs to find the appropriate balance between theoretical development and empirical exploration.  Without an appropriate theoretical lens we cannot identify the interesting puzzles that surround the martial arts.  And if we fail to dive into the historical or social data, we will never be able to convince the non-specialist readers that these social discourses and causal mechanisms have a substantive impact on the broader community.  Again, that is the bar we are striving to reach when we attempt to show that martial arts studies, as an interdisciplinary project, really matters and brings something to the table that more traditional approaches might not.

 

Weapons confiscated in Chinatown, New York City, 1922. This haul shows a remarkable mixture of modern and traditional weapons. Source: NYPD Public Records.

 

 

Conclusion: Meaningful consequence

 

This brings us to the final piece of advice.  We need to clearly convey to our own audience that all of this will have meaningful consequences.  This is one area when I think the Martial Arts Studies literature has come up short in its discussion of these hand combat systems.

After all, who wants to preach to the choir?  We do not need to convince our colleagues and interlocutors within the field that the reconstruction of Spanish fencing systems, or the reemergence of Haitian machete fighting, matters.  Any one of us could come up with half a dozen research questions to pursue through the embodied study of those disciplines before the end of this talk.   Nor do we need to convince the cross-over audiences composed of actual practitioners which many of our books and articles enjoy.  The very fact that they are willing to wade through another ethnography on some aspect of Capoeira speaks to a level of obsession that makes any apologies unnecessary.

Yet it seems that there is a great deal of low hanging fruit, of potential value to wider discussions, that remains un-plucked.  In the opening editorial to the Summer 2017 issue of martial arts studies, Paul Bowman observed that there are very few discussions of actual violence coming out of the field of martial arts studies, yet this is a pressing theoretical and policy issue.  It is also a problem that students of the martial arts, and scholars of Martial Arts Studies, might be uniquely qualified to consider.  Nor is there only one conversation to have.  Violence exists in many modalities, from interpersonal to interstate conflict.  The nature of martial arts schools means that they have often been implicated in, or been forced to respond to, community violence in pretty much every region of the globe.

A few voices in the historical and anthropological literature have picked up on these threads.  Yet as a field we are well positioned to examine the current trend towards greater levels of organized ethno-nationalist, social and political conflict.  How should we approach the rise of organized alt-right groups dedicated to public acts of violence?  Can we speak to the somewhat complex connections between various forms of terrorism and martial arts training? And what insights martial culture might open on the nature of domestic abuse?  I doubt that these topics will reflect our individual experiences with the martial arts, and there is always a bias towards writing what you know.  That is another bit of advice that you might get from a screenwriter.  Yet the many faces of violence are a topic that must be tackled.

Still, I do not want to downplay our accomplishments.  They are important to consider as well.

In the last few years Martial Arts Studies has firmly planted its feet on a new and more difficult path.   For decades pioneers like Burton, Draeger and Hurst attempted to bring the study of the martial arts into the academy.  And yet, for a variety of reasons, they failed.  Hoplology never gained the traction that Martial Art Studies currently enjoys, remaining essentially a hobby, and the few real successes that emerged, such as Hurst’s study of the armed martial arts of Japan, or Wile’s work on the Taiji classics, while a wedge in the door, tended to fall within the confines of disciplinary bounded discussions.[8]

The view from 2017 looks very different.  Rather than studies of traditional fighting systems or combat sports being a personal eccentricity, something that an individual scholar might pursue in lonely isolation in addition to their “serious” academic work, the martial arts are now receiving a greater degree of respect.  We no longer ask whether it might be possible to treat the martial arts as an academic subject of inquiry, we just do it.

And we do it rather well.  The last few years have seen the creation of academic journals, research institutes and networks, a book series, and even annual conferences series such as the one that has brought us together.  Top university and academic presses have taken on an increasing number of martial arts studies manuscripts, and their appetite for these sorts of projects continues to grow.  I know that I have a pile of manuscripts needing to be reviewed as soon as I get back to the United States.

All of this is good news.  And yet a moment of reflection reveals that this rapid success has also raised the stakes.  A university press can only publish so many monographs in a calendar year.  Which means that our acquisition editors must argue not just that our project is interesting, but that it is more important, and will generate more enthusiasm, than something else.

More graduate students in fields like anthropology, cultural studies and history are focusing their dissertations on martial arts related research projects than ever before.  And every year a number of these students hit a highly competitive job market full of interesting and well qualified candidates.  Likewise, the increase in university press publications reminds us that the first generation of assistant professors (to use the American academic terminology) is rapidly coming up for tenure review.  And as part of that process they will need to demonstrate to a number of individuals that not only were they capable of getting works on Martial Arts Studies published, but that these works have made critical contributions both to their disciplines and beyond.

The question posed by Paul Bowman and myself in the editorial of the last issue of our journal may have been somewhat rhetorical.  No one in this room believes that the martial arts, or Martial Arts Studies, is trivial.  Trivialities do not inspire so many individuals to embark on transoceanic flights.

Yet this same understanding may not be shared by the funding officers, tenure committees, and acquisitions editors who are even now getting their own vote in whether and how Martial Arts Studies continues to develop.  Ironically the success that we have enjoyed up to this point has simply moved us into a position where we are likely to meet such gatekeepers with increased frequency in the future.

Our next challenge as a field will be to establish a regular presence at the various professional meetings that dominate the academic calendar.  Beyond that we need to find the sources of funding necessary to institutionalize the gains that we have made to this point. These are exciting opportunities and we are fortunate to be working from a solid foundation.  Yet making Martial Arts Studies matter within the larger academic context is a challenge precisely because the stakes keep getting higher.

Rather than explaining the many ways in which the martial arts have mattered, we need to show the gatekeepers what we as a field can do.  We must show them the unique insights that we can bring to the table.  Of course, all of us in this room will approach that goal from the same perspective, and that is one of the strengths of the interdisciplinary approach.

When we strive to treat the martial arts as an active protagonist, or as an independent variable, we make a stronger case for the independence of Martial Arts Studies.  When we balance theoretical insight with historical or social data, we have the best chance of reaching non-specialist readers and convincing them that the martial arts generate externalities that extend beyond the realm of individual hobbyist.  Lastly, by emphasizing the meaningful consequences of these discourses and practices we answer the question of whether the martial arts are “trivial.”  When we do these three things we show that Martial Arts Studies matter.

 

 

[1] Syd Field. 2005. Screenplay: The Foundation of Screen Writing. Delta; Revised edition.

[2] K. M. Weiland. 2016. Creating Character Arcs: The Masterful Author’s Guide to Uniting Story Structure, Plot, and Character Development. PenForASword Publishing.

[3] Andrew Morris. 2004. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sports and Physical Culture in Republican China. University of California Press.

[4] G. Cameron Hurst III. 1998. Armed Martial Arts of Japan: Swordsmanship and Archery. New Haven: Yale UP; Denis Gainty. 2015. Martial Arts and the Body Politic in Meiji Japan. Routledge

[5] Jasmijn Rana. “Producing Healthy Citizens: Encouraging Participation in Ladies-Only Kickboxing.” Etnofoor, Participation. Vol. 26 Issue 2. 2014. Pp 33-48.

[6] Paul Bowman. 2016. Mythologies of Martial Arts. Rowman & Littlefield.

[7] Douglas Wile. 2017. ““Fighting Words: Four New Finds Reignite Old Debates in Taijiquan Historiography.” Martial Arts Studies.  Issue 4 (Summer).

[8] Douglas Wile. 1996. Lost Tai Chi Classics of the Qing Dynasty.  Albany: SUNY Press; G. Cameron Hurst III. 1998. Armed Martial Arts of Japan: Swordsmanship and Archery. New Haven: Yale UP.


Chinese Martial Arts in the News: August 4, 2017: MMA, Shaolin and Wong Jack Man

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Introduction

Welcome to “Chinese Martial Arts in the News!”  This is a semi-regular feature here at Kung Fu Tea in which we review media stories that mention or affect the traditional fighting arts.  In addition to discussing important events, this column also considers how the Asian hand combat systems are portrayed in the mainstream media.

While we try to summarize the major stories over the last month, there is always a chance that we may have missed something.  If you are aware of an important news event relating to the TCMA, drop a link in the comments section below.  If you know of a developing story that should be covered in the future feel free to send me an email.

Its been way too long since our last update so there is a lot to be covered in today’s post.  Let’s get to the news!

Students at an MMA based school in Chengdu. Source: SCMP.

News From All Over

The discussion of the Mixed Martial Arts in China has dominated headlines for the last few months, and much of this coverage has been mixed.  The last few weeks were no exception.

Controversy again erupted among micro-bloggers after viral videos emerged showing children and young teens competing in pretty serious MMA matches.  Headlines in a large number of both Chinese and Western news outlets reported that the police were investigating an underground MMA fight club that was exploiting orphans.  The truth of the situation turned out to be more complicated.

In fact, the MMA training was being conducted at a martial arts based residential school in Chengdu that both adopted orphans and took in the children of predominantly poor families.  Such practices are common in other martial arts high schools throughout China, including those in Chen Village and the more famous ones near the Shaolin Temple.  And many articles reported that students preferred life at the school (which included regular meals) to what they had left behind in their home villages.  Still, this is not the first time that concerns over child exploitation and injury have dogged China’s martial arts vocational schools, and many members of the public thought that the nature of MMA training made it uniquely unsuited to children of this age, even in comparison to Sanda and other Chinese arts.

But the news for MMA was not all bad.  While some regional fight promotion companies have enjoyed decent success in China, the UFC has found this market to be particularly challenging.  But their luck may finally change.  The Financial Times, and a number of other outlets, have reported that the company has locked in their first “mainland” fights for later this summer.  The event will happen in Shanghai and may finally give the brand a shot at a larger slice of the Chinese domestic media market.

Stone Lock at the first Shaolin Kung Fu Tournament, 2017.  Source: New China.

A very different sort of contest recently happened at the Shaolin Temple in Henan province.  This Kung Fu tournament dispensed with the more familiar types of kickboxing and forms display in favor of exotic, and solitary, events.  It featured four different types of contests focusing on iconic skills.  These included breaking tiles, the manipulation of “stone locks” (a type of traditional strength training device), knife throwing and two finger push ups.  You can read about the event here, in a slightly more detailed article at the SCMP.  The truly curious can also watch the YouTube live stream of the final day of competition, complete with English language color commentators. While not great TV, students of martial arts studies may find the ways in which the event itself was discussed to be interesting.

Foreign Wushu students at Shanghai University.

One of the more interesting news articles from the last month was titled “Wushu Summer Games”.  The piece provided a fairly detailed discussion of a month long summer exchange program run by Shanghai University.  Unlike other exchange programs which we have discussed here at KFT, this one was aimed explicitly at western University students who were interested in learning more about modern Wushu, as well as studying other aspects of Chinese society and culture.  The program is sponsored by Shanghai’s government and would seem to be another example of the cooperation between educational and state institutions in the promotion of China’s “Kung Fu Diplomacy” strategy.  In fact, I suspect that this might make a great field work site and future case study for any undergrads who are currently interested in doing martial arts studies research in China.

Speaking of “Kung Fu Diplomacy”, it turns out that the Chinese martial arts are popular in Burundi.  At least that is what this article asserts.  While we hear a lot about efforts to promote Wushu in Africa, this article was particularly interesting as it once again focused on the close collaboration between government agents (in this case diplomatic staff) and University personal in promoting this aspect of China’s public diplomacy strategy.

The Vision Times is offering “A Brief History of the Chinese Martial Arts.”  Its a popular and more romantic account, but a good example of the sort of discourse that surrounds these fighting systems.

Bruce Lee facing off against Wong Jack Man in George Nolfi’s biopic, Birth of the Dragon.

There is a new Bruce Lee bio-pic coming to a theater near you.  And that means that you may have questions about Wong Jack Man.  Here are six facts that the Movie Pilot thinks you need to know.  To which I will add my own: No, he wasn’t actually a Shaolin monk!  If you are actually interested in learning more about Lee, Wong and why they came to blows, I would highly recommend Charlie Russo’s book Striking Distance, which I reviewed here.

But maybe you are interested in checking out the theatrical styling’s of Shaolin’s various performance teams?  If so, this review has you covered.  Some of the language it uses around the question of ‘authenticity’ is particularly interesting.  One wonders what makes theatrical performers more legitimate than their counterparts in film?

“While one may be used to the awe-inspiring character of kung fu master Wong Fei Hung, thanks to the countless movies and productions featuring Jet Li, Donnie Yen and Jackie Chan, this performance offers a rare chance to witness actual heroes who have spent most of their lives learning one of the oldest institutionalised Chinese martial arts.”

91 year old Master Lee Lo-tsun, whose Kung Fu is soon to be immortalized in a new digitization project.

During the course of these news updates we have related quite a few stories regarding Hing Chao’s efforts to create a digital archive of the Southern Chinese martial arts in Hong Kong.  This article in the Taipei Times introduces a similar effort that is now under way in Taiwan.  Check it out!

Consumer Reports (among other outlets) is reporting a new study on the ability of Taijiquan practice to prevent falls among senior citizens.  Not only was practice linked to better balance and fewer falls, those incidents that did occur resulted in fewer serious injuries.  This study went a step further than most previous research efforts and also concluded that Taijiquan training was more effective than other types of commonly employed exercise and physical therapy.


Martial Arts Studies by Paul Bowman (2015)

 

Martial arts studies

The martial arts studies community has been quite busy over the last month.  To begin with, the much anticipated summer issue of the MAS journal is now out.  You can download your copy here (and be sure to check out Douglas Wile’s article on recent document finds related to the Taijiquan history debates).

Second, I can report that the 3rd Annual Martial Arts Studies Conference, held at Cardiff University, was a great success and a lot of fun.  You can see some initial conference reports here and here.  Further, I have it on good authority that more are more expected in the coming weeks.  Be sure to keep an eye out for papers and slides starting to show up at Academia.edu and similar sites.  It has only been a couple of weeks and I can hardly wait for next year!



Her Own Hero: The Origins of the Women’s Self-Defense Movement (NYU Press, 2017) will start shipping sometime this week!  This volume looks great, especially for those of us who are interested in the history of the martial arts in the West.

At the turn of the twentieth century, women famously organized to demand greater social and political freedoms like gaining the right to vote. However, few realize that the Progressive Era also witnessed the birth of the women’s self-defense movement.

It is nearly impossible in today’s day and age to imagine a world without the concept of women’s self defense. Some women were inspired to take up boxing and jiu-jitsu for very personal reasons that ranged from protecting themselves from attacks by strangers on the street to rejecting gendered notions about feminine weakness and empowering themselves as their own protectors. Women’s training in self defense was both a reflection of and a response to the broader cultural issues of the time, including the women’s rights movement and the campaign for the vote.
Perhaps more importantly, the discussion surrounding women’s self-defense revealed powerful myths about the source of violence against women and opened up conversations about the less visible violence that many women faced in their own homes. Through self-defense training, women debunked patriarchal myths about inherent feminine weakness, creating a new image of women as powerful and self-reliant.
Whether or not women consciously pursued self-defense for these reasons, their actions embodied feminist politics. Although their individual motivations may have varied, their collective action echoed through the twentieth century, demanding emancipation from the constrictions that prevented women from exercising their full rights as citizens and human beings. This book is a fascinating and comprehensive introduction to one of the most important women’s issues of all time.

This book will provoke good debate and offer distinct responses and solutions.

Wendy L. Rouse teaches United States History and social science teacher preparation at San Jose State University. Her research interests include childhood, family, and gender history during the Progressive Era.

 

Chinese tea utensil. Source: Wikimedia.

 

Kung Fu Tea on Facebook

 

A lot has happened on the Kung Fu Tea Facebook group over the last month.  We have talked about “Japanese pirates”, seen lots of rare film footage of vintage martial arts demonstrations, and discussed when a martial arts meme is “empowering.” Joining the Facebook group is also a great way of keeping up with everything that is happening here at Kung Fu Tea.

If its been a while since your last visit, head on over and see what you have been missing!

 


The Five Tiger Stick Society: Pilgrimage, Local Religion and the Martial Arts

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Daoist priests on Hua Mountain in the 1930s. Source: Photo by Hedda Morrison, Harvard digital archives.

 

An Unexpected Lunch

 

A friend from graduate school called during one of one of those terrible afternoons that only the month of February can conjure.  I was sitting in my windowless office at the University of Utah, ostensibly writing lectures for the semester’s new course preparations.  Half an hour later I found myself in a Chinese restaurant with my friend Whitney and his former Chinese language and literature professor who also happened to be in Salt Lake for the day.

 

The professor was a jovial older gentleman who was regaling us with the sorts of travel stories that one accumulates after bouncing around Asia for decades.  The company was excellent, the food was average, and before we left I decided to ask him about something that had come up.  At this point I had already started the preliminary research on my book documenting the social history of the Southern Chinese martial arts.  During my personal Wing Chun training I had been exposed to what seemed like a basic cosmological theory regarding the five phases, and then I had seen a similar idea pop up in a few other arts as well.  I asked the professor about the origins of this notion and whether it indicated anything about the creators of these systems.  I never bought into the stories of mystical burning Buddhist monasteries, or “white eyebrow-ed” Daoist abbots.  Yet when working on a project like this you know that certain topics are bound to come up, so it is best to chase down leads when an opportunity presents itself.

 

The professor’s response was concise and to the point.  He noted that martial artists, in his experience, tended to confuse cultural metaphors with philosophical theories.  What I was asking him about, in his opinion, was not actually a well worked out philosophical system.  Rather it was a set of observations derived from daily practice.  To make the lesson more memorable someone had simply appropriated some commonly employed labels and applied them in a new way.  In short, the only thing that I could reliably surmise about this individual was that he was Chinese, and (not surprisingly) turned to elements common in late imperial or Republic era popular culture to explain his embodied insights about the nature of boxing.  Rather than investigating the ancient Daoist or Buddhist “roots” of such things he recommended that I instead focus on topics like popular literature and Confucian culture.

 

All of which sounded very sensible as this was already my basic approach.  But the professor was not done.  He then asked me what I had thought of the meal?  Before I could answer he noted that when he was younger he was obsessed with Daoist studies, and he read a huge amount of this material.  After all, he noted, “Its full of great stuff….its just so rich.”  But as he aged he decided that this focus was ultimately unfulfilling, at least from the perspective of intellectual history.  It was like always eating desert, but never eating dinner.

 

Sweet foods only make culinary sense when paired with a savory main dish. Likewise, individuals in the Qing dynasty who might have known about Daoist or Buddhist ideas were almost certainly educated by Confucian teachers.  Indeed, they probably were Confucian scholars by day who pursued these other interests in their free time.  It was the Confucian world view that defined the universe that other philosophies existed within (and sometimes reacted against).  “Look at late Confucian thought and how it impacts popular culture and religion,” he concluded. In retrospect, this was one of the better pieces of advice that I got when setting out on my current line of research.

 

A still image of the Five Tiger Stick Society performing on Miaofeng Shan. Source: http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/gamble/

 

The Mystery of the Five Tiger Stick Society

 

 

I recently found myself remembering that lunch.  It seems that an interest in martial arts history offers individuals almost limitless opportunities to skip dinner and head right for dessert.  Many of these temptations are prominently displayed in places like YouTube.

 

Social media sites can be a phenomenal resource for students of Martial Arts Studies.  If nothing else, they offer a vast video archive of the last century of hand combat development.  Yet the nature of the medium seems to encourage us to cut and edit this material into ever shorter and more focused clips, effectively stripping it of its original identity and any remaining contextual data.  In effect, our efforts to curate moments of vintage Kung Fu tells us more about ourselves than the often-anonymous individual whose movements have been immortalized on film.

 

Consider the case of the ‘Five Tiger Stick Society’.  I only recently discovered their historical existence after running across a YouTube clip.  It records a wonderful, if baffling, performance.   One is immediately left to wonder when it was filmed, and by whom?  Where and why did this performance take place?  Are all of the individuals in the clip part of the ‘Five Tiger Stick Society’?  Or did that label only apply to the five children with actual sticks who make an appearance in the film’s opening scenes?

 

A close viewing of the clip, while interesting from a technical standpoint, cannot really answer any of these questions.  What becomes clear is that for something that lasts only one minute and 43 seconds, this is a surprisingly complex visual record.  The film itself is composed of nine distinct vignettes, shot in at least two locations.  Most of these scenes are a recording of a single martial arts performer shot in a single take.  Yet the first and last sequence have been done in a number of cuts and were later edited together.

 

Here is a quick review of what you can see in this film:

0:00-0:06         Title Card

0:07-0:21         Five children wearing opera costumes perform with sticks in some sort of courtyard, possibly in front of a structure.

0:22-0:42         A group of very similar children (but wearing slightly different costumes) perform a dance with sticks on what looks like a road by wall.  This time they are accompanied by an adult male wearing white.  Note that the first and second shots were probably recorded at separate times and then edited together.

0:43-0:49         A group of musical performers standing by the afore mentioned wall.  Meanwhile an individual wearing white performs a dao form in the foreground, but he does not appear to be the focus of the camera man’s attention.

0:50-0:57         A solo performance with a heavy crescent knife or halberd.

0:58-1:06         A very nice spear set.  This is probably my favorite sequence in the clip.

1:07-1:19         Another solo dao demonstration by a different individual, this time wearing a dark shirt.

1:20-1:37         The demonstration of a two-man dao set.  Note that this was recorded in multiple shots.

1:38-1:40         Two different individuals performing a different two-man dao set, spliced into the ending of the previous scene.

1:40-1:43         Two men with spears attacking a single unarmed individual who demonstrates tumbling in his evasion.

 

Judging from the sheer number of unique performers, one suspects that this clip is a very abridged record of a martial arts demonstration that might have been quite lengthy.  There is also at least a suggestion that we are seeing scenes shot in two locations.  But again, if we only focus only on the details of the performance itself, we are left with no real sense of the social context that framed this extensive demonstration.

 

Lacking that information we cannot ask critical questions about why individuals participated in this activity, what their goals were, or how the assembled audience judged the quality of this performance.  Eating dessert on an empty stomach is rarely satisfying.  While these sorts of clips are intriguing, their discovery rarely alters our understanding of the historical record in a fundamental sense.  The way in which this clip (and so many like it) has been edited leaves us with few contextual clues necessary to tackle these more central questions.

 

Gamble with friend and camera after having completed the Miaofeng Shan pilgrimage (denoted by the flowers in his hatband). Source: http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/gamble/

 

Sidney D. Gamble and the Miaofeng Shan Pilgrimage

 

Luckily, “few clues” is not the same as “none at all”.  The day after discovering this clip I was in the library at Cornell and decided to do a quick journal search on the one bit of context that remained.  I knew from that title card at the start of the film that someone in this group was thought to be members of the “Five Tiger Stick Society.”

 

That is not much to go on.  But to my surprise this name turned up a hit in a 2014 article in the Cambridge Journal of China Studies.  It seems that a martial arts society using this same name was taking part in the annual pilgrimage (sponsored by local incense societies), to the temple of Bixia Yuanjun on Miaofeng Shan outside of Beijing.

 

A few more searches revealed that this pilgrimage route has some history behind it.  It was popular during the early 20th century, and the clip above records a small part of one procession during the mid-1920s.  A bit more digging revealed that this footage is an excerpt from a much longer and more interesting film recorded by an individual named Sidney D. Gamble.

 

Gamble spent much of his early career as a social scientist working to advance various causes in northern China.  He graduated from Princeton with a degree in Economics in 1912, and in 1916 he earned a Masters degree in Sociology from the University of California.  He even taught some classes there.

 

Still, Gamble is much better known for his fieldwork.  While in China he worked to promote the YMCA and various missionary efforts which he saw as key to modernizing and strengthening the nation.   He also conducted extensive surveys and fieldwork that became the basis of his subsequent academic writing.

 

Luckily for us, Gamble was also an intrepid amateur photographer and was quite interested in traditional Chinese culture.  In pursuit of good photographic opportunities he participated in the famously colorful Miaofeng Shan pilgrimage on three separate occasions between 1924 and 1927.  These trips resulted in many fantastic black and white images as well as the collection of 16mm footage that Gamble edited into a short documentary after returning to the United States in the 1930s.  His family discovered the extensive photographic trove years after his death, and has since worked with Duke University to preserve and publicize this visual legacy.  In preparation for an exhibit of his work, the University lightly edited and added a soundtrack to his film.

 

The complete film is spectacular.  Anyone who is interested in Chinese popular religion during the 1920s will want to see this.  It runs about 15 minutes and can be watched here. In fact, anyone with an interest in both Chinese martial studies and sound intellectual nutrition (rather than just dessert) should watch the whole thing.

Perfomers from the Lion Society at Miaofeng Shan. Source: photo by Gamble, http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/gamble_586-3408/

 

 

Contextualizing the Five Tiger Stick Society

 

In retrospect, I am not surprised that the film, and the many photos that go along with it, were recorded by a professional sociologist.  It was obviously collected and vetted by a trained observer.  Gamble’s images are interesting precisely because they combine items of aesthetic, historical and theoretical value.

 

Film was expensive during the 1920s, and cameras only get heavier the higher up the mountain one carries them.  What was it that Gamble saw in these martial performances that inspired him to record them in such detail?  How did he, and by extension, how should we, understand their connection to the rest of the festival?  Lastly, what does this tell us about the reality of martial culture during the Republic era, outside of the modernizing and nationalizing influence of the Jingwu (Pure Martial) and Guoshu (National Arts) movements?

 

The fact that Gamble was even able to record such images suggests that we sometimes exaggerate the reach and success of these later reform movements.  Despite their notable successes, both movements had trouble winning the interest of large segments of the Chinese martial arts community.  Unaligned temple boxing societies, militias and village boxing clubs remained common throughout the 1920s.  The identities promoted in these sorts of organizations were more local and parochial in nature, rather than the nationalist and statist ideologies of the reform movements which were gaining traction among the urban middle class. I think that it is important to remember that in 1924 vastly more individuals were taking part in practices like this than were training in Jingwu’s start of the art, YMCA inspired, facilities.

 

Many Western observers first became aware of local martial arts through their participation in local festivals.  As writers at the time noted, their reasons for participating were often layered.  Such can be seen in the account of this same event left by the journalist Julius Eigner.

 

“Towards the end of the season another colourful element enters the scene.  These are actors, acrobats and street performers who, with the complete outfit of their profession, such as masks and their bizarre costumes, make the pilgrimage.  There are days when as much as a dozen groups appear on the mountain top.  On every shrine they pay homage to the deities as every other pilgrim.  After this ceremony has been gone through, they give a free-for-all show, especially to the delectation of those pilgrims who are returning already from the mountain as they, after the religious part of the ceremony has been completed, are carefree and in a happy frame of mind, ready to enjoy to the utmost any opportunity that is offering itself.

The main performances, however, are taking place on the platform in front of the highest temple of the mountain.  There are, for instance, the lion, dragon and tiger dancers.  Each lion is made up of two men who are covered by a piece of brightly colored cloth.  The head of the lion is very large, its eyes and snout being movable.  The performance resembles that seen on Western cabaret stages of the two-man horse.  The difference is that there are several animals in the ring which play with each other, biting and growling.  As the simple country folk who are gathering here are not often treated to such hilarious and skillful performances, they enjoy them to a high degree.

Then there are the sword dancers.  They are by far the best trained artists of them all.  Their extraordinarily swift movements and their high skill in the sham fights earn them continued howls of the hao, hao, comparable to the Western Bravo or clapping of the hands.

Next follow the actors with very primitive plays.  They in turn are followed by child actors.  These little ones win the most rounds of applause as, with stern and set faces, they proceed with their performances.

An interesting aspect of these free vaudeville shows is that the performers thereby hope to win the special favour of the god of their craft so that throughout the year they may have full houses and paying customers. At the same time, they get thereby free publicity, as the pilgrims, gathering on Miao Feng Shan, are coming from very far away places all over the northern provinces.”

 

Julius Eigner. 1939. “Strange Ceremonies Connected with the Buddhist Pilgrimage to Miao Feng Shan” The China Journal 30:3. p. 171.

 

While overly romantic, and more a shallow travelogue than an ethnographic account, Eigner’s entire article is worth reading.  His description supports the hints given in Gamble’s film that the martial arts societies were only a single aspect of the entertainment that one might find on the mountain during pilgrimage season.  And it is fascinating to see his discussion of the enthusiasm that child actors generated among the crowds.

 

Still, Eigner is mostly concerned with the performances and motivations of what appear to be professional opera companies.  The individuals that Gamble recorded looks more like members of local schools or temple organizations.  That is important as rather than trying to broadcast their skills across the region (hoping to attract a paying gig), such martial artists or musicians would have been more concerned with how their performance reflected and augmented their place in the village’s social structure.  In short, the motivations and identities that concerned them the most would have been inward looking and community focused (in addition to the issue of their personal relationship with the goddess, a question discussed extensively by Zhang).

 

These concerns are taken up by Zhang in his much more recent (2014) study of the Miaofeng Shang pilgrimage.  Gamble reports that the pilgrimage route lost popularity and declined with social changes during the 1930s.  By the time that the Communist arrived its unlikely that there was much religious activity on the mountain, and there was none by the era of the Cultural Revolution.  Yet during the 1980s local communities once again formed “incense societies” (essentially local religious congregations) and these groups resurrected or recreated the old pilgrimage patterns.

 

Unsurprisingly, these resurrected practices (once again under pressure as rapid urbanization disrupts what is left of northern China’s traditional village life) included both martial artists and musicians.  Zhang’s research focused on this most recent era, yet many of his findings regarding the motivations and organizations of martial arts performers would probably have been true during the Republic period as well.

 

Zhang found that in the 2000s the various incense societies that promoted the pilgrimage route divided themselves into civil (wen) and martial (wu) factions.  Both attempted to give service to the local goddess by providing goods that would promote the pilgrimage route.  This included efforts to provide free food and tea to visiting pilgrims, or to light the trails at night.  These sorts of projects were spearheaded by the “wen” societies.

 

Opera and martial arts performances have long been treated as a public good offered to entertain both the gods and the local community during festival times.  Yet when Zhang began to investigate the history of the Wu societies (all composed of local volunteers and associated with regional temple groups) an important additional layer of social meaning emerged.  Their presence not only entertained the crowds, it was seen as constructing a “symbolic” or astral temple at the very peak of the sacred mountain.  In this way the merit-winning actions of the martial performers could unite the local community in the blessings of the goddess.  Zhang’s discussion of this point is important enough to quote in full:

 

 

“Although the Wu societies mainly practice Chinese kung fu, the leaders insisted that the purpose of the 13 kinds of Wu societies also served Lao Niangniang. Unlike services provided by the Wen society, services provided by the Wu society can be interpreted on many levels. First and foremost, their pilgrimages to Miaofeng Mount contribute [ ] much more incense for the cult. Secondly, the Wu societies present wonderful performances before the goddess’ shrine. Last but not the least, the 13 societies in old Peking constituted a symbolic temple with their internal symbolic meaning.

 

‘The flying fork society goes first, the five tigers stick society follows behind. We put stilts in front of the door (stilt society). The pennant looks so majestic (pennant society). Lions crouch down on both sides of the door(lion society), two stones on the bottom of the door(two stones society, stone locks brace the door(stone lock society), thick stick lock the door(thick stick society), the parterre is used to hold the wine(parterre society), the voice of blowing and beating makes noise(noisy society), we use sticks to hold the boxes for paying tribute(box society), we use balance to weigh(scale society). And the bass drums stoop down (drum society). All these pennants and drums are working to make the world peace and tranquil.13’

Among these 13 incense societies,

‘The lion society symbolizes the stone lions in front of the temple. So the lion society must let other societies go first during the pilgrimage. The pennant society symbolizes the flag in front of the temple, so this society should go first. The bicycle society acts as a messenger raising money and food. The flying fork society [is] just like a pathfinder who clears away the obstacles for Lao Niangniang, so they practice forks. The five tigers stick society and the shaolin stick society are the heralds. The scale society is responsible for weighing for Lao Niangniang, the waist drum society seems to play the holy music. The box society represents the box for storing money and food. The yangge dance society and the small cart society stand for the tourists coming for the temple fair. The two stones society, the stick society and the parterre society etc. symbolize the deacons in the temple and the entertainers in temple fair.14’

Zhang Qingren. 2014. “The Logic of Chinese Local Religion–Analysis of the Statement of ‘Serving Lao Niangniang’ Claimed by the Incense Societies’ Pilgrimage to Miaofeng Mount.” Cambridge Journal of China Studies. Vol. 9, No. 1. p. 102-103 [minor grammatical corrections have been made to this quote.]

 

Modern incense societies lower their flags at Miaofeng Shan, 2014. Source: NY Times.

 

 

Conclusion

 

It may seem paradoxical, but the most important books out there for anyone attempting to understand the Chinese martial arts usually have very little to say about these fighting systems.  The martial arts have many functions, and personal or village defense is certainly one of them.  But on a more fundamental level these things are a type of social technology that allow individuals or groups to achieve their aims, more broadly defined.  We will never understand how this technology functions if we remove it from its (always moving) cultural context and attempt to fix these techniques under ahistorical glass.  As my friend’s teacher reminded me, dinner must come before dessert.  Context comes before understanding.

 

The next time you have an opportunity to post a vintage newsreel on YouTube, put the whole thing up.  Or if you find a clip, try and track down the rest of the film.  It is true that most of this material will not focus on the martial arts.  It may seem to have nothing to do with Kung Fu.  But we one cannot grasp the ever-evolving nature of these fighting systems if we focus obsessively on only a single aspect of the lives of the individuals or communities who supported them.  One cannot understand the practices of the “Five Tiger Stick Society” without knowing why they climbed the mountain in the first place.

 

oOo

If you enjoyed this essay you might also want to read: Red Boats and the Nautical Origins of the Wooden Dummy.

oOo


Ma Liang’s “New Wushu:” Modernizing and Militarizing the Traditional Chinese Martial Arts

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Nationalist troops in a trench, Dadaos at the ready. Photo was probably taken sometime in the 1930s.

 

 

Asking “What if?”

Few things are more difficult to research than historical events that did not happen.  This is especially true for social scientists who approach the question of theory creation and hypothesis testing from a more empirical or positivist angle.  Yet difficult is not the same as “impossible.”  Nor am I sure that we can really understand why a set of events transpired if we do not grapple with the question of what they meant to observers at the time.  For better or worse, there are times when even the most careful researcher must tread into the realm of “the counterfactual.”

Consider the following.  How would the world of the Chinese martial arts be different today if the military officer (and later Governor of Shandong) Ma Liang (?-1947) was remembered as the father of modern wushu?  In truth, Ma’s entire career seems to be an unending series of “what ifs?”

This specific scenario should not unduly tax the imagination or stretch credulity.  Ma Liang was the creator of a movement that went by the name “New Chinese Martial Arts” or “New Wushu.”  He had an impact on national discussions of these fighting systems in the late teens and early years of the 1920s.  Indeed, he came to be seen as something of an educational reformer, as opposed to simply a despotic warlord.  And certain aspects of his reforms are still with us today.

And yet his memory is not.

Why has he been largely written out of Chinese political history?  And what would the Chinese martial arts look like if they had developed along his proposed lines?

This essay is the first contribution of what I hope is a multi-part series looking at Ma’s legacy.  In this post I hope to review the basic outlines of Ma’s life and career.  Subsequent entries will explore specific events as well as Ma’s lobbying efforts to have the martial arts included in school curriculums.  Still, a basic discussion of this largely forgotten figure is necessary before delving into these more detailed cases.

Some of this material has been briefly touched on in other places.  Stanley Henning includes a discussion of Ma’s “New Wushu” in his essay on the martial arts in Republic period physical culture.  Kai Filipiak mentions Ma more briefly in his 2010 article “From Warriors to Sportsmen: How Traditional Chinese Martial Arts Adopted to Modernity,” (Journal of Asian Martial Arts, 19:1 30-53).  Perhaps the most accessible and detailed contribution to the discussion that readers are likely to come across is the essay by William Acevedo at the always excellent Zhongguo Wu Xue blog.   It brings together the conclusions by these authors as well as information from some additional Chinese sources.

More interesting are all of the discussions in which Ma makes no appearance.  Andrew Morris, in an otherwise brilliant analysis of Republican era martial arts, mentions him only in passing, and only in conjunction with his very limited role in the reform of the Guoshu movement.  Ma’s New Wushu project never gets discussed.  In a sense this is understandable as Morris was interested in the history of sports in Republican China, and Ma understood and promoted the martial arts in a very different way.  But given Morris’ impact on the subsequent development of the Martial Arts Studies literature, Ma Liang’s New Wushu has come to be overlooked more generally.  Nor does Ma receive even a brief mention in Lorge’s comprehensive volume Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century(Cambridge UP, 2012).

As a result of this collective oversight, we tend to imagine Jingwu and Guoshu as the only major national martial arts movements during the period.  This binary focus blinds us to the possibility that if historical circumstances had been slightly different, the Chinese martial arts may have ended up developing along very different (and markedly more militaristic) lines.  Indeed, the brief success of Ma Liang’s New Wushu, while not immortalized in Bruce Lee films (like Jingwu), or looked back upon with nostalgia by modern Chinese scholars (as is often the case with Guoshu), paved the way for other reform movements later in the Republic period.

 

One of the most famous images of a Chinese soldier with a Dadao. Originally a postcard. The individual in this image is actually a railway guard.

 

Ma Liang’s Vision of China’s New Wushu

Military officers played an outsized role in both the promotion of the martial arts and the unfolding of China’s political fortunes during the Republic period.  As such, when investigating one of these figures, we have two sources of information that we can turn to.  The often-hazy (or just hagiographic) memory of a figure like General Li Jinglin within the martial arts community can be augmented by the generally richer (and more accurate) records of political history.

Commander Ma, however, is something of an exception.  There can be no doubt that he was a well-known figure in life, whose personal notoriety ensured that his name was frequently in both the Chinese and foreign language press.  Yet due to multiple failures of judgement, he ended up being marginalized in political circles and died an ignominious death.  This probably goes a long way to explaining why we have so few discussions of Ma’s career, and why many of the most detailed of these seem to have been preserved by his fellow martial artists.

Few details from Ma’s early life have made it into the secondary literature.  There even seems to be some question about when Ma was born.  The most frequently cited date is 1875.  Henning favors the slightly later 1878, while Acevedo  puts his birth almost a full decade earlier in 1864.

Ma’s early martial arts background is something of a mystery as well.  In multiple interviews other Chinese kung fu masters have stated that he was introduced to some sort of “Shaolin,” and this became the basis of his later New Wushu.  Unfortunately, in Republican terminology the Shaolin umbrella covers a lot of ground.

William Acevedo reports that in 1900-1901 Ma served as an instructor at the Shanxi Zhili Infantry school, and it was during this time that he assembled his first draft of “Ma’s Exercises.”  If true this would be a fascinating development.  It would place the inception of New Wushu squarely in the middle of the Boxer Rebellion, a period in which the Chinese martial arts (or some version of them) were entering the national political discussion with ultimately disastrous consequences.  It would not be hard to see a rejection of “Boxer superstition” in the modernized, streamlined and scientific approach to military training championed by Ma as a young officer.  Yet in many ways his vision of what the martial arts could be bore the hallmarks of this earlier period of radical nationalism.

Then again, the decade long discrepancy noted above may impact how we read these events. Zhouxiang Lu and Fan Hong, the authors of Sport and Nationalism in China (Routledge, 2014) instead place Ma at the Shanxi Military Academy in the early 1910s and note that this was when he began to develop a four-fold system of basic training focusing on the disciplines of unarmed boxing, wrestling, the spear (presumably useful for understanding the bayonet) and the sword (jian).

Or maybe this is a distinction without a difference.  Historians have noted that the first mass outpouring of popular Chinese nationalism (as the term is understood in a modern academic sense) erupted in 1909-1911 in the lead up to the fall of the Qing dynasty.    One way or another, the New Wushu movement was born out of the combined fires of nationalism and militarism.  Ma saw in the traditional martial arts a system that could be used to both physically strengthen the Chinese people and aid in the creation of more effective citizen-soldiers.

These goals could only be accomplished if Ma’s simplification and synthesis of traditional martial arts training was adopted on a national scale.  In 1911 he and a group of martial arts teachers in Shandong began work on of a multi-volume set of textbooks titled Chinese New Wushu.  One sometimes sees the title translated at New Chinese Martial Arts but in this case, I prefer to use the term ‘wushu’.

In his biographical study of Ma Liang the Chinese scholar Ma Lian-zhen (South China Normal University) notes that one of Ma’s major contributions was the stabilization and popularization of the term “wushu” in Chinese martial arts circles.  In truth, the Chinese martial arts have never been called just one thing (a topic I have discussed at length elsewhere) and the choice of terms is often somewhat political or ideological.   It is no mistake, for instance, that Republic era reformers chose to adopt the term “Guoshu” while later Communist innovators eschewed it.  Ma Lian-zhen credits Ma Liang with helping to stabilize the now ubiquitous terms “wushu” in the current era.

Further revisions to the textbooks were undertaken in 1914, the same year that the program was adopted by the Ma’s newly created Wushu Training Center in Jinan (the capital of Shandong).  Of course, such a movement cannot accomplish its central goals unless it is adopted on a national scale.  Within a few months martial arts organizations in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai were all adopting Ma’s program.  Ma’s reputation as an innovator in civilian educational reform, as well as military training, began to spread.

The timing of the New Wushu movement seemed, at first, to be fortuitous.  During the early Republic period reformers were working to create innovative approached within the education sector.  In practice, they tended to look to Japan and Germany (widely perceived as the ideal models of strong, centrally controlled, “late developing” industrial states) for guidance.  The martial arts (in the guise of practices like Kendo, Fencing, Judo and Boxing) had been adopted by the educational establishment in both countries with the goal of producing strong, easily militarized, students.  Educational reformers in China were also debating the merits of placing the martial arts in the nation’s middle and high schools for similar reasons.

Sometimes these debates went beyond mere talk.  In 1917 the Beijing Normal School opened its doors.  Prospective teachers were expected to take at least two hours of Taijiquan classes a week in addition to their academic subjects.  It was expected that they would be able to teach or run martial arts themed extra-curricular activities.  Teachers were also instructed to include colorful stories of military exploits and martial valor in their regular lessons to indoctrinate students with (government approved) martial values (Filipiak, 2010).

Even in such a favorable environment, Ma Liang did not rest on his laurels. Instead he called on his various military and political connections to lobby on behalf of the New Wushu program.  His efforts paid off.  In 1916 the Ministry of Education sent a fact-finding group to Shandong province to examine the successes and scalability of Ma’s program.  The next year it was accepted as compulsory training in both national police and military academies, as well as in the Beijing Normal School.  The last step was especially critical as a supply of well-trained instructors would be necessary to take the program into China’s many classrooms.

In October of 1918 the National Secondary Schools Principals Congress urged all secondary schools to make arrangements to include Ma’s training program in their curriculum.  This effort was supported by the publication of the final draft of the Chinese New Wushu series by the Shanghai Commercial Press.  The series was originally slated to contain eight volumes.  Four would cover basic training in boxing, wrestling, fencing and the spear, while four more would introduce applications and more advanced material.  Unfortunately, the second series was never printed and programs had to make do with the four basic texts. Nevertheless, the introductory pages of these texts were graced with endorsements and prefaces by important political leaders and intellectuals (Lu and Hong).

 

“Chinese Reoccupy Great Wall Area.” 1933. Still taken from Vintage Newsreel.

 

Modern practitioners often have overly romantic notions about a past “golden age” in which all Chinese individuals practiced and revered some aspect of the traditional martial arts. This was never the case.  Even when martial arts training was deemed necessary, due to China’s Confucian social structure, it tended to remain somewhat socially marginal.

Ma’s successful injection of the New Wushu program into Republican era educational reforms was probably the first time that anyone got close to making the martial arts a mandatory aspect of Chinese social life at the national level.  As one might expect, this rapid rise in visibility provoked a sharp response from other, more modernist, educational reformers.

This became most evident in the page of the left-wing New Youth.   In 1918 Lu Xun, a leading writer and intellectual, unleashed a pointed attack on the notion of placing Ma’s New Wushu in schools.  This position was then echoed by Chen Duxiu who explicitly linked the sudden mania for boxing (most evident between 1911 and 1918) with the similar tide of enthusiasm that swept over the country in 1900, leaving the nation in ruins.

All of this was too much for Chen Tiensheng, a pioneering member of the Jingwu movement, who took up his brush to defend the martial arts in what is probably the single most celebrated public debate of the early republic period.  Every historian of the period has talked about his exchange (see for instance the discussions in Morris or Cohen’s History in Three Keys). Its so well known that there is no need to rehash the debate here.  Yet while this exchange is usually framed as an exchange between middle class Jingwu reformers and left leaning intellectuals, what is often forgotten is that it was Ma’s much more militant vision of a national New Wushu that inspired the discussion in the first place.

Lu and Hong note that on April 6th of 1919 the Ministry of Education issued a special report titled “Proposals for the Development of Physical Education.”  It called for wushu to be included in the curriculum of all schools and went on to declare that it should comprise “the most fundamental” aspect of China’s physical education.  This was a major win for China’s martial artists, and while other organizations, like Jingwu, had been ramping up their own educational capacity (see Judkins and Nielson 2015), Ma’s New Wushu program was best positioned to capitalize on this windfall.

Still, no government declaration enforces itself, and revamping physical education in China’s many schools proved to be both expensive and logistically difficult.  If nothing else, instructors needed to be trained and equipment had to be procured.  So how far reaching were these reforms?

This is not a subject that we have much hard data on, but a June 1924 report indicated some success.  It reviewed the curriculums of 40 secondary schools and universities distributed throughout 14 provinces.  It found that 52.5% of these institutions offered martial arts classes, while an additional 22.5% had adopted them as an extra-curricular activity.  Obviously, any sample of this size is likely to show several biases.  One suspects that researchers were probably better able to get responses from larger and better funded schools that would also have been more likely to support these sorts of programs.  Still, it is interesting to note that this report found that 75% of the schools it surveyed promoted the traditional martial arts on their campuses in the early 1920s.

1919 was the high-water mark of the New Wushu movement.  Unfortunately, the political events that had smoothed the way for the program’s rapid rise played a part in its downfall.  Germany’s defeat in WWI sent shock waves throughout the Chinese political system.  Educators began to reevaluate their “over-reliance” on the German/Japanese model, and began to explore less militaristic theories of education that did not place the martial arts at the center of physical education.

Worse was the blow that was dealt by the Versailles Treaty, which formally ended hostilities between the warring powers.  Rather than returning Chinese territory held by the Germans (as the Chinese government expected), these areas were instead handed over to the Japanese.  Massive public protests and economic boycotts erupted in the face of this decision, sparking the May 4th movement.

This turn of events complicated Ma’s efforts to promote New Wushu on many levels.  The most obvious of these were the personal and professional.  Ma was a follower of “Little Hsu” or Hsu Shu-tseng who, along with other northern warlords, ended up being beneficiaries of Japan’s new status in the region.  In fact, newspaper reporting on some of Ma Liang’s public addresses at the time leads one to suspect that he may have been genuinely disillusioned with China’s failure to build a strong state and had become something of a Japanophile (“Effusions of Ma Liang.” The Peking Leader. September 11, 1919. page 6)

As a military officer Ma was tasked with maintaining social order and enforcing the curfew in the capital and other parts of Shandong.  By all accounts his efforts were a catastrophic failure.  He actively attempted to confront a public that was furious about the Japanese moves in the region.  Ma personally ordered the torture and execution of three leaders of the anti-Japanese commercial boycott (which he viewed as a threat to the social order).  When that failed to calm the situation, he brought a contingent of his men to the local university and held the students hostage while lecturing them on proper behavior and threatening them with his dadao troops if they failed to fall in line.  Even in a period characterized by violence and excess, Ma’s failures stood out and earned sharp rebukes from not just left-wing newspapers, but even other warlords.

Over time, Ma’s poor choices and political failures would undermine his beloved martial arts agenda.  But in the short run this notoriety may have worked to his advantage.  As news of the upheaval in Shandong spread the foreign press started to run stories and profiles on Ma.  As they searched for background material on the officer two things stood out.  First, his Muslim ethnicity, and second his recently published series of books on Chinese boxing (“The Modern Boxers of Shantung,” The North China Herald. Aug. 16, 1919. page 401).  Even his critics were forced to admit that Ma’s troops seemed exceptionally well trained and conditioned.  This was often held up as evidence of the viability of his training methods.  Ma thus became one of the first names to be widely associated with the reform of the traditional martial arts outside of China.

The general seems to have worked to promote this fame throughout the early 1920s.  He became known for his lavish martial arts demonstrations which were used to entertain guests, reporters, political dignitaries and even foreign military officers.  A long account of one such event (discussed here) was even circulated in English through a public relations office.  It was subsequently picked up and distributed by a number of international newspapers.  Indeed, Ma seemed to be acutely aware of the value of the Chinese martial arts as a tool of global public diplomacy, especially if he could argue that they were either older than, or superior to, the Japanese practices that seemed to attract so much admiration in the West.

Ma Lian-zhen has noted that one of Ma Liang’s greatest accomplishment was the organization of the first massive national martial arts tournament held during the Republican period.  The 1923 “National Martial Arts Meet” was staged near Westgate in Shanghai.  Period reports suggest that it may have attracted up to a thousand participants and won widespread coverage in the press.  Reports on the event even circulated in English language newspapers.  This event set the standards and expectations that inspired the Guoshu movement’s later, and much better remembered, “National Martial Arts Examinations.”

The second half of the 1920s were a time of retreat for the Chinese martial arts at the national level. As Henning points out, this was an era in which the “New Culture Movement” dominated the public debate.  It looked for ways to modernize and westernize Chinese society.  While Ma’s New Wushu was notable for its attempts to simplify and rationalize the Chinese martial arts (so much so that it earned the ire of many traditionalists), it still seemed out of step with the era’s progressive values.  The delegitimatizing of educational militarism following Germany’s defeat in Europe, and Ma’s many self-inflicted political wounds, combined to make his New Wushu program more infamous than famous.  By the middle of the 1920s it seems to have slipped completely out of the public discussion of either physical education or the martial arts.

Nevertheless, Ma Liang was nothing if not a fighter.  He continued to look for opportunities to interject himself into the national discourse.  His personal fame ensured that it was not difficult to get his name in the newspapers.  But substantively advancing his agenda during the second half of the 1920s proved to be more difficult.

In 1928, following the success of the Northern Expedition, Ma petitioned the KMT for permission to jump-start his program on a national scale.  Press reports indicate that he asked to be allowed to open Wushu academies in all of China’s leading cities (see North China Herald, September 8th, 1928, page 408).  Such approval does not seem to have been forthcoming as his plans would have clashed with the KMT’s Guoshu movement.  Indeed, Ma was invited to join the staff of the new organization in 1928 as an “educational expert,” and he gave the occasional speech in support of martial arts training.  Yet by in large he became a marginal figure in the new era’s leading martial arts movement.

The Mukuden Incident (1931) seems to have breathed new life into both Ma’s efforts, and the nation’s enthusiasm for martial arts training more generally.  The establishment of a Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria in 1932 unleashed a wave of nationalism that gave the advantage to the advocates of the more traditional “National Essence” approach in their debates with the New Culture Movement.  Political events in Northern China seemed to strengthen their argument that liberal physical education reforms had failed and the nation desperately needed stronger soldiers.  As such, the traditional martial arts had to be reconsidered as the basis of the national physical education curriculum.

Capitalizing on this trend Ma tried something new.  In 1933 he became more vocal in his backing the Central Gusohu Institute.  At the same time, he proposed the creation of a massive (and carefully organized) network of civilian Dadao teams that would ultimately be loyal to him.  Indeed, when looking at some of these national martial arts movements of the period it can be difficult to see where the martial training ends, and the political patronage network begins.

Unfortunately, his story did not end well.  The Japanese advance across China continued during the 1930s, the rising popularity of the dadao notwithstanding.  They captured Jinan in 1937 and Ma surrendered.  The following year he provoked outrage across China (and denunciations from his fellow Muslims) when he accepted the role of Governor in the Japanese puppet government.  To be honest, given his well-known pro-Japanese statements going back almost two decades, I am not sure how many people were actually “shocked” by his decision to collaborate.

In 1939 Ma was deposed from office.  Following the end of the Second World War the now elderly MA was arrested by the KMT and imprisoned.  He fell ill and died while awaiting trial.

 

Undated photograph of a Chinese soldier and his Dadao.

 

Conclusion

If one theme has dominated our review of Ma Liang’s career, it is the oppressive weight of political contingency.  It is all to easy to blame the failure of the New Wushu movement on Ma’s personal or political failings.  Yet the broad outlines of this story were really set by global political events that were beyond the scope of any individual’s control.  Indeed, the cyclic fates of the German and Japanese empires seem to have had an outsized impact on the political and social debates that both determined the place of the traditional Chinese martial arts in Republic era educational reform, as well as the general character of those practices that did emerge.

There is simply no escaping contingency.  Had Germany carried the day on the battlefields of France, it is entirely likely that a highly militarized vision of New Wushu would have come to play a role in Chinese schools very similar to the Budo arts of Kendo and Judo in Japanese education.  That would likely have altered both the popularity of the Chinese martial arts, and the way that they would have been socially constructed for decades after the end of WWI.  Yet with the defeat of Germany, the aggressively urban and middle class Jingwu association was given a lift in their effort to reconstruct the martial arts as one aspect of the country’s “athletic culture” on par with activities like basketball and tennis.

When we chart the history of the Chinese martial arts what we see is a diagram of both individual choice and social contingency that resembles a vast branching tree.  Ma’s career reminds us that the current configuration of the Chinese martial arts was not inevitable.  It does not represent everything that the Chinese martial arts could have become, or all the potential that remains hidden within them.  As social circumstances change in the future, so to will these practices.

Ma’s career is also a valuable reminder that even the paths not taken can have an important impact on what we experience now.  While his New Wushu never really achieved its central aims, it helped to smooth the way for the more influential Jingwu and Guoshu movements.  Ma did much to raise the profile of China’s Muslim’s martial artists, and his training programs helped to give the Republican martial arts perhaps their most iconic symbol, the Dadao.  Ma Lian-zhen may even be correct in his assertion that every time you hear the term “wushu” uttered in a modern context, you are experiencing an echo of his reform.  The past, it seems, is always with us.

 

Sources

William Acevedo. 2015.  “Ma Liang – Chinese Martial Arts Modernizer, Warlord and Traitor.” https://zhongguowuxue.wordpress.com/2015/08/30/ma-liang-chinese-martial-arts-modernizer-warlord-and-traitor/

Kai Filipiak. 2010. “From Warriors to Sportsmen: How Traditional Chinese Martial Arts Adapted to Modernity.” Journal of Asian Martial Arts. Vol. 19 No. 1. 30-53.

Stanley Henning. 2003. “The Martial Arts in Chinese Physical Culture, 1865-1965.” in Thomas A. Green and Joseph R. Svinth (eds.) Martial Arts in the Modern World. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 13-36.

Ma Lian-zhen. 2012.  “Ma Liang and the Modernization of Chinese Martial Arts.” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies. No. 1.

Andrew Morris. 2004. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sports and Physical Culture in Republican China. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Zhouxiang Lu, Fan Hong. 2014. Sport and Nationalism in China. New York and London: Routledge.

 

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If you enjoyed this essay you might also want to see:  Gu Ruzhang-Northern Shaolin Master and Southward Bound Tiger.

 

oOo

 


Research Notes: Ma Liang’s 1923 Wushu Tournament and Charity Demonstration

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Introduction

 

The following research note is part of our ongoing series discussing the career and contribution of Ma Liang (187?-1947).  As I mentioned in the first essay, Ma can legitimately be considered a pioneering figure in the modernization of the Chinese martial arts, yet he is rarely discussed in the current literature.  While scholars are showing renewed interest in the efforts of the Jingwu and Guoshu movements, Ma’s New Wushu consistently attracts less attention.

To rectify this situation, I would like to make some period reports of his activities more widely available to a general readership.  The first of these, an account of one of his famous martial arts demonstrations, was already discussed here. Be sure to look it over if you have not yet read it.

This post focuses on another of Ma’s achievements, the organization and hosting of a massive national martial arts tournament, staged in Shanghai, in 1923.  This event, the first of its kind, managed to attract competitors from all around China.  In some important respects it laid the groundwork for the better remembered “National Martial Arts Examinations” of the Guoshu era.  Ma’s achievement generated enough enthusiasm that China’s foreign language press even began to run reports on the tournament.

The following articles were both published in the pages of the North China Herald in 1923.  It should be noted that this paper was not always kind to China’s martial artists, so the generally positive tone of the reports is encouraging.  The first article covers the opening day of the tournament and reports on the various displays of calisthenics, forms work and weapons demonstrations.  The author notes that no actual boxing or wrestling matches took place, but seems to have been generally impressed with the display.  It is interesting to note that the martial arts are here presented and discussed as a modern set of practices, fit to advance China’s interests in the coming century.  This view is subtly emphasized through the discussion of gender inclusivity and even the sorts of uniforms that the martial artists wear.  Indeed, it is probably not a coincidence that the author repeatedly calls these contestants “athletes.”  Readers should also note the frequent references to the Jingwu Association, which at the time was approaching the peak of its popularity.

Those hoping for reports on actual contests of strength and skill would not have to wait long.  A few days after the close of the game the festival’s organizers and contestants reunited for a demonstration in Shanghai’s Town Hall.  As was common during the period, this event was staged as a charity event.  Various boxing forms were demonstrated, but this time they were accompanied by live (and apparently quite spirited) matches.  There can be no doubt that General Ma would have been happy to learn that after attending his tournament and charity demonstration, foreign reporters in China were touting the strength of the country’s martial artists and pointing out that Japan’s much admired Judo actually had its “roots” in China.  Indeed, one suspects that this was precisely the message that such events were calculated to spread.

 

ANCIENT ATHLETIC ARTS OF CHINA

 

Amazing Display of Agility and Skill by Chinese Athletes at the West Gate

 

More than 1,000 picked athletes representing every province in China took part in the National Athletic Carnival which was held at the Chinese Recreation Ground near the West Gate under the auspices of General Ma Liang and several local athletic associations.

According to General Ma, this is the first time in the history of China that such a representative exhibition has been held, and it proves conclusively the interest that is being taken in one of the foremost arts of ancient China.

The Carnival opened on Saturday afternoon and continued until Tuesday.  It was devoted exclusively to feats of skill and athletics contests based on exercises which were introduced into China during the third dynasty,–some 2,000 years ago.  Boxing, wrestling, dancing, tumbling, expert sword, knife and dagger play, all formed part of this interesting tournament, which was conducted with as much ceremony as ancient historical jousting matches in the list.

The tremendous crowd which thronged the confines of the Public Recreation Ground on Saturday afternoon, gave ample testimony of the interest which is felt in the sport of the ancient Empire.

 

CALISTHENICS FOR BOTH SEXES.

After the opening preliminaries, including a parade of contestants dressed in their smart club uniforms, a salute to the national flag, and an address of welcome delivered by General Ho Feng-ling and the reading of congratulatory messages by General Ma Liang, the display began with a series of formal calisthenic exercises by girls from the Cantonese Guild School, the Chin Ying Girl’s School, and the Chin Woo Girl’s Athletic Association.  The girls were all dressed in smart light blue blouses and gymnasium knickerbockers.  Their rhythmical movements to the count of their several instructors was especially interesting when it is remembered that, a decade ago, a Chinese girl was never allowed to take part in the exercises of her older brothers, but was closely confined to the house.

The calisthenics were followed by various ceremonial dances in which every muscle of the body is exercised, especial attention being paid to deep breathing.

After the girls had concluded their part of the programme, the various men’s athletic societies took the large field and conducted similar calisthenic exercises, which included the elementary positions of wrestlers.  Especial mention should be made of a remarkable exhibition made by 40 picked soldiers, belonging to the 47th Mixed Brigade of the 2nd Division of the Frontier Defense Army under the command of General Ma Liang.  These men were all considerably over six feet in height. And instead of wearing military uniforms were dressed in white short coats, navy blue trousers, and wide white canvas belts.  The precision of their movements, sometimes most intricate, to the command of their drill sergeant was excellent.  One of the movements to induce greater suppleness of back and lower limbs, consisted of standing erect, placing one hand on the hip, extending the other arm full length overhead with the palm of the hand inverted, then bending forward, without bending the knees, resting the palm of the hand on the ground, then clasping the opposite ankle and forcing the head through the narrow aperture, then by slowly raising the lower hand returning to the former erect position.

 

ARTS OF SELF-DEFENCE.

Following the group calisthenic exercises, various individual exhibitions were given in the ancient art of self-defence.  But unlike western boxing, there were no opponents.  It might be compared to our “shadow” boxing, used by all boxers before a match.  The speed, agility, and grace with which an antagonist slipped away from an imaginary opponent were all taken into consideration.

Instead of continually taking the aggressive [sic] and carrying the fight into the theoretical enemy’s camp, several of the boxers pretended that they were far spent and showed the manner in which to fall gracefully and without injury.  Mr. Ching Kwan-foh, an instructor at the Chin Woo Athletic Association, was especially brilliant, making no less than 45 full length falls, including forward, side and back, in less than 12 minutes.

One of the most interesting as well as the most graceful of the boxing and lance displays was made by Mr. Li Whei-ling, also of Chin Woo, who celebrated his 85th birthday last month.  Mr. Li was more agile than any of his younger opponents, and made a picturesque figure, thrusting and parrying dexterously with his long lance, his long white beard waving continuously.

Other individual competitors exhibited their skill with quarter-staff, cudgel, double-edged sword and dagger, one man frequently being pitted against four opponents.  In none of the games of the Occident is such speed, quick thinking, and coordination between the hand and eye necessary, since all the weapons are sharpened to knife points, and a slip, or misstep would result in certain death.

On both sides of the official stand were ambulances and stretcher bearers waiting for calls.  Their services were only required twice on Saturday, once to dress a slight cut and the other to remove several splinters from one of the contestants who had slid on the pine platform.

 

WEAPONS INNUMERABLE

The implements used by various contestants comprised every known form of weapon both ancient and modern.  The catalogue gives the following list which have corresponding types in the Occident: club, three-linked clubs, single sword, double sword, double dagger, hilt, lance, hooklance, axe, tiger-headed protector hook, two-edged sword, rapier, javelin, hammer, copper clasp, swallow wing clasp, steel rings, shears, lock, saw, lash, awl, blunderbuss, chain, drill. Arrow barb. Long shuttle. Shield. Spears. Heavy shuttle, teeth spike, long handled spear, halberd, and mace.

“Ancient Athletic Arts of China.” North China Herald. April 21, 1923. Page 171.

 

Shuaijial Masters in Tainjin, 1930. Source: http://fightland.vice.com/blog/shuai-jiao-chinas-indigenous-wrestling-style

 

CHINESE ATHLETES AT TOWN HALL

Ancestor of Jiu-Jitsu: Speed. Dexterity and Courage: A Remarkable Display

 

A fairly large audience gave an enthusiastic reception to 250 Chinese boxers and wrestlers at the Town Hall on Saturday evening, when athletes representing every province in China met and gave an exhibition of their skill in the manly art of self-defence.  The exhibition was held under the auspices of General Ma Liang, and many of the athletes were the same who took part in the games held at the West Gate.  The proceeds from the sale of tickets were devoted to the Chekiang Relief Fund, and it was stated that quite a considerable sum was realized.  Through the courtesy of General Ho Feng-ling and Arsenal Band furnished incidental music.

In addition to the individual displays of boxing and wrestling against an imaginary opponent, there were several good bouts in which antagonists were real flesh and blood and took amazing and difficult falls apparently suffering not the slightest injury.

Chinese wrestling is in reality the parent of jiu-jitsu now taught universally in the Bushido wrestling schools in Japan.  It is maintained that the men do not have to be of equal weight or strength, but the victor’s success depends mainly upon their agility in securing the primary hold upon his adversary.  This contention was proved more than once on Saturday evening, when a wrestler frequently threw an opponent 20 or 30 pounds heavier.  On the other hand, Mr. Ling Soh-ching, from Tientsin who weighed in the neighborhood of 13 stone, threw seven opponents in nine minutes, which was considered the record for the evening.  By way of explanation, it might be added that a “throw” according to the Chinese definition, means usually casting your adversary some 15 or 20 feet away so that he rolls on his back.  Nor were there any mats or mattresses to break the force of the fall.

Several of the boxing bouts were fast and furious affairs.  The rules laid down by the illustrious Marquis of Queensbury doubtless have not been published in Chinese, since the various competitors fought with bare knuckles, kicked, scratched, bit, clawed each other with reckless abandon, that is, they would have if the opportunity hand offered.  After “squaring off,” each contestant made a dash toward the other and kicked and struck centrally, the object apparently being to blind your opponent before he had the opportunity of carrying out his evil designs on you.  The dexterity with which kicks and blows were parried equally well was a marvel of speed and agility.

The honors of the evening, however, were unquestionably awarded to a little girl of 10 years and her brother a year and half younger.  Not only did these children imitate their elders to perfection, but in addition gave several quite remarkable exhibitions on their own behalf.

“Chinese Athletes at Town Hall.” North China Herald. April 28th, 1923. Page 240.

 

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If you enjoyed this you might also want to read:  Rituals of the Red Spear Movement: Invulnerability, Spirit Possession and Battle Magic.

oOo


How Jiu-Jitsu Became a Traditional German Martial Art

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Introduction

One of my on-going projects is a co-authored study of Wing Chun’s history (and social meaning) within the German martial arts community.  I will admit that in the crush of competing papers and presentations this topic, while fascinating, has slipped to the back burner.  Still, I believe that it is a critical issue to consider from a number of perspectives.

One would be hard pressed to think of any nation (and I include Hong Kong in this statement) where Wing Chun has proved to be more popular than Germany.  I have never conducted a scientific study on the topic, but I suspect that there are probably more practitioners of the art there than in any other single country.  Traditional Chinese systems have generally done well in Germany.  Taijiquan and Hung Gar both have an impressive following.  In fact, all sorts of martial arts generate a great deal of enthusiasm.  While most studies of the globalization of the Asian fighting systems focus on the post-WWII North American market (and get caught up in factors that were unique to the social history of this region), it is my hope that a detailed study of more recent events in Europe will help us to broaden our theoretical understanding of the global spread of these communities.

Still, finding the time to pursue the various projects that I have lined up can be a challenge.  There are only so many hours in the day, and fewer still if you plan on spending some of them in the gym and the training hall.  But I recently came across something that may nudge this project towards the front of my research agenda.

 

“London Sees Thrill of Japanese Sports.”
A Judo match between a British and German competitors. Taken from a vintage newsreel. 1932.

 

Making Jiu-Jitsu German

Sarah Panzer, who recently finished her PhD in History at the University of Chicago, authored a chapter in J. M. Chao et al.’s edited volume Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan (Palgrave, 2016).  I decided to skim the collection on the odd chance that it might have some discussion of the early history of the Asian martial arts in Europe, and it did not disappoint.  Readers will want to check out Panzer’s paper “When Jiu-Jitsu was German: Japanese Martial Arts in German Sport and Korperkultur, 1905-1933” (91-106).

The article is just as evocative as the title suggests.   While historically, rather than theoretically, oriented, it chronicles the initial introduction of the Japanese jiu-jitsu into Germany, and its steady rise in popularity through the middle of the 1930’s.   At first blush this success might not appear surprising.  Historians of sports and popular cultural have already commented on the global spread of jiu-jitsu during the early 20th century.  When you have Teddy Roosevelt literally promoting a Japanese fighting system from the Oval Office, it is not hard to understand why a variety of scholars would take note.

Yet Panzer notes that the German case suggests some unique paradoxes.  Rightly or wrongly, German society during the early 20th century had a reputation for being hostile to foreign sports.  Given that this was the great age of nationalism in Europe, that trait was not entirely unique.  In the period rhetoric that surrounded these discussions, great emphasis was often put on the local “rootedness” and cultural value of a given activity.

Given that context, it would be hard to think of any more exotic a physical practice than Japanese jiu-jitsu during the 1910’s.  One might suspect that this art would have enjoyed only a modest degree of success.  That was not the case.

Jiu-jitsu took off at a pace unmatched in most places in the West.  Indeed, the early success of the Japanese grappling arts in Germany seems to be an almost textbook case of cultural borrowing and acculturation.  Panzer notes that by 1937 Nazi leisure organizations could, with no sense of irony, advertise their jiu-jitsu programs as “typically German” types of recreation along with swimming, horseback riding and calisthenics.

German’s fascination (and later close political relationship) with Japan was a critical aspect of this story.  As in other places, Japan’s victory over Russia (1904-1905) set off a wave of admiration and questioning.  Germans were fascinated by the stories of the surprising strength, endurance and mental resilience of the Japanese troops in Manchuria.  In this environment certain individuals came to see the Japanese as ‘kindred spirits’ and perceived in them an alternate model of the link between hyper-masculinity and nationalism.

Jiu-jitsu came to be seen as the secret code that would allow the outsider to unravel the mysteries of Japan’s military strength, won in seeming defiance of the strict racial hierarchies of the day.  To those whose interest were broader, it was also taken as a key to the island nation’s success in rapid industrialization, a mirror revealing its perceived quality of spiritual equanimity, and even a clue to the excellence of Japan aesthetic sensibilities.  As always, the Asian martial arts seem to have thrived when they were accepted as the key to unlocking an entire range of values stretching from the realms of masculinity and militarism to culture and spirituality.

In this environment, it is no surprise that pioneers like Eric Rahn would begin to train themselves in these techniques, or that the demonstrations performed by Japanese sailors on a goodwill tour would win an elite audience and result in the art’s introduction to police and military academies.  Panzer notes that the first dedicated jiu-jitsu club opened in Berlin in 1906.  By 1923 there were no fewer than 13 established schools in the country.

Still, by the 1920s the first flush of “Jiu-Jitsu Fever” had cooled off in much of the rest of the West.  Jared Miracle has noted how the art’s introduction fit with changing notions of masculinity in North America.   Yet Wendy Rouse has argued that the critique of traditional masculinities which drove much of the initial enthusiasm for the art never quite fit with the overall trend of the progressive era in the US.  Thus one suspects that additional forces might help to explain the success that the art enjoyed in Germany.

Panzer notes some key differences in this process of acculturation.  At the most basic level German students did not simply take up ‘Japanese’ practices.  Rather, they sought to transform them in such a way that they could legitimately be understood as extensions of German, rather than Japanese, values.  Some thinkers went even further, formulating an argument that jiu-jitsu had, at heart, always been German, and may have emerged from the nation’s brutal medieval battlefields.  In that sense, there was nothing uniquely Japanese about the art at all.  It was simply another example of the knightly cultural traditions that were revered in so many other places within Western society.

Panzer states:

“Indeed, one of the first scholarly works on the discipline [of Ju-Jitsu] was an explicit attempt to redefine it as fundamentally German.  Martin Vogt, an instructor at the Theresien-Gymnasium in Munich. Published his own findings on the cultural heritage of jiu-jitsu under the title Dschiu-Dschitsu der Japaner—das alte deutsche Freiringen.  In this meticulously illustrated pamphlet Vogt juxtaposed images of standard jiu-jitsu holds and grips with woodcut images from medieval German texts on wrestling, including one illustrated by Albrecht Durer.  Vogt claimed that he had felt compelled to write the book in response to the growing visibility of jiu-jitsu in Germany following the Russo-Japanese War; his work was meant to be a response to the growing suspicion among Germans that the Japanese possessed some secret or special knowledge about combat and self-defence that made them especially formidable opponents. Vogt attempted to dispel any existing anxiety about jiu-jitsu by making it more immediately familiar and recognizable thereby effectively recovering it as a forgotten piece of German cultural inheritance.

In the text that accompanies his elaborate pictorial comparisons of jiu-jitsu and medieval German wrestling Vogt argued that jiu-jitsu was, quite simply, a system of practical techniques paralleling those used by medieval Germans, preserved and formalized in Japan.  He never went so far as to suggest that one evolved out of the other, but instead argued that any logical study of the human body and its weaknesses in hand-to-hand combat, unencumbered by the demands of chivalry or rules of combat, would have yielded similar and practical strategies.” (p. 95-96)

 

A uniquely German approach to jiu-jitsu emerged in more practical venues as well.  Panzer documents the shifts that occurred within the German umbrella organization as the “self-defense” aspects of the art (often those that would be of the most interest to law enforcement or military personnel) fell out of favor and were replaced with training regimes that placed much more emphasis on the basic movements that would be useful in competition.  Indeed, this debate on the value of competition defined the evolution of the art in the post-WWI period.

Given the success of the art’s sporting wing, one might be forgiven for assuming that judo, which also shed many of its militant techniques in favor of those that could be used in more sporting settings, would have been a great success.  This was not the case.  The cultural and moral aspects of the practice that Kano went to such great lengths to promote rubbed many of these early German practitioners the wrong way.  They sensed within them the inescapable presence of Japanese nationalism and identity.  In their view none of that was really essential to jiu-jitsu, which at its core was an expression of universal truths about human combat, and (under their guidance) had evolved into a uniquely German system of physical training and competition that did not closely resemble daily practice in the Kodokan.

Nor were they swayed by appeals to judo’s greater ‘internationalism.’ Defenders of the emerging discipline of German jiu-jitsu pointed out that none of these arts had developed as successfully in other Western countries as they had in Germany.  And in any case, it was the expression of uniquely German values transmitted through specifically developed bodily technologies that gave the practice its intrinsic values, not Japanese moralizing.

 

An American Wrestler facing off against a Judo student. This photo is identified as having been taken in the Philippines in 1904, but Joseph Svinth suspects that it was actually taken in the US in 1904. Source: https://calisphere.org

 

What is this a case of?

Panzer’s historical study is fascinating.  One of the ironies of the 1920’s was that so many individuals wished to claim either judo or jiu-jitsu as their own when there was little doubt where these systems actually came from.  We have already reviewed a case of English wrestlers who refused to admit that there was anything uniquely Japanese about the system of combat.   And Chinese nationalists were only too eager to point to their systems of jacketed wrestling as the ultimate origin of all Japanese hand combat practices.  Indeed, Kano and other early Japanese students went to great lengths to rhetorically distance judo from any relationship with Chinese boxing and promote its ‘pure’ Japanese origins.

Still, I have yet to see anything so far reaching as the German acculturation of jiu-jitsu in the pre-WWII period.  They wasted little time in replacing its core Japanese identity with their own brand of German values and nationalism.  Panzer suggests that these efforts were so successful that by the middle of the 1930’s these grappling arts had effectively become German, rather than Japanese, in the popular imagination.  German martial artists were certainly aware of their Japanese brethren and knew of the prevailing trends on the other side of the Pacific.  And yet they unapologetically declared themselves to be the masters of the better art, unpolluted by Kano’s internationalism or moralizing.

These sorts of arguments are not entirely unique.  While the discourse emerged much earlier in Germany than any parallel Western cases that I am aware of, by the 1980’s and 1990’s similar sentiments were being openly expressed by a variety of American students of the Chinese martial arts.  As always, the specific circumstances vary.

Within certain quarters of the American Chinese martial arts community, the common refrain was that the authentic martial arts no longer existed in China.  By the late 1970s they had died out, or been pushed to the brink of extinction.  Truly excellent teachers could only be found in California, Taiwan, Hong Kong or within the South East Asian diaspora.  This sad state of affairs was usually attributed to the Cultural Revolution.  The light of China’s martial genius had been extinguished and now existed only within the diaspora.

It is certainly true that the Cultural Revolution badly disrupted the folk martial arts and local fighting systems of mainland China.  There is no denying that.  Yet this rhetoric always seemed a bit self-serving.  The underlying message seemed to be that only experts located in the periphery (and given the nature of globalization, many of them were not Chinese) could judge the legitimacy of an individual’s performance of, or identity within, the greater Chinese martial arts community.

Again, the details of these specific cases are quite different, but they seem to share certain echoes.  This is where a more theoretically focused discussion of the German case might be helpful.  If one were only interested in the evolution of the German martial arts community, that might not be as critical.  Yet when we make our theoretical framework explicit, it becomes easier to identify mechanisms that transcend the peculiarities of any single career or case.  A more explicit theory might allow us to begin to compare cases, and from there to consider the evolving nature of the global spread of these fighting systems.

Many such discussions begin when we look at an outcome and ask, “What is this a case of?”  Generations of graduate students have been taught that this is the first step in inductive social scientific inquiry.  But rather than establish a strict system of categories, perhaps we should re-frame this classic question.  After all, what we are really searching for is some sort of tool to help us make sense of what we are seeing (something which we cannot make sense of, and therefore cannot effectively categorize).  In that case we might instead ask, “What theoretical lens, or set of concepts, reveals the most about this case?”

The German example is interesting as it seems not to fit a number of the stock concepts that often help us to make sense of the martial arts.  This is not an example of an “invented” tradition as the term is typically used.  While the displacement of Japanese identity by German values was certainly novel, and German jiu-jitsu can be understood as a domestic creation, there was no attempt to forget the role of the Japanese in all of this.  That sort of overwriting of the past, so critical to the work of Hobsbawm and Ranger, is not really seen here.  Nor did German jiu-jitsu ever attain any sort of hegemonic or binding status within the national discourse.  It remained one sporting community among many.

We might turn to the idea of cultural appropriation to explain this trend.  Simply defined this is the adoption of elements of one culture by members of another in ways that are harmful to, or serve to further marginalize, the first group.  While a commonly referenced concept in the literature, there is a wide range in how various authors apply this idea.  Most researchers define this as an overtly negative (often exploitative) process and therefore different from the sorts of “cultural exchange,” borrowing and hybridization that emerge naturally whenever two cultures meet.

The question of whether the creation of German jiu-jitus was harmful to the Japanese is an interesting one.  One can only imagine that the ways in which Japanese values and culture were systematically stripped out of a practice that was a source of great national pride in the 1920’s would have been irksome.  The discovery that a Japanese creation actually had “German roots” seems, on the surface, like a classic act of appropriation.

Yet when you delve into the case things become much more complicated.  In current theoretical discussions one of the things that separates an act of appropriate from normal borrowing, hybridization or admiration is the existence (and exploitation) of a preexisting power asymmetry between a dominant and a subordinate community.  In fact, it is this asymmetric exchange that lies at the heart of most of these discussions.

This causes obvious problems for the case of German jiu-jitsu.  Japan was in no way subordinate to Germany.  The island nation was never conquered or colonized, and by the 1920’s had emerged as an aggressive imperialist power in its own right.  In some key respects both Japan and Germany were similarly positioned within the global system.  Both were highly centralized late industrializing powers that felt hemmed in by preexisting power structures.  Both went through a carefully scripted process designed to create a common national identity.  Japan actively sought to export and internationalize its grappling traditions as one element of a public diplomacy strategy designed to bolster the state’s influence in the global arena.  The successful spread of its physical culture indicated the rapidly rising strength (and prestige) of the Japanese state, rather than any sort of post-colonial status.  The cultural appropriation framework does not seem to be a fit this case.

A more fruitful approach to this set of puzzles might be found if we were to change gears and instead think more carefully about the specific goal of the jiu-jitsu pioneers vis a vis the rest of German society.  The Budo arts may have been part of the social discourse that decided what sort of modern society Japan would become, yet that was certainly not the case in Germany.  While popular compared to other places in Europe, the number of people who took up Japanese grappling was still relatively small.  In this instance we are dealing with the actions of a well-organized, self-selecting, voluntary social movement.

This realization might turn our attention toward the concept of “strategic anti-essentialism.”  This notion was developed (and later abandoned) by the American theorist George Lipsitz.  It begins with a scenario in which a social group is unhappy with some aspect of an artificially imposed cultural construct.  They then adopt the practices or identities of an outside culture as an act of resistance.  One suspects, however, that the values what are ultimately expressed are those of the community in question rather than a true reflection of the culture that is turned to.  As such, practices are not just adopted, they are also adapted.  In this framework global transmission always implies transformation.  Nor does strategic anti-essentialism make any necessary assumptions about the sources or motivations behind this act of adoption.

While perhaps not a perfect fit, this seems to give us more traction on the German case.  Historians of the martial arts have already warned us that shifting and contested notions of masculinity and nationalism were among the forces that helped to explain the global spread of these practices in the early 20th century.  Further, the rhetoric that Panzer shares makes it clear that many of the early advocates of jiu-jitsu seemed unhappy with the direction and values that had been adopted in other German athletic movements and combat sports.

Testing this theory is beyond the scope of this essay.  That would require an experienced social theorist who is an expert in early 20th century German social history.  Unfortunately, I am a social scientist who looks at China’s encounter with the global system.  As such I will happily hand this baton off to other scholars for the next leg of the race.

Still, I think that this brief discussion has suggested three points.  First, Sarah Panzer’s paper is both fascinating and insightful.  Second, while she is primarily interested in the evolution of German sports culture, this case may be of interest to a broader range of readers.  Finally, bringing an explicit theoretical framework to the table might help us to bridge the gap between nationally focused case studies and broader comparative projects.  Germany’s jiu-jitsu students were not the only individuals to turn to Asian fighting systems in the hopes of escaping the cultural constructs that they inherited.  That impulse seems to have led to both the adoption and the adaption of the martial arts in many communities throughout the tumultuous 20th century.

 

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If you enjoyed this essay you might also want to read: “The Professor in the Cage”: Can Gottschall Bring Science to the Study of Violence?

oOo



Chinese “Martial Arts” and the Problem of Presentism

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Cross Big Knives, early 1930s. By Thomas Handforth. Source: Oregon State University Digital Collections.

 

Introduction

 

I would like to begin today’s post by noting that Joseph Svinth (whom most of you will already know from his many contributions to Martial Arts Studies) really deserves to be listed as a co-author on this piece. Joe was kind enough to bring Thomas Handforth’s many prints to my attention and noted some of the debates that his career as an illustrator inspired.  Further, he suggested that “presentism”, a topic that has been a part of the discussion of Handforth’s illustrations of Chinese life, is one of those central issues that must also be periodically addressed within Chinese martial studies, a position with which I strongly agree.  In short, Joe was the driving force behind today’s post.  Any errors of omission or commission are mine alone.

 

Archer, early 1930s. By Thomas Handforth. Source: Oregon State University Digital Collections.

 

 

A Quest for Art

 

Given the physically explosive nature of kung fu, I have always been surprised that these hand combat practices have not generated more in the way of visual art outside the world of film.  Obviously, there have been some notable exceptions.  And I have gone out of my way to showcase vintage photographic images of these practices here at Kung Fu Tea over the years. Still, I cannot help but feel that something is missing.

Perhaps the situation is over-determined.  The kung fu movies of the 1970s certainly gained a huge pop-culture following, but maybe that has been part of the problem.  Perhaps these practices just seem too trivial to be the subject of “serious” art.  Or maybe it is more difficult to translate explosive physical movement into static visual composition than one might think?

Still, my biggest frustration is that the Chinese martial arts are so often portrayed in a remote, mysterious or down-right orientalist way.  And yet all the Chinese martial artists that I have encountered are modern individuals who have integrated these practices into their daily lives.  In attempting to stabilize these practices “exotic” and “mysterious” origins, we lose sight of their lived reality and dynamism.

Plus, I run a blog.  The internet is an unrelentingly visual medium.  The difference between a successful essay and one that no one clicks can come down to something as simple as the choice of cover images.

Still, on a more personal level I want to see something more than just ethnographic accuracy or nice composition in a photograph.  For me, the best martially themed artistic images are interesting precisely because they capture something about the time, place and feeling that prevailed at the moment of creation.  When Joseph Svinth started to email me the images of Chinese life that Thomas Handforth published during the 1930s, I knew that he had come across something special.

A few words of introduction will be helpful.  Handforth was born in Tacoma in 1897 (died 1947) and studied art at the University of Washington before dropping out and moving to New York City.  Eventually he was swept up in the fires of WWI and served with the US Army’s medical and sanitation corps in France.

Like other artistic individuals of his generation he showed no immediate interest in returning to the US.  Handforth lived in Paris for a time and studied at the L’Ecole des Beaux Arts, before moving on to the less traveled places where he would sharpen his artistic vision and establish his reputation as one of the period’s great illustrators.  These other destinations included Africa, Latin America and (most importantly for us) China.  During the late 1920s Handforth began to receive commissions to illustrate children’s picturebooks, though all but one of these early efforts have fallen into obscurity.

In 1931 Handforth’s life changed when he won a Guggenheim Fellowship funding a five year tour across Asia.  Horning reports that after spending two weeks in Beijing he decided that this single city had enough visual richness to keep him busy for years.  He settled down in a traditional home, became a fixture in the city’s gay arts scene, and began to experiment with lithography.

Handforth seemed to be at his best when capturing the views of street life and the common people.  Vibrant marketplaces attracted his attention and a number of his pieces from the period display vignettes of daily life.  Chinese physical culture was a special point of interest.  Many of his most interesting pieces feature wrestlers, acrobats, marketplace performers and “sword dancers.”  After corresponding with Handforth’s surviving family Alexander Lee obtained some his vintage photographs and noted how these images were reworked and developed into his better-known illustrations.

His commercially produced prints from this period typify trends that were sweeping through the worlds of art and graphic design.  Archers (probably strongmen pulling heavy bows as part of a performance) and wrestlers stand against stark, empty, backgrounds.  The result is a heightened sense of visual tension and drama.  The classic conventions of art deco design are employed to further stylize and strengthen the visual form.  No one would look at Handforth’s well muscled figures and call them “The sick men of east Asia.”  Indeed, his work seems to fetishize the link between masculinity and the martial arts.

It is also interesting to note what does not appear in his art.  There is no sign of the modernizing Guoshu or Jingwu influence in his prints.  Rather than recording the rise of rational, middle class, martial arts, Handforth was fascinated by the older traditions that persisted in the era’s marketplaces.  I suspect this is why we see less unarmed boxing (and no female martial artists) in his catalog.  On the other hand, he left future generations many scenes celebrating China’s various wrestling traditions, a topic that receives surprisingly little attention today, even within Martial Arts Studies circles.  He also covered darker aspects of the city’s life, such as the gruesome public executions and beheadings that became increasingly common in Beijing as the political situation deteriorated.

 

The actual Mei Li, reading her book. Source: KATHLEEN T. HORNING, the Horn Book.

 

Enter Mei Li

 

This does not mean that female figures were absent from his art.  Handfroth drew a number of sketches of female acrobats and gymnasts.  And it was one four-year-old girl by the name of Mei Li who was without a doubt responsible for his greatest success as an illustrator.

Kathleen Horning notes that Handforth was rather shy by nature and one wonders whether this was why he decided to settle in a neighborhood in Beijing rather than performing a five-year grand tour of Asia.  Whatever the case, local markets and public spaces provided him with an unending supply of a subjects.  And closer to home a small girl named Mei Li ruled over the courtyard that Horning did much of his sketching in.  Mei seems to have been responsible for lining up some of Handforth’s subjects and translating instructions as to how they were to stand.  His writings indicate that while small in size, the child had a personality that was well suited to management.

A young sword dancer that Handforth produced many studies of. Photo by Handforth. Source: http://www.waking-green-dragon.com/2014/02/mei-li-real-story.html

 

The same boy, now as a finished fine art print. The photo and finished study give us some idea of Handforths method of interpreting and producing images. Source: http://www.waking-green-dragon.com/2014/02/mei-li-real-story.html

As Handforth’s collection of local friends and models grew he decided to illustrate a story that might plausibly bring them all together in a single place.  As such, he composed a narrative in which the irrepressible Mei Li, with the help of her brother, would sneak off to see and take part in the annual New Year festival.  Of course, this involved breaking a few social conventions for a female from her background and social standing.  Still, the real-life Mei seems to have been only too happy to become the protagonist of such a story.

Handforth was clearly aware of, and attempted to comment on, the changing gender relations in China during the 1920s.  This can be seen in three spots in his short story.  It opens with the translation of a Chinese poem lamenting the uselessness of an unconventional (or possibly any) female child in a traditional home.  Indeed, Mei’s escapades in the festival might be best understood as an elaborate (and pointed) answer to the poems rhetorical question of “what can a girl do?”

Second, while at the festival the young girl has her fortune told and it is revealed that she would one-day rule over of a kingdom.  Such a prediction was clearly not far off the mark for either the real-world Mei or her literary doppelganger.  Handforth’s writings make it clear that he expected great things in the girl’s future.

The problem of gender really comes to a head, however, when Mei returns from the festival, only to be greeted by the home’s Kitchen God.  The family’s deity informs her that the kingdom she is actually destined to rule over is that which has traditionally been assigned to females, the hearth and home.  Mei’s response to this assertion is quizzical.  She accepts the answer, but only up to a point, noting, “It will do for a while, anyway.”

Some modern critics (including Xiaoli Hong) have detected in this a failure of imagination on Handforth’s part, and seen in it a message that was potentially damaging to female children.  Indeed, the fact that the book won the 1939 Caldecott prize, and received critical acclaim in venues such as the NY Times, make the subtle implications of its contents even more important.   Rather than clearly facing and overcoming an unjust barrier, the irrepressible Mei seems to have been stifled by social convention and accepted the norms barring her from participating in public life.

Horning, however, has disputed this reading of the text.   She notes that it is entirely too easy for modern readers and critics to forget what the actual situation in China was like during the 1920s and 1930s.  While this was a period in which modern feminist principals took root, they were not yet firmly established.  Students of Chinese martial studies will already be aware that there was a good deal of push-back on these ideas.  Indeed, the entire thrust of the story shows Mei challenging the attitudes of her time (in a very physical and embodied way) and the community being richer for it.

In a revolutionary situation, rather than focusing on her statement that “It will do…”, the clear implication is that readers should take much more seriously her qualification of “..for a while, anyway.”  Mei is an irrepressible force glimpsed in a moment of radical change.  Indeed, every time we read accounts of female martial artists in the Guoshu or Jingwu movements, it is important to remember that they were commented upon precisely because they seemed to be exceptions and signs of impending social transformation.

The Clinch, early 1930s. By Thomas Handforth. Source: Oregon State University Digital Collections.

 

After encountering Horning’s treatment of Mei Li, Xiaoli Hong reevaluated her approach to Handforth’s classic picturebook.  She read it again with a more sophisticated set of theoretical tools and paid special attention to the tension that existed between how events were described in the text and what was actually shown in the illustration (indeed, the story seems to feature a somewhat unreliable narrator).  She concluded:

“Horning’s article also evoked wonderings about whether I applied a presentist lens in my first reading of Mei Li. According to Power (2003), readerly presentism—a reader’s perception that a book written in or about the past is, racist and sexist—is “to a large degree inevitable as readers cannot completely identify and control their own cultural and social conditioning “(p.425). However, it “would be a grievous problem if it in fact denied the integrity of a past era” (p.457). After recollecting my first encounter with Mei Li, I think I imposed my modern beliefs and values onto a past era without going deep into how the social structure of discrimination and oppression against women was (and may still be). Based on stories I read and heard about in contemporary society, I assumed that a female character would triumph over sexism or at least make some life-transforming decisions at the end of the story. My presentist lens precipitated me into a quick yet narrow judgment of the picturebook. Thus, as McClure (1995) argued, “the milieu of the time in which a book is set should be considered for its influence upon the book’s perspective and content” (p.11).

 

Mongolian Wrestlers, , early 1930s. By Thomas Handforth. Source: Oregon State University Digital Collections.

 

Presentism as a Problem in Chinese Martial Studies

 

This last insight illuminates aspects of not just Mei Li, but Handsford’s larger body of visual art that both spread and commented upon images of Chinese martial culture during the 1930’s.  Indeed, one can think of few points as important to consider within the historical branches of martial arts studies as the ease with which modern readers might slip into a presentist mindset, even without ever recognizing it.  Xiaoli Hong’s warnings regarding the way that we evaluate questions of gender and identity are certainly valid.  Yet the challenges that we face in martial arts studies run deeper.

As I have noted many times before, a presentist bias is built into the very words and concepts that we use to describe these fighting systems.  If we were ask Handsford about the various sorts of wrestlers, boxers, opera singers, sword dancers and “acrobats” he called his friends during the early 1930’s it is likely that he could tell us quite a bit about their individual careers and social worlds.  Yet if we were to instead ask him about China’s “martial artists” he would probably have looked at us in puzzlement.  I don’t think that I have seen that phrase commonly applied to these practices in English until the 1970’s.  Indeed, throughout the 1960’s unwieldy constructions like “Chinese Karate” and “Chinese Boxing” remained much more common in the popular literature.

This semantic confusion has real consequences when we talk about the history of these arts.  I think that one of the things which supports the erroneous notion that the TCMA were unknown in the West prior to Bruce Lee is the simple fact that they went under different names.  A review of pre-WWII newspapers turns up no references to the “Chinese martial arts,” but accounts of sword dancers, “national boxers,” jugglers, wrestlers and acrobats are not all that uncommon.  What was missing was our modern vocabulary, and the notion that all of these practices occupied the same conceptual space or represented the same (usually essentialist) notions of national identity.

Indeed, the core idea behind the phrase “Chinese martial arts” is that these practices are structurally similar to, and in a sense function interchangeablely with, a wide range of other practices including the Japanese, Filipino, Brazilian and (most recently) Historic European “martial arts.”   I do not wish to reopen the debate on how, or whether, we should define the martial arts in the final paragraphs of this essay.  Instead I would like to revisit a more basic argument which I made in the opening pages of The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts (SUNY, 2015). Imprecision is our enemy when we talk about the development of these fighting systems.  Many individuals claim to be interested in the deep history of these traditions, yet what actually concerns them are those practices and identities that they personally enact on a weekly basis.  Almost by definition, those are a product of the modern world.  They would be better explored by a sociologist, anthropologist or film studies scholar than a historian of the Ming dynasty.

Further, the very words and concepts that we use create problems when we do delve into the late imperial period.  The problem with the term “martial art” is that everyone has an intuitive, pop-culture inflected, understanding of what this entails.  And that turns out to be a very difficult thing to set aside.

 

Chinese Wrestlers and Manager, , early 1930s. By Thomas Handforth. Source: Oregon State University Digital Collections.

 

You say the words “martial art” and it is almost impossible not to imagine commercial schools with detailed curriculums and grading structures, standardized uniforms, and well established organizational bodies.  Of course, many of these traits entered American society rather recently via the boom of interest in the Japanese martial arts in the post-WWII period.  Because the basic social and economic structure of village life in China during the 18th and 19th century was quite different from anything that the average suburbanite might imagine, the modes of social organization seen in their hand combat systems must have been equally different as well.  For instance, one cannot simply “pay” for instruction when living in a non-monetized environment.  Nor do most of us spend a lot of time thinking about the clan militia system as an important diffuser of martial knowledge in southern China.

Of course, “different” is not the same as “unintelligible.”  The danger of approaching these discussions with a presentist lens is that we will always see a few facts, here and there, that we seem to recognize.  Those can be creatively combined and used to imagine in the past the same sort of institutions and interests that we have in the present.  In a perverse way, it is actually easier to read highly modern and inappropriate models of the martial arts onto Chinese history as we go farther back in time as there is just less surviving evidence to remind us of how wrong headed this exercise is.  That certain elements of the Chinese government’s “public diplomacy” machine actively promote self-orientalizing narratives for both political and economic reasons further complicates the situation.

Good martial arts history does not necessarily start with the excavation of the fighting systems themselves.  Rather, it takes seriously the understanding that we are engaged in the process of social history.  One begins by reconstructing the social, cultural, political and economic environment.  Only then can you really begin to make valid determinations as to how the remaining pieces of the puzzle fit together.

And yet some element of the Chinese martial arts themselves seem resistant to this process.  The earliest references that we have (such as the enigmatic Maiden of Yue, or the writings of General Qijiguang in the 16th century) already describe the martial arts (as they existed then) as an intrusion of an “ancient,” half-forgotten and primordial, past into the present.  To paraphrase a famous story, when looking for the roots of these fighting systems, it really does appear to be invented traditions, all the way down.

This strain of romanticism was very much alive in the 1930s.  As the KMT linked the development of the martial arts to the promotion of Chinese nationalism, elements of the primordialist discourse surrounding the TCMA were strengthened.  All of that is evident in Handforth’s art.  Note for instance the swordsman wearing what appears to be a traditional Qing era bamboo helmet.  And yet the dadao that he manipulates were quite a popular weapon during the 1930s.  When looking at the heroic, art-deco inspired, treatment of the human form, it is clear that Handforth’s work captured the spirit of the age.

Yes, the references to a romanticized past are still present.  But it is the modern visual aesthetic that really gives his work artistic merit.  Likewise, Mei Li may face social opposition, yet in her declaration to the Kitchen God we hear the promise of a different world to come.

At its best martial arts history can do something similar.  Rather than simply passing on invented traditions or reviewing the development of specific techniques, when fully understood it offers a clear view of the social fault-lines that defined the lives of its practitioners, as well as a better understanding of how they sought to exercise their agency moving forward.  To understand the past we must first accept that it was someone else’s present.  In doing so we reject the temptation to simply read ourselves into it.

 

oOo

If you enjoyed this essay you might also want to read: What is a lineage? Rethinking our (Dangerous) Relationship with History

oOo


Chinese Martial Arts in the News: August 28th, 2017: Dragon Girls, New Books and the Rebirth of the Long Spear

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Introduction

Welcome to “Chinese Martial Arts in the News!”  This is a semi-regular feature here at Kung Fu Tea in which we review media stories that mention or affect the traditional fighting arts.  In addition to discussing important events, this column also considers how the Asian hand combat systems are portrayed in the mainstream media.

While we try to summarize the major stories over the last month, there is always a chance that we may have missed something.  If you are aware of an important news event relating to the TCMA, drop a link in the comments section below.  If you know of a developing story that should be covered in the future feel free to send me an email.

 

 

 

News from All Over

Our round-up starts with one of the more interesting stories that I have come across in the last few months.   A rather extensive article in the Torontoist discusses the (re)creation of a Ming-era school of spear practice by a local martial arts teacher and aficionado, as well as his attempts to spread the system by creating a combat sport based on the knowledge that he reconstructed.  Of particular interest to me, as a Wing Chun student, are the training spears that he designed.  They sound like exactly the sort of thing that we need for contact pole training as well.  But setting that personal interest aside for the moment, his system sounds fascinating, and the next time I am in Toronto I will be making a point of trying to check this out!

 

While he has taught his own students, Guo wants the sport to spread wider, with players setting up teams and tournaments independently. Participating in the da qiang community requires attending an introductory class with Guo to learn about the equipment and scoring system, but after that players are encouraged to connect to each other, form their own clubs, and organize local tournaments on their own initiative…..

As da qiang players such as Wei form teams, Guo eventually hopes to create an online community, where people can post videos of their fights and be ranked by a rotating shift of judges. Guo hopes he can build sponsorships and have the strongest fighters come to Toronto to compete. This competition, Guo believes, is what will bring out the best development for da qiang—forging better techniques and better players.

Be sure to also check out Guo’s Facebook page (linked in the article) for more information about his project.

 

 

Chinese martial arts, lion dance, are well preserved in Macau,” or so reports the Shanghai Daily.  This short article touches on a number of topics including Choy Li Fut and the increasing challenge that real estate development and rising rents places on traditional martial arts organizations throughout China.  The report was inspired by a recent tournament held in the city.

THE 2017 Macau Wushu Master Challenge held late last week attracted hundreds of wushu masters from across the world to join in various competitions and display Chinese martial arts and traditional lion dance.

Indeed, behind all those hustle and bustle of shopping malls, casinos, hotels and must-go tourists spots, the martial arts and lion dance are well protected in China’s Macau Special Administrative Region, with many local residents keeping on with their tradition of playing martial arts for physical exercises and learning about self-challenge and team work.

 

The Voice of America recently ran a profile of the Nepalese nuns whose martial arts practice has put them in the news repeatedly over the last couple of years.  This time they are running a series of martial arts and self defense workshops designed to raise awareness of, and strike back against, the increase in rapes and sexual assaults in India.  The article has a number of interesting quotes and photographs.  And to be totally honest, I do not envy anyone who is practicing Kung Fu at that altitude!

“Most people think nuns just sit and pray, but we do more,” said 19-year-old Jigme Wangchuk Lhamo, one of the Kung Fu trainers, as she rested after an intense two-hour session in Hemis village, 40 km (25 miles) from the northern city of Leh.

“We walk the talk. If we act, people will think if: ‘If nuns can act, why can’t we?'”

“Kung Fu will make them stronger and more confident,” she said, adding that they decided to teach self-defense after hearing of cases of rape and molestation.

 

The reviews of Nick Nolfi’s bio-pic “Birth of the Dragon” are in, and the news is not encouraging.  They seem to range between “Meh…” and “I don’t understand how anyone could make Bruce Lee so boring?” The following review from the LA Times was basically middle of the pack.

“The martial arts biopic “Birth of the Dragon” claims to be inspired by Bruce Lee’s rise to fame in San Francisco, but it seems just as beholden to “Ip Man,” the international hit that turned the real life of a kung fu pioneer into an exaggerated action epic.”

I thought that line suggested the evolution  of an interesting discursive circle between the myths that now surround both teacher and student.  If you are interested in more Bruce Lee news you might want to check out the following interview with Wilson Ip where he talks about the forthcoming “Ip Man 4” and the importance of their relationship to the film.

Female student studying Wushu in a scene from Inigo Westmeier’s Dragon Girls.

An empty parade ground fills the foreground. The camera pans upwards to reveal misty hills and fir trees and a thin black line of people.

Suddenly, a shout goes up and the black line rushes forward, revealing its great depth. Thousands of figures are charging now, roaring in cacophonous unison all the way as an orchestra crescendos them into proximity.

This is the opening sequence to “Dragon Girls,” one of the greatest documentaries I have ever seen, which also happens to be free to watch on YouTube.

So begins this Business Insider review of “Dragon Girls.”  Its a nice piece about a great documentary.  This film has been out for long enough that many of you will already be aware of it.  But if you have not seen it yet, be sure to check it out.  Or maybe its time for a second viewing?

 

A couple of English language Chinese tabloids ran the following short photo essay.  It followed a descendant of the famous Huo Yuanjia (of Jingwu fame) who currently teaches his style in physical education classes at the Tianjin University of Commerce.

 

 

The Wudang arts have also been in the news.  The Shanghai Daily (through their new shine.cn website) ran a short feature reporting on a display of Wudang’s “intangible cultural heritage” (heavily weighted towards the martial arts) which was celebrated in the recently reopened Shanghai Great World (or Dashijie).

 

The Straits Times reported that a martial arts school in Singapore had recently been raided and its owner convicted of running a gaming house.  A closer look at the article suggests that rather than some sort of huge gambling operation, he was charging nominal fees for the use of a couple of mahjong tables and applying the money towards the school’s otherwise costly rent.  As I read this I wondered whether the story was more a reflection of the martial arts’ long association with the quasi-legal side of Chinese social life, or if it was another indication of the problems of rising rents and property values.

 

Kung Fu training at the Shaolin Temple. Source: Global Times.

As always, there were a couple of interesting “Kung Fu Diplomacy” stories in the last news cycle.  The first was titled “Chilean kung fu master creates “mini China” in Chile.” It is not so much a news item as a fascinating case study in how Kung Fu Diplomacy unfolds at a granular level in the life of a single instructor. The interaction of government and quasi-government actors with educational institutions and private individuals was particularly interesting, as was the implied commentary on Chinese and Chilean society.  It even features some great “Wax on-Wax off” moments.  Secondly, this local paper in the UK ran a story covering the journey of the one of the area’s martial arts instructors (and a couple of students) to study at the famed Shaolin Temple.  Its an interesting juxtaposition of two very different kung fu pilgrimages.

 

 

Martial Arts Studies

The end of summer is a slow time in the academic world, and I will admit to taking some time off in the last couple of weeks.  But now that we are back, it is time to assemble a reading list and think about some of the books coming out this fall!

 

First off, Her Own Hero: The Origins of the Women’s Self-Defense Movement (NYU Press) by Wendy L. Rouse, is now shipping and available from amazon.com.  I am looking forward to receiving my copy soon.

The surprising roots of the self-defense movement and the history of women’s empowerment.

At the turn of the twentieth century, women famously organized to demand greater social and political freedoms like gaining the right to vote. However, few realize that the Progressive Era also witnessed the birth of the women’s self-defense movement.

It is nearly impossible in today’s day and age to imagine a world without the concept of women’s self defense. Some women were inspired to take up boxing and jiu-jitsu for very personal reasons that ranged from protecting themselves from attacks by strangers on the street to rejecting gendered notions about feminine weakness and empowering themselves as their own protectors. Women’s training in self defense was both a reflection of and a response to the broader cultural issues of the time, including the women’s rights movement and the campaign for the vote.

Perhaps more importantly, the discussion surrounding women’s self-defense revealed powerful myths about the source of violence against women and opened up conversations about the less visible violence that many women faced in their own homes. Through self-defense training, women debunked patriarchal myths about inherent feminine weakness, creating a new image of women as powerful and self-reliant. Whether or not women consciously pursued self-defense for these reasons, their actions embodied feminist politics. Although their individual motivations may have varied, their collective action echoed through the twentieth century, demanding emancipation from the constrictions that prevented women from exercising their full rights as citizens and human beings. This book is a fascinating and comprehensive introduction to one of the most important women’s issues of all time.

This book will provoke good debate and offer distinct responses and solutions.

 

 

Secondly, the literature surrounding Capoeria continues to grow rapidly and another volume on the subject is expected this September.

Power in Practice: The Pragmatic Anthropology of Afro-Brazilian Capoeira by Sergio González Varela (Berghahn Books; 1 edition (September 30, 2017)

Considering the concept of power in capoeira, an Afro-Brazilian ritual art form, Varela describes ethnographically the importance that capoeira leaders (mestres) have in the social configuration of a style called Angola in Bahia, Brazil. He analyzes how individual power is essential for an understanding of the modern history of capoeira, and for the themes of embodiment, play, cosmology, and ritual action. The book also emphasizes the great significance that creativity and aesthetic expression have for capoeira’s practice and performance.

Sergio González Varela is Professor of Anthropology at Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, Mexico. He is currently working on a book about the anthropologist Paul Stoller.

 

 

Finally, students and fans of MMA might be interested in Unlocking the Cage by Mark Tullius (Vincere Press, due out on Oct 10, 2017).  I am not sure what the ratio of personal narrative to sociological theory will be in this book, but it seems to draw on an extensive body of interviews and fieldwork.

The cage door clangs shut. The lock slides into place. The voice in my head drowns out everything else. What the hell is wrong with me?

Follow the journey of Mark Tullius, former cage fighter and boxer turned author and stay-at-home dad as he puts his love of fighting and his sociology degree from prestigious Brown University to use. What began as a personal exploration to unlock his reasons for continuing to train and pursue a fight career evolved into an in-depth sociological study of why competing in mixed martial arts (MMA) appeals to fighters. Why do these men and women subject themselves to the endless hours of grueling training required for the full-contact sport? In MMA a fighter’s goal is to punch, kick, and choke an opponent into submission, and if there is blood and injury along the way, so be it. What compels these individuals to develop the necessary strength, endurance, discipline, and skill despite the risks involved?

Over the course of 3 years, Tullius traveled to 23 states and visited 100 gyms where he interviewed 340 fighters. Although it wasn’t necessary, Tullius trained with the fighters and soon came to realize how valuable that time was, cultivating mental strength by surrounding himself with positive and inspiring individuals. It encouraged him to continue his project when he still had doubts about seeing it to its completion. Finally, Tullius believed that his willingness to get on the mat and demonstrate his trust in the fighters encouraged them to trust him and open up to a stranger about their fears and mistakes, dreams and accomplishments.

MMA is one of the fastest growing sports in the country, and the popularity of MMA training facilities is also on the rise. Unlocking the Cage takes readers into the gyms and into the minds of the fighters. It celebrates the unique qualities of each individual while highlighting themes that appear and reappear. It looks past the stigma of violence and embraces the resilience and strength that are the foundation of the fighting culture.

 

 

Kung Fu Tea on Facebook

A lot has happened on the Kung Fu Tea Facebook group over the last month.  We have discussed China’s Islamic fighting systems, traditional Turkish archery and answered the question “Why martial arts?” Joining the Facebook group is also a great way of keeping up with everything that is happening here at Kung Fu Tea.

If its been a while since your last visit, head on over and see what you have been missing!

 


State, Education and Ma Liang’s New Wushu

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The Snake River in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. August 2017. Photo by Benjamin Judkins. Given that educational reform is not a very photogenic subject, I have decided to share some images from my recent visit to the Grand Teton range.

 

The Nation and the Sword

Seki Juroji may be one of the most important pioneers of the traditional Asian martial arts who no one has ever heard of.  Gainty (2013) notes that Seki was a successful farmer and swordsmanship instructor from Nagano.  Like many other individuals from his generation, Seki seemed to have been gripped with not just a love of the martial arts (something that I am sure most of us can empathize with), but also a nostalgia for the time of the Samurai.  These attitudes would have a far-reaching impact on Japan’s early 20th century educational reform efforts, and the modern martial arts as we know them today.

At the outset, it should be noted that a love of fencing and a burning nostalgia for the Samurai were not always inseparable traits within Japanese society.  By the end of the Tokugawa period the Samurai class was openly reviled by the majority of Japan’s citizens who viewed them as self-aggrandizing parasites.  Samurai theories of their innate leadership qualities and right to rule did not have a huge amount of support outside of the social circles that produced them.  When the Meiji government finally abolished the Samurai class very few tears were shed.  When the government forcibly closed the urban dojo’s and outlawed the wearing of swords most of Japan’s citizens cheered.  Decades would have to pass before the actual memory of the (often very flawed) flesh and blood samurai could fade and be replaced with a more valuable, and politically useful, nostalgia.

This social hostility towards the remnants of the feudal past was so great that Japan’s traditional martial arts would have to come close to disappearing before any of them could be reestablished on a more forward-looking foundation.  Yet this transition was aided by the fact that by the end of the Tokugawa period quite a few individuals from non-Samurai families had developed an interest in fencing.  G. Cameron Hurst notes that some of the most important instructors of the late Tokugawa period were actually civilians, and it was clearly the enthusiasm of marketplace crowds which reversed Japanese fencing’s slide into oblivion during the 1870s.

In that sense Seki might appear unremarkable.  By the 1890s one could find any number of farmers, brewers, police officer or shop keepers who had developed a new enthusiasm for the blade.  What made Seki different was that he, and a hand full of others who would come after him, not only wished to share this enthusiasm with the rest of Japanese society, they wanted to make it mandatory.  Indeed, Seki believed that the sword was one of the foundations upon which modern (post-Samurai) Japanese society should be built.

In 1893 Seki became the first individual to formally petition the Meiji Ministry of Education to include fencing classes in Japanese public schools.  Citing a type of cultural argument that will be immediately familiar to students of Chinese martial studies, he noted that since the introduction of Western educational and social reforms Japanese society had veered dangerously away from masculine and “military” values towards “literary” and “civilian” ones.  The result was a notable weakening of both the state and society.  Luckily, the situation might be reversed if schools were to adopt mandatory martial arts training.  Seki (who clearly had a stake in this outcome) noted that such a policy would not only improve the physical health of the nation’s students, but would showcase its strength on the world stage.

I have always found that last element of his argument to be fascinating.  Its true that there was a certain degree of global interest in the Japanese martial arts in the 1880s and 1890s, but Seki’s vision was well ahead of the ground swell that would emerge at the turn of the century or (even more intensely) at the time of Japan’s defeat of the Russian empire.  Indeed, the issue of global image may have played a key role in this unfolding drama.  While certain martial artists wished to moderate Western social influences, Japan’s Ministry of Education was very much committed to European (and notably liberal) views on educational theory and school administration.  Potentially dangerous pursuits such as kendo and judo faced an uphill battle within the various ministries.

Gainty observes that this is a critical point too often glossed over in discussions of the state’s relationship with the modern Japanese martial arts.  These practices could not be co-opted as tools to promote nationalism, militarism and loyalty to the imperial house on a national scale until they were inserted into the curriculum of primary and secondary schools around the country.  Yet this was not a plan that the government proposed, envisioned or demanded.  Its technocratic administrators tended to be working from other, more “modern,” models of state development.

Rather, it was the concerted lobbying efforts of individual civilians like Seki that set the stage for what would happen in the 1920s and 1930s.  More specifically, individual reformers teamed with institutions like the Butokukai and the Kodokan to lobby democratic institutions and advance their own vision of the proper relationship between the martial arts and the state.  I don’t think that one could deny that the Japanese arts were eventually “captured” by the state, yet this outcome was actively sought and engineered over the course of decades.

For better or worse, Seki would not live to see the fulfillment of his dream.  He submitted petitions to the Ministry of Education and the Diet (which forwarded his ideas on for further study) multiple times before his death in 1905.  But a number of other reformers took up the cause.  In 1911 both fencing and judo overcame bureaucratic opposition and were approved as elective middle school courses.  From there things flowed more smoothly, with the new classes first spreading to primary schools before being made mandatory for all students in 1931.  At this point Seki’s dream had been achieved.  More Japanese citizens were then studying fencing than had even been the case during the Tokugawa era.  While the sword had once been the soul of the Samurai, now, under state sponsorship, it had become the soul of modern Japan.

Brad and Ethan setting out for the summit. Photo by Benjamin Judkins.

 

New Wushu and Chinese Educational Reform

Its instructive to know something about the relationship between educational reform and the adoption of the martial arts in Japan before discussing the Chinese case.  Clearly Chinese reformers looked to Japanese models when thinking about these issues.  And everyone in the more urbane corners of the Chinese martial arts community was painfully aware of the global prestige that kendo and judo had brought to Japan.  As such, it is not surprising when we see the occasional parallel.  But more instructive are the differences.

Both Japanese and Chinese reformers attempted to introduce the martial arts to primary and secondary school curriculums.  And in both cases they claimed to be concerned with bolstering the cause of nationalism and state strength.  But the process by which these decisions unfolded, and their ultimate success, proved to differ in important ways.

More specifically, the actors in the Chinese cases were more likely to be military or state agents.  The entire process moved much more quickly in China.  Yet these intended reforms never had a chance to deeply penetrate the less developed and more diverse Chinese countryside.

It needs to be stated at the outset that several civil martial arts groups in China were very much in favor of advancing the cause of physical education reform.  And in some ways their arguments about the benefits of the martial arts to the state were not all that different than the arguments that their Japanese counterparts had made a decade or more earlier.  For instance, as Jon Nielson and I have previously noted, the Jingwu (Pure Martial) Association proved to be particularly successful at placing its instructors in local primary and middle schools during the early 1920s.  In that way they influenced much of the up and coming generation of martial artists.  Yet you cannot draw any simple equivalences between this Chinese group and the much longer lived, and more influential, Butokukai.

China had one resource during the Republic period (which was totally missing in Japan) that would have a huge impact on the development of its martial arts.  That was a seemingly limitless supply of independent warlords and KMT generals.  For complex social and political reasons, many of these individuals found that it was in their interest to advance a particular vision of the modern Chinese martial arts as well as the organizations and lineages that inevitably followed.

While not frequently discussed today, one of the most important of these individuals was the then notorious general, traitor and martial arts reformer Ma Liang.   Indeed, Ma plays a somewhat similar role to Seki in that he was one of the first individuals in China to begin to put together successful lobbying campaigns that would lead to the introduction of martial arts classes into the school curriculum and make these fighting systems available for state capture and appropriation.

Where as the ultimate success of Japanese reformers came after two to three decades of effort, the process in China moved much faster.  Given the obvious success of Budo as a domestic strategy and source of global prestige, liberal intellectuals in China probably had a harder time pushing back against these martial reforms.  Indeed, Ma Liang achieved his greatest success as a policy advocate in well under a decade.

As we learned in our previous biographical sketch, the Muslim general began to experiment with educational pedagogy as young infantry officer.  His attempts to create a simplified martial training method seemed to offer good results in the field and would eventually earn him something of a reputation as an educational reformer.  In 1911 Ma’s interests seem to have expanded and he turned his interest from military training to the creation of a more general educational program suited for civilian study.  The outbreak of nationalism and anti-Manchu sentiment following the fall of the Qing dynasty undoubtedly fueled these efforts.  In Ma’s early efforts revolved around a set of four textbooks that were explicitly understood as a modern classroom curriculum rather than a manual of timeless secrets.

By 1914 a number of other martial artists had become involved in this project, and Ma’s followers opened civilian training centers in Jinan, Beijing, Tianjin and other norther cities.  The timing his New Wushu movement was fortuitous.  It capitalized on a general enthusiasm for combat sports among Chinese educational reformers.  Of course, these individuals were not inspired so much by Chinese martial arts as the inclusion of subjects like military drill, fencing, wrestling and boxing in the curriculums of ascendant global powers like Germany and Japan.  The early enthusiasm for combat sports in these countries created an obvious opening for Ma’s own lobbying efforts.

And lobby he did.  In 1916 the Chinese Ministry of Education sent a fact-finding mission to observe the success of Ma’s program in Shandong and study its scalability.  Drawing on his contacts in government and the military Ma succeeded in having his New Wushu program added to the required classes at the national police and military academies in 1917.  It was also made a mandatory class at the new Beijing Normal School to prepare the way for its broader introduction into middle and secondary school classes.  These efforts came to a head in 1918, the same year that Ma released the final edition of his four-volume curriculum.

Finally, in 1919 (only eight years from the start of his lobbying efforts) the Ministry of Education issued a special report titled “Proposals for the Development of Physical Education.”  It called for wushu to be included in the curriculum of all schools and went on to declare that it should comprise “the most fundamental” aspect of China’s physical education.  This was a major win for China’s martial artists, and while other organizations, like Jingwu, had been ramping up their own educational capacity, Ma’s New Wushu program was best positioned to capitalize on this windfall.

It is interesting to consider the greater speed with which these reforms succeeded in the Chinese case.  Obviously, the prior success of Japanese efforts deserves much of the credit.  While Chinese educational reformers were not simply seeking to recreate Budo, the prestige that the Japanese enjoyed internationally would have bolstered their cause and given them some protection from left-wing intellectuals like Lu Xun and Chen Duxiu who were unhappy to see boxing being interjected into school curriculums.

Yet it is also important to note the identities of the “reformers” in the Chinese case.  The Jingwu Association gets much of the credit (and deservedly so) for reforming the TCMA during the Republic era.  And yet under Jingwu, these practices remained essentially the recreational activities of the well-off urban middle class.  The masses would have to wait for Wushu to appear in their local schools.  It seems unlikely that this would have happened as quickly without the efforts of Generals and military figures like Ma Liang.  It was Ma who engineered one of the first successful attempts at a national martial arts curriculum early in this period.  And ultimately it would be the military backed Guoshu Institute (working on the behest of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government) that would ultimately see the project through.

Just as the American occupation of Japan in 1945 reshaped its educational policy towards the martial arts, events in global politics would ultimately undermine the efforts of Chinese reformers.  Specifically, Germany’s defeat in WWI deprived its educational approach of a good deal of luster, and Chinese administrators increasingly looked towards more liberal theories.  Further, the Japanese betrayal of China at the Treaty of Versailles further dampened enthusiasm for the Budo model as the 1920s progressed.

Still, one suspects the core problems that plagued the efforts of Chinese martial reformers were more structural in nature.  Japan was a relatively small and unified state.  Not all of its prefectures were equally developed, and they all had their own rich histories.  But imposing a single educational structure on the country proved to be a manageable and uncontroversial task.  China, on the other hand, is vastly larger in scale.  At various points in the Republic period many provinces were under the control of independent warlords rather than any sort of central government.

The differences in culture, economics and geography between places like the impoverished agricultural regions of Shandong and urban cities like Shanghai in the 1920’s could not have been starker.  There are very good reasons why one area produced occult infused militias (such as the Red Spears) while the other was cultivating a much smaller number of sophisticated and rationalized middle-class physical culture movements (like the Jingwu Association).

It is entirely too easy to think of groups like the Yihi Boxer or the Red Spears as “primitive” while the Jingwu Association is held up as a product of modernity.  But that is not really the case.  All three of these groups represented different social strategies of accommodating the onset of modernity and advanced a specific vision of what a “modern China” should look like.  Indeed, the martial arts are interesting precisely because they have become a site where both the state and various social groups can articulate and contest these visions.  For a fleeting moment in the late 1910s Ma Liang’s vision appeared ready to dominate this national discourse through its attempted capture of the process of educational reform.

A Pika surveys his domain. Photo by Ben Hoppe. Jackson Hole, August 2017.

 

Modernity and the Death of Kung Fu

 

A number of commentators, in China, Japan and the West, have all wondered aloud about the fate of the “traditional” martial arts in the modern era.  Can these social structures survive the demands of a fast-paced economic marketplace or rapid social change?  While I generally think such concerns miss the mark, one must admit that some of the trends are worrying.  Young people in China, Japan and South-East Asia appear to be less interested in seeking out martial arts training than their parents were in the 1980s.  Further, the rise in real estate values and rents is proving to be a serious challenge for traditional schools in cities as diverse as Hong Kong, Singapore and London.  In absolute terms, we have clearly seen a decrease in the number of practicing martial artists over the last generation, though it remains unclear to what degree this is offset by the rising popularity of combat sports like MMA.

Still, a broader historical view may help us to contextualize these trends.  Simply put there was never a golden age in Japan’s feudal past when everyone was a dedicated fencing student.  Nor was there ever a time in China’s history when the country was as full of Kung Fu students as the average martial arts film might lead you to believe.  Prior to the onset of modernity and the attempted capture of these arts by the state, the martial arts tended to be highly specific, rather than universal, skills.

Put differently, the martial arts were a means of earning a living and asserting an identity. That identity tended to be narrowly defined, limited and parochial in nature.  Only a certain class of Samurai retainer specialized in spear fighting.  Another sub-cast specialized in the use of firearms.  And while there may have been some important civilian swordsmanship instructors on the late Tokugawa period, most of their countrymen had no interest in the art and nothing but resentment for the Samurai who dominated the practice.

The situation in China is, as always, harder to resolve.  The sheer geographic variability and historical scope of the subject stymies quick generations. In certain times and places (the Pearl River Delta in the 1840’s) all able-bodied men might well have been pushed into a village militia for fear of the piratical attack and foreign invasion.  In other places and times civilian martial arts training seems to have been much less common, and generally restricted to “bare sticks” and others who stood outside of the realm of “good society.” Yet what is clear is that when individuals took up weapons, the identities that were reinforced tended to be much more narrowly drawn and focus on questions like profession, clan affiliation or village.

These questions of identity are not secondary to the success of the martial arts.  It was only once kendo was reimagined as the heart of the Japanese people (rather than the Samurai), or that Taijiquan became a marker of Chinese culture (rather than residence in Chen village), that stable styles could become a mass cultural phenomenon.  Put slightly differently, it was the spread of Chinese nationalism and identity that made Jingwu a success in the 1920s, just as the same basic forces power the immense domestic market around Taijiquan today.

The number of martial artists in the current era ebbs and flows, just as it has done for decades.  Yet it is important not to mistake the temporary and cyclic outcomes that a given social system produces (which may vary due to trends in global competition, or even the entertainment industry) with a more fundamental change in the nature of the system itself.  Modernity is not a threat to the martial arts as we know and experience them today.  These things are a direct product of the modern nation state system, and that system has allowed for vastly more people to practice these arts than was ever possible in the past.

The question of educational reform in both Japan and China in the early 20th century is interesting as it allows us to focus on a specific moment in history and observe the differential process by which the state sought to co-opt, and then universalize, these systems.  In some cases this process was even promoted by martial arts reformers as it would give them a previously unthinkable ability to influence to development of the modern “national identity.”

Such developments are best understood in the Japanese case.  Yet Ma Liang’s often overlooked career as an educational reformer is equally important.  He helped to pioneer the links between the modern Chinese state and its defacto support of wushu training, something that is now taken for granted.  While his immediate educational successes may have been short lived, and to the best of my knowledge no one currently practices his New Wushu, Ma’s memory still casts a long shadow over the relationship between the Chinese martial arts and the state.

 

The author standing under a natural stone bridge at the first summit in the series. Photo by Benjamin Judkins.

 

oOo

If you enjoyed this post you might also want to see: Kung Fu is Dead, Long Live Kung Fu: The Martial Arts as Voluntary Associations in 20th Century Guangzhou

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Research Notes: The Big Knife and Ma Liang’s Attempted Comeback

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A captured Chinese dadao being held by a Japanese soldier. Note the unique saw back blade. Source: Author’s Personal Collection.

 

Given that it is a holiday weekend, I will be keeping this research note brief.  Still, the subject matter is quite interesting.  China’s Republic era dadao, or big knives, generate a good deal of interest among both historians and practical martial artists.  They also played a role in the development of General Ma Liang’s career as a martial arts reformer.

In some ways that is a bit surprising.  The general’s troops were often Muslim and hailed from impoverished areas of Northern China.  Of course these were exactly the sorts of individuals that would win fame as they faced down the Japanese army along the Great Wall in 1933, or slightly later in famous Marco Polo Bridge incident.  Stories of such exploits went a long way towards explaining the general enthusiasm for the dadao among China’s civilian martial artists during the early 1930s.

Yet the dadao itself was not really part of General Ma’s highly structured “New Wushu.”  One may skim his four textbooks (published in their final form in Shanghai in 1918) and not see any hint of his eventual big knife movement outlined below.  Ma was certainly interested in swords, and fencing was an integral part of his system.  For reasons which I have never completely understood his training method seems to have focused on the jian (traditional straight sword) rather than the more militarily accessible dao (saber).  Yet that did not stop the enterprising general from heavily promoting the dadao as he searched for a route back into the center of China’s martial arts community during the 1930s.

In our ongoing series, we have already reviewed a number of Ma’s accomplishments.  A basic overview of his life can be found here, as well as more specialized discussions of his role in promoting the martial arts as part of educational reform and the organization of the first national Wushu tournament.   Most of the General’s great successes came in the late 1910s and early 1920s when public enthusiasm for the martial arts was at its peak, and it appeared that there was a decent chance that his New Wushu program would begin to appear in school curriculums around the country.

However, international and domestic politic trends attenuated these early successes.  After the explosion of the New Culture Movement, martial artists of all stripes struggled to articulate how their practices might contribute to the development of a modern, strong China.  Yet the wheel of fate is always turning.  Other geopolitical developments would breath fresh life into China’s martial arts community and the General’s flagging career as a martial art reformer.

The 1931 Mukuden incident was the event that cast doubt on the New Culture Movement’s prior attacks on the martial arts and their role in educational reform.  This social shock was further compounded in 1932 when the Japanese installed a puppet regime in Manchuria, touching off a wave of nationalist fervor in China.  The latent associations that had been forged between the Chinese martial arts and notions of nationalism in the 1910’s were reawakened.  This led advocates of the “National Essence” approach to call for the promotion of modernized and militarized versions of the martial arts (both in schools and the general civilian population) as a counterweight to the fear of further Japanese aggression against China’s cities and economic centers.

General Ma, while still discussed in newspaper articles, found himself to be increasingly marginalized during the late 1920s.  This became clear with the formation of the KMT’s new Guoshu (National Boxing) Institute.  While Ma was eventually asked to join, he played a comparatively minor role as an “educational reform” expert.  The sudden swing in public opinion in the early 1930s presented him with an opportunity to restore a measure of public leadership.

The following articles illustrate two of his activities during this period.  First, Ma seems to have become more involved with the promotion of the KMT’s Guoshu program.  Secondly, Ma began to formulate his own plans for the creation of a civilian network (or militia) armed with dadao, capable of repelling the advance of Japanese infantry through cities (or at least making it costly).  It should be noted that Ma was far from the only martial arts reformers in the 1930’s to have this same “good idea.”  Many individuals, at both the local and national level, were spreading similar schemes.  During the 1930’s the dadao became something of a defacto symbol of the state and Chinese military strength, and the nation’s answer to the more famous Japanese katana.  Multiple specialized manuals were published, and a huge number of local martial arts instructors began to assemble their own systems to teach the weapon.

I have yet to discover the ultimate fate of Ma’s dadao network.  Maybe it never got off the ground.  Still, it is interesting to read a somewhat detailed outline of how one of these groups might have been organized.

It should also be noted that these efforts were well enough known that they began to attract the attention of the English language press.  Indeed, the stories that appeared in these newspapers during the early 1930s set the stage for China’s “Kung Fu Diplomacy” efforts after 1937 as the country appealed for military aid in the face of a much broader Japanese advance.

 

A Japanese private holding a captured Dadao sometime between 1931 and 1936. Source: Author’s Personal Collection.

 

 

Art of Self Defense Urged by Ma Liang

Genera Ma Liang, Mohammedan leader in China, urged every Chinese citizen to learn and practice Chinese boxing and swordsmanship which he said is necessary for the building of a strong China in the future, during a lecture at a [illegible] party given in his honor by General Chang Chih-chiang, director of the National Boxing Training Institute at 24 Weihaiweai Road yesterday at noon.

Following the lecture, performances in Chinese boxing and swordsmanship were given by 20 students of the Mohammedan general which won applause from the audience.

“The Art of Self Defense Urged by Ma Liang.” The China Press, Feb. 18, 1933. P. 8

 

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Wide Training in Big Sword Use is Planned

Students to be enlisted from all nation for Nanking course

Many already applying to join movement

Nanking, March 23. –(special)—People from the whole country will be trained in the use of the “big sword” which has proved its usefulness as a weapon against the Japanese, according to a move just started by General Ma Liang, Mohammedan Leader of China.

The move aims at the organization of a “National Big Sword Army” to begin at Nanking.  The idea of the Mohammedan leader has met with enthusiastic response as scores of young Chinese have registered their names with the central Boxing and Swordsmanship Training Bureau asking to be members of the Big Sword Army under organization.

According to the scheme laid down by General Ma, Nanking will be divided into eight districts, each to have one company of the Big Sword Corps.  All who join the organization will be required to undergo boxing training in the Central Boxing and Swordsmanship Training Bureau before being taught the use of the big swords.

The organization of the Big Swords Corp will gradually spread to all cities and the countrysides throughout the nation until people of the whole country are equipped with and thoroughly trained in the use of the big sword as an effective weapon.

“Wide Training in Big Sword Use is Planned: Students to be Enlisted” The China Press. March 24, 1933.

 

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If you enjoyed this research note you might also want to read: Bridges and Big Knives: The Use of the “Big Knife” saber in the Chinese Republican Army by Brian Kennedy

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Do Martial Arts Create Just Societies?

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For ten years I have been polishing this sword;
Its frosty edge has never been put to the test.
Now I am holding it and showing it to you, sir:
Is there anyone suffering from injustice?

-“The Swordsman” by Jia Dao (Tang dynasty).  Trans. Liu, 1967.

 

“Abe Lincoln may have freed all men, but Sam Colt made them equal”

     -Post-Civil War advertising copy for Colt Firearms.

 

Introduction

I have always been interested in the social effects of the martial arts.  More specifically, might the spread of voluntary associations which focus on violence (and preparing individuals for it) make society better off?  Such a question is interesting precisely because it is not easily solved.  There are the seemingly counterfactual cases in which we hear about the benefits that come from putting at “risk youth” in boxing programs, or integrating taijiquan into the therapy plans offered to homeless individuals.  And if we have learned nothing else from martial arts studies, it is that a wide variety of individuals who have encountered these fighting systems have reported an increased sense of empowerment and health.  Indeed, the popularization of traditional fighting systems (initially from Asia, but more recently Europe and Latin America as well) has sparked the creation of multiple cottage industries.

Yet demonstrating that certain individuals have been empowered by the spread of a hand combat system is not the same thing as proving that society itself is actually better off.  As a historian it is not all that difficult to locate instances in which the spread of martial arts has preceded social disasters.  The case of the Boxer Rebellion springs to mind.  While certain marginal individuals may have been empowered by the Yihi movement, they immediately turned their new found strength against other marginal groups in the Chinese countryside, most notably Chinese Christians.  What resulted was anything but “just.”  And while many Chinese villages have turned to martial arts trained militias for basic defense and security, the bandits that have always been the scourge of the countryside also drew on their own (often identical) martial training in the perfection of their criminal vocation.

None of these issues are unique to China.  I note them simply because I spend much of my time thinking about this particular case.  Indeed, various rulers during the Qing dynasty seem to have wrestled with this quandary.  Some early imperial edicts cautiously endorsed the notion of the martial arts for communal self-defense, whereas other emperors noted (possibly correctly) that these practices caused as much trouble as they solved, and that the only true pathway to social peace was to be found in rectifying the self and the family.  Similar versions of this paradox can easily be found in European, African or American history.

Still, I am not sure that framing this issue solely as a historical question really gets us to the root of the problem.  As a social scientist, I have always been more interested in the patterns of outcomes rather than singular discrete events.  Historical examination may be the main means by which we can test our hypothesis as to when, and under what circumstances, the martial arts lead to good outcomes.  Yet we can have no hypothesis without first developing a theory, a baseline set of expectations about the many ways that martial arts and society interact.

Shi Jin, the Nine Dragoned (Kyûmonryû Shishin), from the series One Hundred and Eight Heroes of the Shuihuzhuan (Suikoden hyakuhachinin no uchi). 19th century Japanese Woodblock print.

 

Theories of Justice

 

This returns us to our opening quotes.  Many individuals have heard some variant of the statement “God made men, and Sam Colt made them equal.” It is the kind of statement that fits nicely on a bumper sticker and seems to capture something about the insecurities that run through American society.  More is at stake in this assertion than just the question of gun ownership.  The original version of this statement was released as an advertising slogan by Colt in the years following the conclusion of the Civil War.  By focusing on the political actions of Abraham Lincoln, rather than the inscrutable ways of an all omniscient being, it suggested a paradox about the nature of justice, and even the notion of the common good.

Before we can actually delve into the relationship between the fighting arts and justice, we must know more about this later concept.  Given that my background is in the social sciences rather than political theory, I am sure that there are others who could go into the subject in much greater detail.  Yet anyone who has looked at the literature on justice in even a cursory way will be forced to acknowledge that it is both one of the most fundamental, but also most contested, concepts in Western thought.  For instance, many of the partisan debates that periodically paralyze democratic states are actually about what a just or “fair” society looks like.

Ancient Greek philosophers defined justice as a state of social harmony that resulted from everyone properly adhering to their place in society, even if those roles were radically unequal.  So in Greek thought a society with legal slavery could still be “just.”  Justice maximized social rather than individual utility.  In later medieval and early modern thought notions of justice multiplied.  Concepts like the “social contract” and “natural rights” came into play.  Equality, rather than simply harmony, became the mark of a just society.

And yet societies tend to be radically unequal places.  What rights can we really claim, and who enforces them?

Clearly there are negative rights.  Abraham Lincoln might declare that one had the right not be a slave.  Yet in a society built on overt discrimination, this minimal assertion did not free African-Americans to participate in their communities or live a life free from violence.  These additional rights to social, political and economic equality might be thought of as “positive rights.”  Ironically, rather than turning to the government to enforce such rights, the Colt firearms company claimed that they could be ensured only through the consumption of their products.  Indeed, the one right that everyone seems willing to fight for in a capitalist system is the ability to purchase products promising a better tomorrow.  Still, this quip suggests that both private and public actors have weighed in on the provision of justice, a point that we will return to at the conclusion of this essay.

As distasteful as Colts advertising slogan may have been in the wake of the Civil War, it all makes a certain amount of sense.  Historically speaking the United States was a “weak state” both before and after the Civil War.  It had little in the way of a standing army and the federal government’s ability to actually enforce social outcomes at the local level was very limited (as the largely stalled process of Reconstruction demonstrated).  What the Colt quote seems to tacitly acknowledge (and even romanticize) is that during the 19th century many citizens were effectively living in a system of “self help” of the sort commonly encountered in international relations theory rather than domestic politics.  Still, it is worth asking what a just society would have looked like in the abstract.  Would anyone opt for the martial arts, or even Colt’s revolvers, if given a choice.

We cannot bring up the question of social contracts and the theoretical choices that might lead to a more just society without introducing John Rawls (1921-2002).  In 1971 he released a book titled A Theory of Justice, further developing an important paper that he had published in the late 1950s.  Rawls’ work, designed as a response to utilitarian philosophers, has generated many critiques and an immense secondary literature.  As such, it cannot be said to be the last word on these questions, but it is probably the most important work in American philosophy written during the second half of the 20th century.  The nature of current debates in American society suggest that this might be a good time to revisit Rawls, and the structure of his thought experiment makes him particularly useful when it comes to evaluating the the social utility of the martial arts.

Rawls’ work is based on an abstract and ahistorical thought experiment designed to determine what sort of society most people would prefer if they had no idea what position they would eventually be forced to occupy within it.  To simplify what is a very nuanced argument, he claimed that to understand what actual justice looks like, we need to take a step back from the assurances and strengths that we derive from our own lives.

Rawls noted that many distributive gains within an economy accrue to individuals not because of their hard work, but because of accidents of birth.  He argued that the key predictor of an individual’s success in life was the position of their parents, and that simple statistics suggest that true instances of “self-made millionaires” are in fact so rare as to be statistically insignificant.  Yet we are very emotionally attached to these narratives, and that attachment simply complicates our efforts to build a more just society where everyone has an opportunity to succeed regardless of their circumstances of their birth.

This does not mean that Rawls advocated for absolutely equality.  He noted that situations of inequality could make society better off.  For instance, the creation of modern medicine requires the accumulation of vast amounts of capital, knowledge and professional expertise.  That is a good thing and it has vastly improved everyone’s quality of life.  Likewise, most of us would prefer that our political leaders would be given greater authority, and that the best individuals should be selected for the job.  That almost always means paying them more than the average civil servant.

Discussions about justice are debates about society, and all societies are unequal.  Yet they are not all unequal in the same way.  Rawls suggested that inequality in outcomes should be permitted, and even encouraged, if the resulting surplus is used to benefit all members of society, including the least well off, more than a pure redistribution of wealth would.  So the creation of some sort of medical industry would be almost certainly be “just,” even if leads to rich doctors and hospital administrators, whereas the local warlord collecting “taxes” from merchants wishing to use “his” roads is not.  The question really gets down to the provision of public versus private benefits.

Assuming that individuals are basically rational, but risk averse, Rawls proposed that when covered by a “veil of ignorance” most of us would choose a notion of justice (and hence social structure) that would advantage the least fortunate members of society.  In the real world (something that was purposefully excluded from Rawls thought experiment) this might look like a typical European welfare state.  And I am sure that Sweden is a very nice place to live.  But would we choose to live in a society with martial arts?

This is where the inclusion of real world elements into an otherwise abstract thought experiment gets tricky.  Let us begin by accepting, at least in broad terms, that Rawls’ original thought experiment would yield something approaching a just (or at least “more just”) society.  But upon adding the weight of history and real world constraints, his subjects now know that the societies that they will be born into will be, in some respects, fundamentally unjust.  Given a choice, would they prefer to be born into a mundane society with martial arts, or without?  Can the existence of these fighting systems help us to move towards the sort of society that Rawls imagined?

Answering this question turns out to be more difficult than one might think.  To begin with, most of the testimonies in favor of the transformative nature of these fighting systems come from those that practice them.  Indeed, it stands to reason that those who would have the most to gain from the martial arts would also be those who invest the most in them.  Thus our attempts to understand their impact in purely empirical terms will likely always suffer from a type of selection bias.

Rawls spoke directly to this point in his 1971 text.  He noted that individuals derive unearned benefits from all sorts of circumstances of birth that go well beyond the frequently discussed categories of gender, race and socioeconomic status.  Raw physical talent is nothing that anyone inherently deserves, yet some people are born with it in abundance.  Likewise intelligence, disability or age (the timing of our birth) are other factors that we cannot control. All of these circumstances can contribute to unearned rents or hardships that a just society must consider.

While a logical argument cant be made that both Samuel Colt’s revolver and the martial arts might contribute to greater sense of fairness or equality in society, I think that we need to give an edge to the martial arts in the case of a Rawlsian thought experiment.  In our modified version of his “original position,” all individuals know that they will be born into an unjust society.  Yet to paraphrase Dostoyevsky, while all just societies are basically the same, each of their opposite numbers might be unjust in their own unique way.  Cloaked in the veil of ignorance we do not know which set of injustices we will face.

If the problem is open violence and private warfare, Samuel Colts vision of equality may have something going for it.  Which is not to say that individuals do not, and have not, turned to the martial arts in the face of individuals and community violence.  Yet these fighting systems are fundamentally social in nature, and that gives them a huge added measure of flexibility in facing other types of challenges.  What if we emerge from the original position to find that we face some other sort of violence?  The social networks created by martial arts associations can be used to gather information about potential employment or to defray risks for those facing economic injustice.  Cultural inequality can be combated through the creation of new status hierarchies or the preservation of “intangible cultural heritage.”  The regular practice of certain arts might lead to better physical health, or the creation of “social capital” as different sorts of individuals are brought together under a single roof in a new type of community.

Yet Rawls would remind us that not all individuals will become martial artists.  Indeed, whether we can partake in these activities again comes down to questions that we do not directly control.  These include our economic status, age, level of physical ability and the randomness of access to preexisting martial arts networks.  The real questions revolve around those who do not, or cannot, practice.  Are they better off living in a society in which the martial arts thrive and consume scarce resources?

One suspects that the answer to this question will vary quite a bit.  Further, the specific ways in which the martial arts interact with both the local and national community may be quite important.  If the martial arts are treated as private goods, used to advance the interests of narrowly drawn social factions, I am not sure that there is any reason to assume that they will contribute to justice.  When the Triads have controlled a large percentage of the local martial arts schools, the broader community has generally seen these practices as a blight on the neighborhood, even if a group of independent martial artists existed who actively resisted the criminal element.  In general the weakest members of society were made no better off by this privatization of violence.  Indeed, many were probably left much worse off.

In other cases the equation seems to balance quite differently.  When the state is strong and able to resist organized criminal groups, the martial arts are less likely to become a tool of community exploitation.  That same state may also subsidize the cost of martial arts practice, or make it available to a wider range of people with many levels of ability, in an attempt to promote either public health or national identity.  Both these can be thought of as public goods that advantage everyone (and not just those in the expanded pool of practitioners).  Less money being spent to control age related chronic illnesses means more health dollars for those facing other challenges.  And while nationalism has proved be a double edged sword, people crave the sense of belonging that healthy communities generate.

Statue with Sword and Wine Gourd. Another figure in China’s long tradition of eccentric warrior-sages. Source: Vintage German Postcard.

Conclusion

 

Can the martial arts contribute to the creation of a just society?  The answer seems to be, “It depends.”  A strictly empirical student might dismiss such a finding as really no improvement over a deep dive into the historical record.  As the introduction of this essay established, the relationship between popular fighting systems and justice has been debated for centuries.

Yet examining this question through the theoretical lens provided by John Rawls has helped to sharpen our thinking in a number of ways.  To begin with, we often ask the wrong questions when attempting to evaluate the social impact of the martial arts.  Rather than simply asking about the relatively small group of people who self-select to join a school or association, Rawls reminds us that we need to ask about the outcomes for the rest of society as well.  Secondly, by evaluating strategies for distributive justice by modeling their impact on the most marginal members of society, Rawls encourages us to think much more carefully about the classes of “public goods” (or “bads” in the form of negative externalities) that the martial arts might produce.

Traditionally, when evaluating the martial arts, we have focused our attention on either the “philosophy” of the group in question, or possibly the motivations and actions of its members.  An alternate focus on their ability to produce public goods suggests that such strategies have fallen short of revealing the full picture.  To understand outcomes we must instead think much more carefully about the relationships between these groups and either the state or the society that supports them.  It is this set of structural constraints that will really determine whether the martial arts produce public goods, and hence a more just society.  A detailed examination of the relationship between the martial arts and the concept of “public goods” will be the subject of an upcoming essay.

 

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If you enjoyed this essay you might also want to read: Do the martial arts unite or divide us? Kung Fu and the production of “social capital”

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